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Abstract

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition (DSM-5) promises a refined definition of mental disorder, which is tantamount to acknowledging that prior DSM definitions have failed to clarify what mental disorder is and why a person should be considered mentally disordered. Since the DSM promotes the position that what is actually the matter, as in medicine generally, is an impersonal, anonymous affliction, the universe of considerations that goes along with thinking about an individual as a person becomes ancillary at best. Incorrect diagnosis of mental disorder present is a form of person negation, with unlimited possible iatrogenic consequences. The new definition, like the old, is simply a form of double-talk. The American Psychiatric Association continues to be unconcerned with the practical consequences of person negation.

Keywords

person-talk versus disorder-talk subjectivity person negation social violence

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Mental Disorder or “Normal Life Variation”? Why It Matters

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