Based on an analysis of the reports of twenty-eight national-level public commission inquiries into events involving ethno-national violence—drawn from five national contexts and arrayed over the course of the twentieth century—this article demonstrates the strikingly transnational character of these investigatory bodies’ attempts to authoritatively explain episodes of collective violence and to thereby restore governing legitimacy in the wake of violent crises. One of four distinct “logics,” or core explanatory frameworks, each associated with a particular mode of “racial power,” characterized a diverse cross-national pool of violence commission reports during defined periods of the twentieth century. In revealing globally encompassing logics to what has often been framed as a national or case-specific phenomenon, the author shows how global ideational currents compose a key dimension of national political dynamics.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. "Letters: Sartre on Amnesty," New York Review of Books, Vol. 20 No. 6, April 19, 1973.
2.
South Africa, Commission of Enquiry into the Riots in Durban, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Riots in Durban (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1949), 6.
3.
United States, National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, To Establish Justice, to Insure Domestic Tranquility: The Final Report (New York: Praeger, 1970), xix.
4.
I use the term in a manner akin to Claire Jean Kim, who suggests that "racial power operates not only by reproducing racial categories and meanings per se but by reproducing them in the form of a distinct racial order." Bitter Fruit: The Politics of Black-Korean Conflict in New York City (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 10.
5.
The classic account of British royal commissions is H. M. Clokie and J. W. Robinson, Royal Commissions of Inquiry; The Significance of Investigations in British Politics (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1937).
6.
Quoted in A. Todd, On Parliamentary Government in England: Its Origin, Development and Practical Operation (London: Longmans Green, 1867).
7.
See T.J. Cartwright, Royal Commissions and Departmental Committees in Britain: A Case Study in Institutional Adaptiveness and Public Participation in Government ( London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1975 ).
8.
In the mid-1930s, a scholar of the British royal commission wrote that "such has been the wide extension of their [Commissions of Inquiry] use that the Dominions . . . may be regarded as more definitely committed to this procedure than Great Britain herself." H. M. Clokie, "Introduction," in A Finding-list of Royal Commission Reports in the British Dominions, ed. Arthur Cole and Hugh Clokie (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1939).
9.
Quoted in C.J. Hanser, Guide to Decision: The Royal Commission (Totowa, NJ: Bedminster Press, 1965).
10.
For a discussion, see Oz Frankel, States of Inquiry: Social Investigations and Print Culture in Nineteenth-century Britain and the United States ( Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).
11.
See Robert Merton, "Social Knowledge and Public Policy: Sociological Perspectives on Four Presidential Commissions," in Sociology and Public Policy: The Case of Presidential Commissions, ed. M. Komarovsky (New York: Elsevier, 1975).
12.
See, e.g., Hanser, Guide to Decision. Claims about commissions’ democratic character are often made by commission members themselves. See, e.g., David Linowes, Creating Public Policy: The Chairman’s Memoirs of Four Presidential Commissions (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998).
13.
For a recent example, see Jonathan Simon’s argument that American presidential commissions can foster the ability of the public to "speak truth to power," thus enhancing the accountability of state officials, "Parrhesiastic Accountability: Investigatory Commissions and Executive Power in an Age of Terror," Yale Law Journal 114, no. 6 (2005): 1419-58.
14.
Joshua Toulmin Smith, Government by Commissions Illegal and Pernicious: The Nature and Effects of All Commissions of Inquiry and Other Crown-appointed Commissions: The Constitutional Principles of Taxation: And the Rights, Duties, and Importance of Local Self-government (London: S. Sweet, 1849), 17.
15.
For a discussion, see Clokie and Robinson, Royal Commissions of Inquiry.
16.
For instance, as D. H. Borchardt put it in a study of Australian royal commissions, "It cannot be stressed sufficiently that Royal Commissions of inquiry and similar investigations are in the first place political instruments used by the government of the day for its own ends, be that to exculpate itself, to nail political enemies to the cross, or to clean up an Augean stable in a government bureau or department." Commissions of Inquiry in Australia: A Brief Survey (Melbourne: LaTrobe University Press, 1991), 55.
17.
Beatrice Webb, The Diary, Vol. 2, 1892-1905 (London: Virago, 1983), 25. Webb later served on the 1905 British Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, to which she submitted a famously powerful dissenting report.
18.
Michael Lipsky , "Protest as a Political Resource," American Political Science Review62, no. 4 (1968): 1144-58.
19.
Legal scholar Liora Salter notes, "Policy-seeking lends itself to ‘horse-trading’ in fashioning recommendations." "The Complex Relationship between Inquiries and Public Controversy," in Commissions of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise, ed. Allan Manson and David Mullen (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003).
20.
Michael Lipsky and Daniel Olson, Commission Politics: The Profiling of Racial Crisis in America ( New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1977).
21.
Adam Ashforth , The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth-century South Africa (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1990).
22.
I have not attempted to condense the corpus of cross-national commission literature into these notes but rather have selected an illustrative sample. On national uniqueness, for instance, one study of Indian commissions notes that though based on a British model, "The inquiry by the commission under the Indian Act is a class by itself and is perhaps unique in the whole world. There can be no comparison with any other inquiry or by any other agency as regards object, purpose, nature, method and result." J. Sarkar Sarma, Commissions of Inquiry: Practice and Principle (New Delhi, India: Ashish, 1990).
23.
Commission scholars focused on a particular nation often refer to shared historical roots but discount the possibility of cross-national comparisons by invoking claims of differences in political systems. Many draw on a logic consistent with K. C. Wheare’s classic study of government committees in Britain: "The administrative function of committees in local government in Britain is not capable of being understood apart from the context of the nature and status of local authorities in the constitution of the country." Government by Committee: An Essay on the British Constitution (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1955).
24.
Lipsky and Olson’s excellent aforementioned account of American riot commissions-which analyzes federal, state, and local commissions-asserts that they must be understood, in part, in the context of America’s unique history of race relations.
25.
For instance, the informal procedures that govern how the members of American presidential commissions are appointed have shifted over the twentieth century from almost exclusive control by the executive to a process involving greater congressional input.
26.
David Kettler , "Was Adam Smith a Reaganite?" (unpublished manuscript). http://www.bard.edu/contestedlegacies/kettler/works.shtml (accessed September 15, 2008).
27.
Numerous exemplars can be found in Anthony M. Platt, ed., The Politics of Riot Commissions, 1917-1970: A Collection of Official Reports and Critical Essays (New York: Macmillan, 1971). For an illuminating analysis of the depoliticization of violence in a local commission, see Robin Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction: The City of Philadelphia versus MOVE (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
28.
There is broad agreement that control over "legitimate" violence is fundamental to state power and that states are reluctant to enter into routine public negotiations concerning the boundaries of official violence. This dual proposition can be seen in Max Weber’s classic statement of the relationship of violence to the state: "The state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e., considered to be legitimate) violence. If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be." H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 78.
29.
This includes royal commissions in Australia and Canada, presidential commissions in the United States, federal investigatory commissions in South Africa, and both royal commissions and tribunals of inquiry in Britain. For more information on the tribunal model, see note 67.
30.
I use the term ethno-national to include the common early-century tendency to treat national heritage as a marker of one’s behavioral dispositions. Such tendencies are particularly evident in the debates surrounding "German national culture" during World War I. See, e.g., Émile Durkheim, "Germany Above All": German Mentality and War (Paris: A. Colin, 1915).
31.
For a discussion of these trends, see chap. 3 of my 2008 doctoral dissertation, "Redrawing the Color-line: How National Commissions Explained Collective Violence in the Twentieth Century" (PhD diss., University of California, Davis, 2008).
32.
South Africa, Witwatersrand Disturbances Commission, Report of the Witwatersrand Disturbances Commission (Pretoria : Government Printing and Stationery Office, 1913), 61.
33.
Timothy Keegan , "Gender, Degeneration and Sexual Danger: Imagining Race and Class in South Africa, ca. 1912," Journal of Southern African Studies 27 no. 3 (2001): 460.
34.
To be sure, there are a number of borderline cases-particularly in the postwar period-when, as I discuss, commissions often sought to minimize the language of ingrained racial or ethnic differences. In general, to be included, a commission had to (a) be rooted in a violent event or events explicitly acknowledged to have a racial or ethnic component and/or explicitly address ostensible differences between racial or ethnic groups, (b) specifically address violent events and/or the nature of "legitimate" violence, and (c) involve a violent act or allegation of abuse committed against more than a single individual. Thus, commissions broadly concerned with "Aboriginal peoples" were excluded if they did not explain discrete violent events; commissions were included if their initial impetus was explicitly tied to violent events that explicitly involved an ethnic character and/or if it directly addressed the legal limits of state violence. Category c was employed because acts of violence against a single person are far more likely to be traced to individual wrongdoers-and thus unlikely to call governing legitimacy into question.
35.
Also excluded is the second Bloody Sunday Inquiry, in Britain. More than a decade after its appointment and as of this writing, the inquiry had not released its final report.
36.
For a discussion, see Margaret Somers and Fred Block, "From Poverty to Perversity: Ideas, Markets, and Institutions over 200 Years of Welfare Debates," American Sociological Review 70, no. 2 (2005).
37.
Throughout my discussion, I reproduce, in quotations, the terminology used in the report itself to describe the groups or individuals in question. Given my focus on logics of explanation, my descriptions of events also entirely rely on the reports themselves and are not attempts to assess the accuracy of their claims.
38.
The Bondelzwarts resided within former German South West African territory, which had been parceled out to South Africa under the terms of the Versailles Treaty.
39.
South Africa, Commission on the Rebellion of the Bondelzwarts, Report of the Commission on the Rebellion of the Bondelzwarts (Cape Town: Cape Times Government Printer, 1923), 1.
40.
The commission also investigated the possibility that Morris’s travels to the Bondelzwarts were part of a "plot" organized by an "agitator" who happened to reside in nearby South African territory.
41.
Ibid., 32.
42.
Ibid., 2.
43.
Ibid., 3-5.
44.
Ibid., 18.
45.
See especially pp. 24 and 27 in Australia, Royal Commission into the Affray at Goaribari Island, Report of the Royal Commission on the Affray at Goaribari Island, British New Guinea (on the 6th of March, 1904) Together with Proceedings, Minutes of Evidence, and Appendices (Sydney: W. A. Gullick, Government Printer, 1904).
46.
As the commission wrote, "Any analogy between the duty of a Constable and a criminal . . . and that of a high Government authority in dealing with an offending member of an alien, though subject, race would be a false one." Ibid., 24.
47.
Great Britain, Palestine Royal Commission, Report of the Palestine Royal Commission (Geneva, Switzerland: League of Nations, 1937), 117.
48.
Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1994).
49.
Palestine Royal Commission, Report of the Palestine Royal Commission, 117.
50.
The specific events mentioned involved clashes that arose in the midst of a funeral procession for a Jewish resident who had allegedly been killed by an Arab resident.
51.
In the commission’s view, the Arab population was most in need of developmental guidance and financial assistance. But even the Jewish population, the commission asserted, was not prepared to accept the consequences of full independence.
52.
Ibid., 375.
53.
Ibid., 373.
54.
Howard Winant, "Race and Race Theory," Annual Review of Sociology 26, no. 1 (1990): 169-85. On a similar turn in anthropological theory, see Lee D. Baker, From Savage to Negro: Anthropology and the Construction of Race, 1896-1954 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
55.
This is not to imply that it was only social scientists who were involved in the report. The commission members were drawn from the "usual" commission suspects- prominent politicians, business leaders, heads of educational institutions, and so on. Similarly, lawyers were employed as staff or consultants. Nevertheless, in reading the report, the social scientific influence is sharply evident.
56.
For a discussion of Myrdal’s influence generally, see David Southern’s excellent work, Gunnar Myrdal and Black-White Relations: The Use and Abuse of an American Dilemma, 1944-1969 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987).
57.
For a brief overview and extension forward to Bill Clinton’s racial initiatives, see Claire Jean Kim, "Clinton’s Race Initiative: Recasting the American Dilemma," Polity 33, no. 2 (2000): 175-97.
58.
United States, Kerner Commission and T. Wicker, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam, 1968), 2.
59.
Ibid., 1, emphasis added.
60.
Officially, the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.
61.
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, To Establish Justice, 61.
62.
The commission remarked that government action alone would not solve the problem and that "the need is not so much for the government to design new programs as it is for the nation to generate new will." Kerner Commission, Report of the National Advisory, 412. But the centricity of government action was clear throughout the report, as when the commission noted in closing that the "principal burden for funding the programs we have proposed will fall upon the Federal Government" (455).
63.
Though the Eisenhower Commission was more explicit in its attribution of pathology to dissenting groups, so too was Myrdal critiqued (most famously by Ralph Ellison) for characterizing black culture as a pathological response to white oppression. Such convergences in the treatment of marginalized groups led Historian Hugh Davis Graham to describe the collective ethos of the late 1960s commissions as embodying a pluralistic perspective which "viewed the behavior of mass society in social-psychological terms of anomic pathology, like suicide and crime, which reflected the failure of the uprooted and alienated to adjust to rapid social change." "On Riots and Riot Commissions: Civil Disorders in the 1960s," Public Historian 2, no. 4 (1990): 17.
64.
The use of judicial rhetoric was common among commissions or tribunals organized in the context of violence in Northern Ireland during this period. Several British scholars accordingly characterized the quasi-judicial mode of legitimation as the dominant representation of "official discourse" of the era. See Frank Burton and Pat Carlen, Official Discourse: On Discourse Analysis, Government Publications, Ideology and the State (London: Routledge, 1979). By contrast, at roughly the same time, American scholars were suggesting that quasi-social scientific narratives were the central mode of legitimation in riot commission discourses. Although the split between the two modes did not hold over historical time, the rapid transition from one mode to another, in combination with the temporal unevenness of commission appointments, unquestionably bolstered the conclusion that commissions are national in character.
65.
Dating at least from 1960, South African violence commissions were overwhelmingly composed of a single judicial member-as was the 1972 British Tribunal into the events of Bloody Sunday. All of the Australian and Canadian violence commissions appointed during the post-1975 period either were headed by or had a majority of members who hailed from the legal profession.
66.
Australia, Laverton Royal Commission, Report of the Laverton Royal Commission (Perth: William C. Brown, Government Printer, 1976), 83.
67.
The Tribunal of Inquiry, which emerged in its modern form in Britain in the 1890s, is an explicitly quasi-judicial body that has typically been used to investigate specific allegations of malfeasance in government. Given this organizational structure, one might be led to wonder how it could produce anything but a logic of misrule or correction. But this is precisely the point: the choices governments make in determining which form of investigation to appoint are-like the explanatory logics-embedded within dominant ideas concerning what "caused" violence and the legitimacy of particular modes of explanation. For a history of the tribunal, see George W. Keeton, Trial by Tribunal: A Study of the Development and Functioning of the Tribunal of Inquiry (London: Museum Press, 1960).
68.
A fourteenth civilian later died from injuries sustained.
69.
In the tribunal’s words, "Some are wholly acquitted of complicity in such action; but there is a strong suspicion that some others had been firing weapons or handling bombs in the course of the afternoon and that yet others had been closely supporting them."
70.
The use of paraffin tests as evidence of discharging a weapon had been controversial at least since the early 1960s, when they played a controversial role in the investigation of John F. Kennedy’s assassination.
71.
This is the first major conclusion in the Widgery report, which is reproduced in J. P. Widgery and Stationery Office, Bloody Sunday, 1972: Lord Widgery’s Report of Events in Londonderry, Northern Ireland, on 30 January 1972 (London: HMSO, 2001).
72.
There are numerous critiques of the tribunal on these grounds; perhaps one of the most devastating is a 1997 report of the Irish government, which proceeds through the report on a nearly line-by-line basis. See Ireland, "Bloody Sunday and the Report of the Widgery Tribunal." http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/index.asp?docID=206 (accessed September 15, 2008).
73.
The attempt to bring history and politics into the equation is well exemplified by the Irish Republican Socialist Party’s response to the tribunal: "Blood stained the pavements and barricades of Free Derry because . . . the minority within this artificial six county statelet had been denied their basic human rights since the inception of Stormont, which in turn had its roots based in eight hundred years of British military, cultural and economic interference." Derry Irish Republican Socialist Party, Sunday Bloody Sunday (Derry, UK: Starry Plough Publications, 1978).
74.
Laverton Royal Commission, Report, 201. The Laverton Commission took its rhetorical cue, at least in part, from a prior investigation into the events which had been appointed by the government of Western Australia. That investigation took an explicitly "social" approach to explanation. See Joint Laverton Study Group, Report of the Laverton Joint Study Group (Perth: William C. Brown, Government Printer, 1975).
75.
Introduction to volume 2, part C, The Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. The report is available, as of September 15, 2008, at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/rciadic/
76.
Elena Marchetti , "Critical Reflections upon the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody,"McQuarrie Law Journal5 (2005): 103-25.
77.
For a discussion of "centers of gravity" as an analytic tool, see chap. 1 of Patrick Carroll’s Science, Culture, and State Formation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). My conceptualization of commissions’ explanatory logics also drew inspiration from John R. Hall’s account of "cultures of inquiry." Cultures of Inquiry: From Epistemology to Discourse in Sociohistorical Research (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
78.
A recent account in this vein from the New York Times suggested that commissions follow a "well-practiced routine": press conferences are held, members toast one another and receive thanks from the president, and the report is promptly relegated to a dusty shelf in the archives. David E. Rosenbaum, "Ideas and Trends: Commissions Are Fine, but Rarely What Changes the Lightbulb," New York Times, October 30, 2005.
79.
Robert Centa and Patrick Macklem, "Securing Accountability through Commissions of Inquiry: A Role for the Law Commission of Canada," in Commissions of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise, ed. Allan Manson and David Mullen (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003), 83. 80. The report did refer to engaging in an ideological battle overseas and contained vague assessments of policies toward specific foreign countries. But it articulated no distinct vision of American foreign policy. The specificity of its account left it virtually no grounds for doing so.
80.
Indeed, even the Johnson administration did not foresee the Kerner Commission’s outcome. Johnson was reportedly disgruntled that the commission failed to recognize the positive impact of his administration’s War on Poverty programs and that it failed to recognize the political sacrifices he had made in supporting the passage of civil rights legislation. He mentioned the report in only a scant few public commentaries after its release.
81.
Hanna Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1970), 75.
82.
The terminological reference is to James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed ( New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
83.
See Baker, From Savage to Negro.
84.
Commission of Enquiry into the Riots in Durban, Report, 12.
85.
Royal Commission into the Affray at Goaribari Island, Report, 24.
86.
This commission is difficult to classify. I listed it as a "compensation" commission since that was precisely its function. The commission was similar to a logic of misrule insofar as it de facto assumed that the federal government was responsible for damages sustained. But it cannot be classified as a logic of misrule because, first, the commission demurred from assessing who or what was responsible for the riots; it simply assumed the compensatory role (a separate commission analyzed immigration and discussed white fears in light of apparently increasing immigration rates, but it, too, avoided directly assessing the causes of the "riots"). Second, it treated the Japanese residents of Vancouver not as Canadian citizens or residents but as citizens of Japan. Since Japanese residents were seen as foreign nationals, there was no correlative body of recommendations suggesting the deepening of government efforts to effectively communicate its civilizing aims to them.
87.
Canada, Department of Labour and W. L. M. King, Report by W. L. Mackenzie King, Commissioner Appointed to Investigate into the Losses Sustained by the Japanese Population of Vancouver, B.C. on the Occasion of the Riots in That City in September 1907 (Ottawa, Canada: S. E. Dawson, 1908), 24.
88.
South Africa , Indian Enquiry Commission and W.H. Solomon, Report of the Indian Enquiry Commission (London: HMSO , 1914).
89.
Great Britain, Parliament, The Irish Uprising, 1914-1921: Papers from the British Parliamentary Archive (London: HMSO, 2000), 12, 23.
90.
Ibid., 83.
91.
South Africa, Rebellion Inquiry Commission and J. H. Lange, Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Causes of and Circumstances Relating to the Recent Rebellion in South Africa and Minutes of Evidence December, 1916 (Cape Town: Cape Times Limited Government Printers, 1916), 74.
92.
South Africa, Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Enquire into the Causes of, and Occurrences at, the Native Disturbances at Port Elizabeth on the 23rd October, 1920, and the General Economic Conditions as They Affect the Native and Coloured Population (Cape Town: Cape Times Ltd., 1921).
93.
Commission on the Rebellion of the Bondelzwarts, Report, 32.
94.
This commission is difficult to classify. It faulted agents of the police, the military, and a nonstate organization (the Ossewa-Brandweg), so it cannot be considered a logic of misrule that centrally focused on the actions of individual agents of the state. It did, however, fault the Ossewa-Brandweg, in part for its failure to adhere to traditional "Afrikaaner values," so it cannot be considered a logic of correction. It is also interesting to note that although in the 1916 Commission on the Rebellion in South Africa the "well-known characteristics of the Dutch people in South Africa" were considered antidemocratic, in this 1941 commission, and as the government was seeking unity concerning its support of England in World War II, the "Dutch people" were suggested to be inherently democratic.
95.
South Africa, Commission to Enquire into Riots in Johannesburg on 31st January and 1st February 1941 and S. H. Elliot, Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into Riots Which Took Place in Johannesburg on 31 January, 1941, and 1st February, 1941 (Cape Town: Cape Times Ltd., 1941).
96.
South Africa, Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Disturbances of the 30th August, 1947, at the Moroka Emergency Camp, Johannesburg, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances at Moroka, Johannesburg on the Twentieth August, 1947 (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1947).
97.
Commission of Enquiry into the Riots in Durban, Report, 13.
98.
South Africa, Commission Appointed to Enquire into Acts of Violence Committed by Natives at Krugersdorp, Newlands, Randfontein and Newclare, Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into Acts of Violence Committed by Natives at Krugersdorp, Newlands, Randfontein and Newclare (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1950), 11.
99.
South Africa, Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Witzieshoek Native Reserve, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Witzieshoek Native Reserve (Parow: Cape Times Ltd., 1951).
100.
M. A. Diemont, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Events in Langa Location, District of Wynberg, Cape of Good Hope, on 21st March 1960 (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1960), 11.
101.
For a thorough discussion of the commission, see Philip H. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity: Sharpeville and Its Massacre (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001).
102.
South Africa, Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Events on the 20th to 22nd November, 1962 at Paarl and the Causes Which Gave Rise Thereto (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1963), 2, 13.
103.
Kerner Commission, Report, 203, 266.
104.
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, To Establish Justice, xiii, 61.
105.
United States, President’s Commission on Campus Unrest, The Report of the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1970), 93.
106.
See South Africa, Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to the University of the North and J. H. Snyman, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to the University of the North (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1975).
107.
South Africa, Commission of Inquiry into the Violence Which Occurred on 29 October 1983 at the University of Zululand and A. J. Middleton, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Violence Which Occurred on 29 October 1983 at the University of Zululand (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1985).
108.
South Africa, Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Incident Which Occurred on 21 March 1985 at Uitenhage and D. D. V. Kannemeyer, Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Incident Which Occurred on 21 March 1985 at Uitenhage ( Cape Town: Government Printer, 1985 ).
