Most researchers agree that the role of money in politics is important, however, there is no agreement on the extent to which money influences electoral outcomes and governmental policies. One reason for this discord is that the existing research concentrates on aggregate level studies. Therefore, this literature cannot tell us anything about the effects of money on individual decision-making. Only recently have spatial models, which examine the interactions of individual decisions within an institutional context, begun to consider the importance of money and politics. However, as the case with most spatial models, there are no existing "real-world " data to test the hypotheses that are derived. Consequently, researchers have relied on laboratory experiments to test the robustness of these models. This essay presents a series of experiments that examine the effects of advertising and political contributions in a sequential spatial election game, given that candidates have equal resources and their positions are fixed. These conditions model the classical prisoner's dilemma game in which both candidates would be better off if they cooperated and choose not to advertise. The results showed that candidates who advertised the most, generally won the most elections.
Austen-Smith, D.
(1987). Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting. Public Choice, 54(2), 123-140.
2.
Banks, J. S.
(1990). A model of electoral competition with incomplete information. Journal of Economic Theory, 50, 309-325.
3.
Baron, D. P.
(1989). Service-induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 45-72.
4.
Bental, B.
, & Ben-Zion, U. (1975). Political contributions and policy: Some extensions. Public Choice, 24, 1-12.
5.
Ben-Zion, U.
, & Eytan, Z. (1974). On money, votes, and policy in a democratic society. Public Choice, 14, 19-42.
6.
Brock, W.
, & Magee, S. (1980). Tariff formation in a democracy. In J. Black & B. Hindley (Eds.), Current issues in commercial policy and diplomacy (pp. 1-9). London: Macmillan.
7.
Calvert, R. L.
(1985). Robustness of the multidimensional voting model: Candidate motivations, uncertainty, and convergence. American Journal of Political Science, 29, 69-95.
8.
Calvert, R. L.
(1986). Models of imperfect information in politics. Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Press.
9.
Chappell, H. W.
(1982). Campaign contributions and congressional voting: A simultaneous profit-tobit model. Review of Economics and Statistics, 64, 77-83.
10.
Chappell, H. W.
(1989). Campaign advertising and political ambiguity. Department of Economics Working Paper, University of South Carolina.
11.
Collier, K. E.
, McKelvey R. D., Ordeshook, P. C., & Williams, K. C. (1987). Retrospective voting: An experimental study. Public Choice, 53, 101-130.
12.
Collier, K. E.
, Ordeshook, P. C., & Williams, K. C. (1989). The rationally uniformed electorate: Some experimental evidence. Public Choice, 60, 3-29.
13.
Coughlin, P.
, & Nitzan, S. (1981). Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting. Journal of Economic Theory, 24, 226-239.
14.
Crain, W. M.
, & Tollison, R. D. (1976). Campaign expenditures and political competition. Journal of Law and Economics, 19, 177-188.
15.
Davis, O. A.
, DeGroot, M., & Hinich, M. J. (1972) Social preference orderings and majority rule. Econometrica, 40, 147-157.
16.
Davis, O. A.
, & Hinich, M. J. (1966). A mathematical model of policy formation in democratic society. In J. Bernd (Ed.), Mathematical applications in political science, II (pp. 175-208). Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press.
17.
Davis, O. A.
, Hinich, M. J., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1970). An expository development of a mathematical model of the electoral process. American Political Science Review, 64, 426-448.
18.
Denzau, A. T.
, & Munger, M. C. (1986). Legislators and interest groups: How unorganized interests get represented. American Political Science Review, 80(1), 89-106.
19.
Downs, A.
(1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
20.
Enelow, J. M.
, & Hinich, M. J. (1982). Nonspatial candidate characteristics and electoral competition. Journal of Politics, 44, 115-120.
21.
Enelow, J. M.
, & Hinich, M. J. (1984). The spatial theory of voting: An introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22.
Fiorina, M.
, & Plott, C. R. (1978). Committee decisions under majority rule: An experimental study. American Political Science Review, 72, 575-598.
23.
Frendreis, J.
, & Waterman, R. (1985). PAC contributions and legislative behavior: Senate voting on trucking deregulation. Social Science Quarterly, 66, 401-412.
24.
Ginsberg, B.
, & Green, J. (1986). The best Congress money can buy: Campaign contributions and congressional behavior. In B. Ginsberg & A. Stone (Eds.), Do elections matter? (pp. 75-89). Armonk, NY: Sharpe.
25.
Glantz, S.
, Abramowitz, A., & Burkart, M. (1976). Election outcomes: Whose money matters?Journal of Politics, 38, 1033-1038.
26.
Grenzke, J. M.
(1989). PACS and the congressional supermarket: The currency is complex. American Journal of Political Science, 33(1), 1-23.
27.
Harrington, J. E., Jr.
(1988). The revelation of information through the electoral process: An exploratory analysis. Working Paper, Johns Hopkins University.
28.
Hinich, M. J.
(1977). Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact. Journal of Economic Theory, 16(2), 208-219.
29.
Hinich, M. J.
, Ledyard, J., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1973). A theory of electoral equilibrium: A spatial analysis based on the theory of games. Journal of Politics, 35, 154-193.
30.
Hinich, M. J.
, & Munger, M. C. (1989). Political investment, voter perceptions, and candidate strategy: An equilibrium analysis. In P. C. Ordeshook (Ed.), Models of strategic choice in politics (pp. 49-87). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
31.
Hotelling, H.
(1929). Stability in competition. The Economic Journal, 39, 41-57.
32.
Jacobson, G. C.
(1978). The effects of campaign spending in congressional elections. American Political Science Review, 72, 469-491.
33.
Jacobson, G. C.
(1985). Money and votes reconsidered: Congressional elections, 1972-1982. Public Choice, 46, 7-62.
34.
Jung, J.
, & Cameron, C. (1990). Signaling by interested parties and the spatial theory of elections: An exploratory analysis. Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Economic Science Association/Public Choice Society, Tucson, AZ.
35.
Kau, J. B.
, & Rubin, P. (1982). Congressmen, constituents, and contributors. Boston: Martinus Nijihoff.
36.
Kau, J. B.
, Keenan, D., & Rubin, P. (1982). A general equilibrium model of congressional voting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97, 271-293.
37.
Ledyard, J.
(1984). The pure theory of large two-candidate elections. Public Choice, 44(1), 7-14.
38.
Ledyard, J.
(1989). Information aggregation in two-candidate elections. In P. C. Ordeshook (Ed.), Models of strategic choice in politics (pp. 7-30). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
39.
Matasar, A. B.
(1986). Corporate PACS and federal campaign financing laws. New York: Quorum Books.
40.
McKelvey, R. D.
, & Ordeshook, P. C. (1982). Two-candidate elections without majority rule equilibria: An experimental study. Simulation & Games, 13, 311-335.
41.
McKelvey, R. D.
, & Ordeshook, P. C. (1985a). Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources. Journal of Economic Theory, 36(1), 55-85.
42.
McKelvey, R. D.
, & Ordeshook, P. C. (1985b). Sequential elections with limited information. American Journal of Political Science, 29, 480-512.
43.
McKelvey, R. D.
& Ordeshook, P. C. (1990). A decade of experimental research on spatial models of elections and committees. In J. Enelow & M. Hinich (Eds.),Advances in the spatial theory of voting (pp. 99-144). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
44.
Miller, G.
, & Oppenheimer, J. A. (1982). Universalism in experimental committees. American Political Science Review, 76, 561-574.
45.
Page, B. I.
(1976). Choices and echoes in presidential elections. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
46.
Page, B. I.
(1978). The theory of political ambiguity. American Political Science Review, 70, 742-752.
47.
Palda, K. S.
(1975). The effects of expenditures on political success. Journal of Law and Economics, 18, 745-771.
48.
Palfrey, T. R.
(1989). A mathematical proof of Duverger's law. In P. C. Ordeshook (Ed.), Models of strategic choice in politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
49.
Plott, C.
(1967). A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule. American Economic Review, 57, 146-160.
50.
Plott, C.
(1987). Rational choice in experimental markets. In R. M. Hogarth & M. W. Reder (Eds.), Rational choice: The contrast between economics and psychology (pp. 117-143). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
51.
Selten, R.
(1978). The chain store paradox. Theory and Design, 9(2), 127-159.
52.
Shepsle, K. A.
(1972). The strategy of ambiguity: Uncertainty and electoral competition. American Political Science Review, 66(2), 555-568.
53.
Silberman, J.
, & Durden, G. C. (1976). Determining legislative preferences on the minimum wage: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 84, 317-329.
54.
Smith, V. L.
(1976). Experimental economics: Induced value theory. American Economic Review, 66, 274-279.
55.
Smithies, A.
(1941). Optimum location in spatial competition. Journal of Political Economy, 49, 423-439.
56.
Snyder, J.
(1989). Election goals and the allocation of campaign resources. Econometrica, 57(3), 637-660.
57.
Welch, W. P.
(1981). Money and voting: A simultaneous equation model. Public Choice, 36, 209-234.
58.
Welch, W. P.
(1982). Campaign contributions and legislative voting: Milk money and dairy price supports. Western Political Quarterly, 35, 478-495.
59.
Wilhite, A.
, & Theilman, J. (1987). Labor PAC contributions and labor legislation: A simultaneous logit approach. Public Choice, 53, 267-276.
60.
Williams, K. C.
(1991). Candidate convergence and information costs in spatial elections: An experimental analysis. In T. R. Palfrey (Ed.), Laboratory research in political economy (pp. 113-135). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
61.
Wilson, R. K.
(1986). Results on the condorcet winner: A committee experiment on time constraint. Simulation & Games, 17(2), 217-243.
62.
Wittman, D.
(1983). Candidate motivation: A synthesis of alternative theories. American Political Science Review, 77, 142-157.
63.
Wright, J.
(1985). PACS, contributions and roll calls: An organizational perspective. American Political Science Review, 75, 400-414.
