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Abstract

This study expands the parameters of the classic Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) by testing an infinite-choice, continuous-time paradigm. A total of48 subjects were presented with a scenario that maintained the structural aspects of the PD but allowed them to choose from an infinite number of cooperation levels and required them to make their choices continuously rather than at discrete points in time. Cooperation levels for each subject and the strategies the subjects employed were analyzed along with total points received and the dynamic properties of their choice behavior Results indicated that the predominant over-time behavior was one of oscillatory cooperation levels, that players tended to match their opponents' behavior, and that initial cooperation level bore no relationship to final outcome.

Keywords

computer simulation cooperation experimental gaming joint decision making Prisoner's Dilemma

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Cooperation in an Infinite-Choice Continuous-Time Prisoner's Dilemma

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