This article provides an updated survey of recent advances in game-theoretic analyses of terrorism. In particular, it investigates the government's allocation of a fixed budget to counter attacks against potential targets. The choice between proactive and defensive countermeasures is addressed, along with the impact that domestic politics has on this choice. Other topics include the interaction between political and militant factions within terrorist groups, the role of asymmetric information, and game-theoretic analysis of suicide terrorism. Throughout, the article highlights surprising results from the application of game theory. Unanswered questions are also indicated.
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