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Abstract

This article addresses how the legacy of the conflict known as the Troubles affects how we conceive of and respond to terrorism and political violence (TPV) on the island of Ireland. It will focus on how dominant frameworks such as those that emerged after 9/11 led to what has become a two-tiered system of counterterrorism and counter extremism: one for Troubles-linked extremism and one for Islamic-linked extremism. Focusing on issues of ideology, radicalization, motivation, legislation, and particularly prison regimes, this article will examine how Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland frame and respond to TPV. In addition, this article will highlight how, what is termed Preventing Violence Extremism (PVE) and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), manifests in Ireland in response to pre- and post-9/11 instances of TPV and, finally, how lessons from Ireland might be relevant for addressing political violence beyond the island.

Keywords

extremism Ireland PVE CVE terrorism

Introduction

Since 2001, the 9/11 attacks have become the lens through which we view terrorism and political violence (TPV; Douai & Lauricella, 2014). The attacks led to a reorganization of national security priorities whereby terrorism became perceived as the strategic threat to many Western countries. However, this threat was seen as emerging predominantly from terrorism linked to Islam that manifest as Al Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and their affiliates. Perhaps one of the most significant impacts of the Al Qaeda attacks in the United States in 2001 was the broad acceptance that Islamic-linked terrorism was a de facto phenomenon rather than an evaluation based on political and cultural (and pejorative) narratives (Jackson, 2007). The 9/11 attacks shaped counterterrorism and later counter-extremism laws and policies, entirely influenced by the perception that an extremist Islamic ideology was one of the (if not the) main issues to be addressed in responding to and preventing terrorism (Roach, 2011). This framing was largely adopted wholesale in the literature on terrorism and we developed what might be regarded as tunnel vision; groups such as Al Qaeda and later ISIS grabbed the headlines in 2001 and have never really receded, even when other ideological forms of extremism should have captured our attention (Ahmed & Lynch, 2021). The continued existence and rise of TPV linked to other ideologies, such as separatism (Ahmed & Lynch, 2022), the far right (Koehler, 2021; Schuurman, 2015), single issue attacks, and nationalism (Horgan & Morrison, 2011) has suffered comparative neglect in the years since 2001.

Perhaps even more relevant in the framing of the terrorist threat is the recent work by Koehler (2021) on side switching, where he focuses on the surprisingly common process of extremist actors¹ changing sides or effectively switching their ideology to that of their once outgroup; in other words, his work demonstrates the fluidity of ideology as a motivator and an explainer of terrorism and extremism. In effect, he points out that categorizing TPV into definitive categories (e.g., Islamic, nationalist, or right wing) based on a loosely defined ideology is problematic. His work demonstrates as fallacy the notion that ideology serves to explain one’s motivation to get involved in TPV and, particularly, how problematic responding to TPV based solely on ideology can be. Despite this, ideology remains a central framework for our understanding of TPV and this is particularly visible in the assumptions inherent in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) initiatives, as will be discussed later.

In light of these conditions, this article addresses how terrorism is conceived of and responded to in Ireland. In particular it will examine how dominant frameworks, such as those that emerged after 9/11, led to what has become a two-tiered system of counterterrorism and counter extremism; one for TPV linked to the conflict in Northern Ireland, known as the Troubles, and another for post 9/11 political violence linked to Islam. In addition, this article will highlight how what is termed PVE and CVE manifests in Ireland in response to pre- and post-9/11 TPV and, finally, how lessons from Ireland might be relevant for addressing terrorism outside of the island.

Setting the Scene—The Troubles

The island of Ireland has for long experienced TPV, predominantly linked to the constitutional status of six counties in the North East of the island. These counties, known collectively as Northern Ireland, were partitioned in 1921; they became part of the United Kingdom, while the remaining 26 counties formed what ultimately became the Republic of Ireland (English, 2003). The status of these six counties has been contested ever since and this contestation manifests as a conflict known colloquially as the Troubles; the violence lasted from 1969 to 1998 when more than 3,500 people were killed and approximately 80,000 injured (Breen Smith, 2012). The Troubles occurred predominantly, but not exclusively, in Northern Ireland; the Republic of Ireland, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Gibraltar all experienced violence linked to the conflict. During the Troubles, paramilitary groups were broadly aligned with either a nationalist ideology or a loyalist ideology and violently clashed with each other and the British state. Loyalists sought to maintain the status quo, a two-jurisdiction partitioned island, with six counties being part of the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) and 26 counties forming the Republic of Ireland; nationalists sought (and seek) a 32-county united Ireland.

The sectarian violence of the Troubles largely ended with the signing of The Peace Process or the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (Northern Ireland Office, 1998). While there was a significant reduction in violence, the paramilitary groups did not disband (Zeiger & Aly, 2015), nor did they cease all of their activities (e.g., fundraising, criminality; Jupp & Garrod, 2022; Marchment et al., 2020). The legacy of the Troubles is very much alive for criminal justice organizations in Ireland, both North and South. The legacy is a prominent criminal justice issue not only because of the extent of victimization among the population, but also the continued activities of paramilitary groups, the ongoing sectarianism across communities, and continued, albeit significantly reduced, violence (McGinty et al., 2007). Despite the very current issues faced on the island linked to the Troubles, oftentimes the conflict is framed as over but also as qualitatively different from political violence witnessed elsewhere in recent times (Duyvesteyn, 2004). Political violence and terrorism linked to the Troubles is often dismissed as being unique to that time and place and not necessarily of relevance to how we understand or respond to terrorism post 9/11 (English, 2019; Smith & Zeigler, 2017: see, for example, Holmer et al., 2018).

Perhaps one of the most striking differences with how the Troubles is imagined in the literature is the broad recognition that the political context, rather than the individual characteristics of the participants, is predominantly relevant for our understanding of the violence (English, 2003; Ferguson, 2017; Moghaddam, 2006). This is particularly obvious when we compare how radicalization—a framework that focuses predominantly on the individual—became the main framework for explaining Islamic-linked violent extremism post 9/11. In addition, the assumption that ideology can and should dominate how we frame the motives and justifications for violence was never prominent in the discourse on Northern Ireland—it was long understood that personal and family history, discrimination, victimization, opportunity, and grievance were important in understanding the emergence of division and engagement in violence (Ferguson & McAuley, 2019). Importantly, the nuance applied to how we conceive of the origins of the Troubles in Northern Ireland had a very significant impact on how we imagined peace might be achieved. The Peace Process was not primarily focused on the individual actors who engaged in violence, but more broadly on rights, governance, and policing, reflecting the societal origins of the conflict and the societal solution. As Neil Ferguson points out, in the case of Northern Ireland, there was an understanding that “with changes in the political context, people of violence can become peacemakers” (Ferguson & McAuley, 2020, n.p.)

Post 9/11 and a New Terrorism

The impact of 9/11 and the construction of the threat of Islamic-linked violent extremism (Powell, 2011) has had a formative and lasting effect on the field of terrorism studies (Silke, 2006). One of the most important yet problematic concepts to emerge in an effort to explain the emergence of groups, such as Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and later ISIS, apart from the assumption of ideological uniformity among these groups, is radicalization (Abbas, 2019). Radicalization as an explanatory term emerged in its current format in the early years after 9/11 (Borum, 2011) and represented the belief that there is some identifiable process that leads from moderation to extremism that can be used to explain involvement in and/or support for terrorism. Newman (Schmid, 2016) pointed out that the term radicalization is used as a catchall to explain what happens before the bomb goes off. Regardless of its vagueness and tautological underpinnings, radicalization is perhaps one of the most widespread and problematic concepts to gain purchase in academia and policy circles. In a general sense, it tells us everything but specifies nothing—with the exception that it is predominantly applied to Islamic-linked violent extremism and not other forms of terrorism. While the term has fallen out of favor to some degree in recent years, the impact of its centrality on CVE and PVE initiatives has not (Koehler, 2017).

At a general level, preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) is focused on developing interventions based on identifying individuals who are likely to engage in violent extremism, as well as working with individuals who are already involved in TPV. Importantly, the assumption that we can somehow intervene successfully in the pre-criminal space, and that we can know who may or may not be likely to engage in TPV, as well as the assumption that we can encourage desistance and even de-radicalization underpins this approach. Each of these issues is hugely complex and even problematic in its own right, and lessons from criminological research have much to offer here about the fallibility of such assumptions, but this discussion is beyond the scope of this article (Bjorjo, 2016; Goldberg et al., 2017). Ultimately, P/CVE is part of the spectrum of counterterrorism tools available to state and non-state actors, however, the spaces in which the interventions take place and the actors involved are oftentimes community-based rather than directed or funded by state entities (Lehane, 2017).

As mentioned, the use of the P/CVE label is relatively new; however, the work of preventing engagement in TPV and, more broadly, conflict prevention and resolution has a long history in the form of community policing initiatives (McEvoy & White, 2012), community/state partnerships, peace building, and youth work. The use of the terms P/CVE emerged predominantly as a response to Al Qaeda and later ISIS and related violence, and this manifestation of extremism was singled out for mention in the Counter-Terrorism Strategy of the European Union (EU) as the main terrorist threat to the EU (Council of the EU, 2005). It follows then that the focus of this approach is informed by the research on Islamic-linked extremism, which relies heavily on frameworks of radicalization and the danger of outsider threats. While increasingly P/CVE is seen as a universal response to all instances of politically motivated extremism, it is still heavily focused on groups and individuals claiming an Islamic ideology, albeit with the far right increasingly featuring. What this means for jurisdictions such as Ireland, where other types of political violence never went away, is that the wandering eye of TPV research creates a void where the experiences of and lessons from the Troubles are relegated to history, or seen as different to or separate from political violence in other contexts. This has led to a reinvention of the wheel when it comes to preventing and countering terrorism post 9/11 and effectively a two-tiered and separate system for dealing with political violence perpetrated by individuals and groups. Underpinning this difference are assumptions of causality linked to ideology and immigration on one hand and history, culture, and the state on the other.

The State of Play—TPV on the Island of Ireland

Prior to further discussing TPV on the island of Ireland, it is worth considering the level of political violence experienced in both jurisdictions. Gathering data is not a simple process—the categorization of events as TPV or TPV linked is not a routine designation. While in Northern Ireland the labeling of an event as security related gives an idea of the number of TPV incidents, no such designation exists in the Republic. In the latter case, the occurrence of acts of TPV can usually only be inferred from the nature of the charge, the referral to a particular court, or committal of an individual to a particular prison wing. These data issues, particularly in the Republic of Ireland, are in addition to ongoing problems faced by researchers investigating crime topics separate to political violence (Hamilton, 2019). These problems are due in large part to the fact that the relevant data are not categorized in a way conducive to identifying incidences of TPV, alongside the lack of a central location for the data, and the way offenses are charged in the criminal justice system. Taken together, this makes the process of identifying the incidences of TPV on the island complex to say the least.

To get an overview of the cases of TPV, it was necessary to access databases and reports from official U.K. and Irish sources, Europol, and the academic and gray literature. In many cases, the time spans for recording data were different (January–January vs. April–April) and the data itself were inconsistent. What follows is an imperfect account of terrorism and terrorism-related incidences on the island. As mentioned, the TPV data from Northern Ireland is categorized as security-related, making it easier to identify TPV events, but the data from the Republic were not categorized in a meaningful way and so court data, police data, and Europol data were used to infer TPV relevance.

From April 2020 to March 2021 in Northern Ireland, there were three security-related deaths, 15 bombing incidents, 41 shooting incidents, 39 paramilitary style assaults, 18 paramilitary style shootings, and 105 individuals arrested under terrorism legislation (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency [NISRA], 2022). The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2021 reported that the United Kingdom (Great Britain and Northern Ireland) listed 62 attacks in 2020: three successful and two failed Jihadist attacks in GB and 56 security incidents (39 shootings and 17 bombings, 79 arrests). The discrepancies between the reports in this case can be attributed to the time frames for reporting. There were no jihadist attacks reported in NI.

There were no terrorist attacks reported in the Republic of Ireland in 2020 or 2021. There was one case of prosecution for membership of a proscribed organization (linked to the Troubles) and multiple prosecutions for explosives-related offenses, which can be inferred to be likely linked to the situation in Northern Ireland. From the annual police report (An Garda Síochána) 2020, it is stated that the police mounted several intelligence-led anti-terrorism operations but no further details are available. The Central Statistics Office produces reports based on police data, and they list the type of offense (e.g., weapons, explosives) but give no information on any linkage to TPV. Perhaps the most telling (but still very problematic) official data are from the Director of Public Prosecution annual report, which detail the breakdown of indictments in the Special Criminal Court (all terrorism and organized crime offenses are automatically referred to the Special Criminal Court for trial). In its 2020 report, there were 26 cases prosecuted in the Special Criminal Court. The EU (TE-SAT) 2021 Report provides further information as it states that in 2020 there were 18 arrests for Islamist-linked activity—these are mostly linked to one prominent case of a returnee from Syria (Lisa Smith) and these were predominantly financing offenses. There were six other arrests noted as separatist ethno-nationalist. Adding to this information, in the 5 years to 2021, media reports detail that there were 30 arrests for Islamic-linked extremist activities in the Republic of Ireland (Gallagher, 2022).

The figures listed here, flawed as they are, demonstrate that in the United Kingdom and Ireland, TPV is overwhelmingly linked to ethno-nationalist/separatist/Troubles-related activity. Right-wing extremism does feature in the reporting from the United Kingdom, but there is no mention of this in the Republic of Ireland, save one arrest in 2022 (The EU TE-SAT Report, 2022), but this is likely an issue of categorization rather than incidence (see, for example, the work of Ahmed & Lynch, 2021, on the definition and classification of Right-Wing Terrorism). Despite this, the counter extremism frameworks for preventing terrorism and radicalization are overwhelmingly focused on Islamic-linked extremism. As discussed in the following, the threat perception in the Republic is revealed in a recent statement to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) where minority communities are referenced in relation to counterterrorism and counter-extremism strategies. Furthermore, the migrant integration strategy (Department of Justice, 2017) speaks of the risk of radicalization and how mitigating this risk is focused on minority integration and societal participation. Hence, despite the ongoing incidents of violence linked to the Troubles, approaches to and conceptualization of PVE and CVE in Ireland and Northern Ireland are heavily influenced by European approaches (see, for example, the work of Radicalisation Awareness Network [RAN]) to counterterrorism and counter extremism, rather than being cognizant of the realities of TPV on the island of Ireland. This demonstrates the influence of post-9/11 frameworks on how we evaluate risk, respond to perceived threats, and conceive of intervention strategies for PVE and CVE.

Countering Terrorism and CVE in Ireland, North and South

Despite the ongoing threat of Troubles-linked extremist violence in Northern Ireland, PREVENT, a pillar of the United Kingdom’s counterterrorism strategy (Home Office, 2018), does not apply in the region; in Northern Ireland, responsibility for counterterrorism sits with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. In 2015, Teresa Villiers stated, through parliamentary questions, that the primary function of Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST; including PREVENT) is international terrorism, not domestic-related terrorism, which is seen as the principal threat in Northern Ireland (U.K. Parliament, 2015) and that a similar delineation exists in the Republic of Ireland (see the following). However, there is a vast array of P/CVE-type work ongoing in Northern Ireland, much of which is carried out by local community organizations and many of those involved in the work were involved in the conflict or spent time in prison during the Troubles (Clubb, 2016). Interventions include youth diversion schemes, restorative justice projects, cross-community integration projects, and neighborhood renewal initiatives (McEvoy & White, 2012). Much of this work overlaps with generic crime prevention interventions but the unique history of community division and the post-conflict environment shape these interventions in a manner unique to the region. In addition to the jurisdictional issues, a significant issue for P/CVE type interventions in Northern Ireland is the role of the state as an actor in the violence of the Troubles. The inherent lack of trust in the state and state agencies, including the police, mean that initiatives to prevent extremism led or funded by the state could be treated with extreme skepticism by some communities, given the role of the British army, Royal Ulster Constabulary, and M15 in the conflict (see, for example, Operation Kenova and the case of the Miami Showband Killings; Travers & Featherstonhaugh, 2007). This is perhaps a useful example of the chasm between national security imperatives around terrorism prevention and local realities on the ground (Lehane, 2017). These lessons could have significant value for recent manifestations of CVE and PVE, given the sense of grievance that exists in some communities regarding their treatment by agencies of the state post 9/11 (Bah, 2006).

While the legacy of the Troubles presents similar complexities for counterterrorism and counter extremism in the Republic of Ireland, there are fundamentally different mechanisms for dealing with the issue on the island. Counterterrorism in Ireland is dealt with at the national level, incorporating policing (operational and intelligence), military intelligence, resources available through diplomatic missions abroad, community engagement (through policing) and engagement with international institutions and academic area experts. Much like the United Kingdom, there is a distinction between what is termed by the Department of Justice as domestic (Troubles-linked) terrorism and international terrorism, with the issue of ideology and radicalization being specifically noted as relevant in the case of the latter (Department of Justice, Ireland, 2022). This division between domestic and international terrorism is also manifest in the legislation that exists to tackle extremism, with the main body of legislation developed to tackle domestic political violence, being the Offences against the State Acts 1939-1998, whereas more recent legislation, such as the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005, was developed in response to international terrorism, although both acts apply regardless of the origins of the perpetrator.

In a recent statement to the UNSC, some key elements of the Irish counter-extremism strategy/practice were revealed. In the statement, the current Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Simon Coveney, referred to the relationship between human rights violations and radicalization and terrorism. He further mentioned the role of poverty and discrimination as underlying causes of terrorism and the need to have a community partnership approach to P/CVE. He went on to say that seeking to strengthen Ireland’s capacity to prevent terrorism was a priority for the country (Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland, 2021). While this multipronged approach is to be lauded, in another recent statement to the UN, the reality of Ireland’s P/CVE strategy was revealed to be focused on minority communities and led by community-policing Ethnic Liaison Officers. Radicalization was only referred to in the context of minority communities and mirrored the language often used in the United Kingdom to refer to British Muslims who engage in terrorism—homegrown extremists. There is no reference to Troubles-linked violence despite the ongoing threat from dissident republican and loyalist groups (Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), 2021; Hourigan et al., 2018). Similar sentiments are found in the U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Ireland (2017) where it is pointed out that the Garda Racial Intercultural and Diversity Office (GRIDO) coordinates, monitors, and advises on at-risk (of radicalization) populations. The report also confirms that the Irish government pursues its CVE strategy through the Ethnic Liaison Offer program of An Garda Síochána, demonstrating that extremism is seen as a minority community issue. This of course has implications for how security services will respond to the next iteration of extremism, how the next ideological manifestation will be responded to, and how it might fit the frameworks currently in place.

Despite the narrow focus on counter extremism as detailed in such statements, there is a very active civil society community in Ireland doing what looks like P/CVE work. This work involves violence prevention interventions, peace building, women’s groups, cross-border initiatives, mental health interventions linked to the experience of the troubles, trauma-focused work, education initiatives, victims’ testimony work, and economic interventions with local businesses (see, for example, the work of Glencree Centre for Peace and Reconciliation). However, despite the impact of the Troubles on the entire island, activities are mostly carried out at a community level in the border counties. Funding that could be seen as having a P/CVE remit has been available since the 1980s from the Government of Ireland under its anti-sectarianism and reconciliation funding through the Department of Foreign affairs. This funding is still available and its aim is to support reconciliation and to create better understanding between people and traditions on the island of Ireland and between Ireland and Britain (Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland, 2021).

P/CVE in Northern Ireland is a topic that appears in the academic literature in various guises (community activism, cross-community projects, reconciliation, and peace building); for example, work by Clubb (2016), and Lehane (2017) have focused on P/CVE interventions in the region. However, in the Republic of Ireland, there is a total absence of literature on P/CVE interventions. A Scopus search for academic articles that mention or focus on Ireland and de/radicalization or Ireland and P/CVE or Ireland and extremism produces zero results. There are a small number of articles specifically referring to the Republic of Ireland that do exist outside of the Scopus database (e.g., McCorry, 2021; Kelly, 2015) and there are of course many results where Northern Ireland is the focus and the Republic is mentioned (e.g., see Kelly, 2015). However, where there is what could be termed P/CVE work underway, it is most likely classed as cross border, peace work, reconciliation work, or development work. One example is the activities of the truth and reconciliation platform (TARP) founded by Stephen Travers, a survivor of the Miami Showband attacks (Travers & Featherstonhaugh, 2007), another is the involvement of members of the Omagh Survivors Group in European-level initiatives, such as the RAN and, specifically, the Victims of Terrorism Working group (RAN VOT) focusing on, among other issues, counter extremism (RAN, 2015). TARP—a group led from the Republic is a cross-border peace and counter-extremism group focusing on providing a platform for victims to give testimony on their experience, as a means of preventing further instances of violence. Another example of PCVE initiatives is the Irish Muslim Peace and Integration Council that has the stated aim of preventing extremism and isolation in the Muslim community. This involved setting up an online presence (jihad.info) that is now defunct. Other P/CVE-focused work is evident in an ISPCC (2021) publication in their guide to online radicalization and in the recent “It’s up to YOUth” resource pack produced by the National Youth Council of Ireland that includes a section on addressing violent extremism (Duffy et al., 2018). However, what emerges after surveying the P/CVE landscape is that there is a two-tiered system, one for Troubles-linked extremism, and one for Islamic-linked extremism.

TPV: Irish Prisons and the Legacy of the Troubles

As discussed, P/CVE in the Republic of Ireland can realistically be said to be two-tiered and nowhere is this more obvious than in the prison systems in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The Peace Process or the Good Friday Agreement (Northern Ireland Office, 1998) led to a very significant reduction of political violence on the island, and a shift in the nature of TPV, particularly in relation to the emergence of dissident groups and the interrelationship between paramilitary and crime organizations (Morrison, 2013). However, despite the fact that it has been nearly 25 years since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (Northern Ireland Office, 1998), the legacy of the Troubles has implications for how individuals affiliated with paramilitary organizations are dealt with in the criminal justice system.

In the Republic, terrorism and terrorism-related offenses are heard in the Special Criminal Court, a court that sits with three judges and no jury. Subsequently, men sent to custody from the Special Criminal Court are housed in Portlaoise Prison, a closed high-security prison. There are no high-security prisons for women in Ireland and women convicted in the Special Criminal Court are sent to a medium-security prison. In Portlaoise prison, there is a separation block (E-block) where men are placed depending on their group affiliation. For example, Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), or New Irish republican Army (IRA) members are accommodated within the block on separate wings. This has the effect of creating a prison within a prison for individuals incarcerated for terrorism and related offenses (individuals commonly referred to as subversives; Office of the Inspector of Prisons, 2021). Much like their counterparts in Maghaberry Prison in Northern Ireland (Butler, 2020), these individuals have special privileges dating back to the 1970s, such as separation from the mainstream prison population, extended out of cell time, a choice of recreation activities, access to additional supplies, and fewer limitations to their day-to-day regime (Brangan, 2021; Office of the Inspector of Prisons, 2021; Reilly, 2013). In the Republic, in addition to these privileges that effectively make these individuals a special category of prisoners, each group housed in E block has an Oifigeach Ceanais (commanding officer [OC]) who serves as a spokesman for the prisoners. This individual has direct access to the governor (Lonergan, 2011). In April 2021, there were 23 individuals housed in E-block. In Northern Ireland, paramilitary prisoners typically represent 4% (approximately 35–40 prisoners) of the population in Maghaberry Prison (NISRA, 2022) and, while they are not officially granted special status, their entitlements are exceptional in comparison with other individuals incarcerated in prisons across the region (Butler, 2020).

As a result of the impact of the Troubles, and as a result of dealing with the very complex situation that emerged when housing men imprisoned for paramilitary-linked offenses during that period, Ireland is perhaps in a unique position to speak to counter extremism in prisons. In the field of Terrorism Studies, in recent years (Silke, 2014; Silke & Veldhuis, 2017), increased attention has been paid to the role of prison regimes in facilitating or countering extremism in prisons (Butler, 2020; Silke, 2014). Issues of contagion between ordinary prisoners and between less and more radical inmates have been discussed, and this has been reflected in how specifically Islamic-linked extremist prisoners are managed in European prisons (see, for example, the prison regime in the Netherlands; Acheson & Paul, 2019). Ireland and Northern Ireland are often cited in these debates as being experienced in this domain, but there is a very poor understanding of the regimes in place in Ireland’s high-security prisons. Butler (2020) documents the use of special prison units to accommodate individuals imprisoned in Northern Ireland. Crucially, she points out that the prison regime is not only influenced by counterterrorism from above (e.g., policy and law), but also involves dealing with the realities of the prison environment where local context is key to understanding and managing the day-to-day realities in the institution. In the case of Northern Ireland, this means recognizing not only the impact of individual and social identity, but also of the community dynamics at play, particularly issues related to the conflict and community division. In the Republic of Ireland, the same issues are relevant; the realities, namely, political, social, and local, are reflected in the management of terrorism and terrorism-related prisoners. Importantly, in Ireland and Northern Ireland, counter extremism can only be considered through understanding the social processes that underpin the conflict and having a thorough understanding of the dynamics of the groups in question, even decades after the Good Friday Agreement (Northern Ireland Office, 1998). The group or the organization is therefore a key part in this understanding and contextualizing the behavior of the individual as part of a dynamic group is key.

In addition to the relevance of individual and group issues, in Ireland in particular, the political realities that are very much a legacy of the conflict are central to understanding how extremist prisoners are dealt with in the prison system. For example, in Northern Ireland, individuals self-request inclusion in SPU (Butler, 2020) and, in the Republic of Ireland, self-request, alongside paramilitary group approval, is required for inclusion in E block Specialised Prison Units (SPU). This reflects not only the importance of both group membership and identity, but also the continued relevance and power of the hierarchy of the paramilitary groups linked to the Troubles (and also organized crime).

Importantly, across Europe since 9/11, as well as in Great Britain (not including NI), there has been substantial investment in developing and delivering in-prison intervention programs based on the concepts of counter radicalization and counter extremism (see Healthy Identities, the use of risk assessment based on radicalization measurement tools, and Aarhus model; Brader, 2020; Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats [CREST], 2019; DIIS, 2015). For example, in the Netherlands, for TPV and related prisoners, there is a focus on rehabilitation and disengagement, and tailor-made plans are put in place for each individual, including psychological assessment. In GB, the Healthy Identities Programme (Brader, 2020) is used with Islamic-linked and, more recently, right-wing prisoners and focuses on motivation, ideology, and disengagement. However, in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland counter extremism is viewed very differently; there are no counter-extremism programs in place for individuals incarcerated for Troubles-linked activities. The political realities of the prison regimes in both jurisdictions dictate the day-to-day realities of the prison system, but regardless of the legacy issues, there is a fundamental difference in how the issue of extremism is viewed. There is no reference to ideology, nor radicalization, and it is well understood that the social and personal contexts, rather than personogenic factors (Lynch & Joyce, 2018), are central to understanding an individual’s involvement in TPV. This can be inferred from the focus on containment and separation of paramilitary group members, appeasement through the role of the OC, voluntary engagement by prisoners in the regime, and the control and power granted to prisoner representatives. This is not a matter of a lack of expertise or willingness to offer intervention programs because other inmates in the same prison avail of specialist interventions, such as the program available to those convicted of sex offenses—the Better Lives programs (see Irish Prison Service, 2009), but is an issue of legacy, political will, and framing. Troubles-related inmates are conceptualized in a fundamentally different manner from individuals incarcerated for other types of TPV.

As mentioned, for individuals incarcerated for Troubles-related offenses, radicalization is not the framework typically used, nor is there an assumption that individual psychological interventions are best placed to assist in dealing with what is well understood to be a social, community, historical, ideological, and identity-based situation. The assumption in other locations across Europe is that radicalization leads to TPV and, inversely, de-radicalization is the pathway out of violence. While there is little evidence to support such an approach (Bouhana & Wikström, 2011) this simplistic tautology persists. However, Northern Ireland–related TPV is viewed differently, due in part because the violence happened as part of an ongoing conflict and there were clear conflict identities represented by opposing paramilitary groups that mapped onto divided communities; but perhaps most importantly was the recognition that involvement in TPV was about much more than ideology and individual behavior. There was, and still is, a tacit acknowledgment that social and political conditions are highly relevant and seeking to manipulate individual identity, and delivering psychological interventions are at best irrelevant and at worst harmful (Lynch & Joyce, 2018). Counter extremism in Ireland and Northern Ireland is best described as bottom-up and emergent from the political conditions (e.g., disarmament and support for the Good Friday Agreement (GFA)). In fact, counter extremism is perhaps an inaccurate reflection of the process of promoting nonviolence among individuals imprisoned for TPV, more accurate would be desistance, the process of (even temporarily) stopping the act of violence, but making no judgment or request for any ideological or cognitive shift around the use of or support for violence (Lynch, 2015).

Conclusion

P/CVE is a significant element of counterterrorism policy and practice at the national, regional, and international level. Ireland, North and South, has a long history of dealing with TPV linked to the Troubles, and the legacy of this conflict has an ongoing impact on the criminal justice system in both jurisdictions. In the aftermath of 9/11, a fundamental shift in how states imagined and responded to terrorism caused a revaluation of how we construct the threat of TPV. Ireland was not immune to this revaluation and, despite its history of and experience with domestic terrorism, similar to its European neighbors, the state engaged in overreach in the name of countering and preventing terrorism (Hamilton, 2019). The impact of 9/11 led to the global (re)construction of the terrorist threat as primarily being driven by Islamic-linked extremism, as well as the reframing of terrorism that was in the past seen as nationalist or secessionist as Islamic-linked. Ireland engaged in this revisionism and, despite the very limited occurrence of any TPV or related activity linked to Al Qaeda, ISIS, or affiliated groups, it has led to the emergence of a two-tiered system for dealing with political violence in both North and South. On one hand, there is the long-standing process for dealing with Troubles-linked activity in the courts and the prison service and, on the other, there is the counter-extremism strategy (inferred in Ireland and actual in Northern Ireland) for dealing with individuals associated with Islamic-linked threats. These perpetrators experience the same court pathway, but the assumptions that exist regarding motive, ideology, and so on, are fundamentally different; ideology plays a very significant part in how the threats are imagined. Influenced by research and practice in both the United Kingdom and Europe, Ireland has come to rely on notions of radicalization, contagion, and de-radicalization as explanatory in the case of Islamic-linked extremism, but not for Troubles-related issues. Furthermore, the assumption that minority communities should be the locus for counter-extremism work is especially problematic.

Lessons from Ireland have the potential to demonstrate to our European neighbors and further afield, how the response to TPV should be informed by local realities, how prison intervention cannot be universally understood or separate from social conditions, and how reactionary policy making serves to prevent decades of experience being brought to bear on how we frame and respond to instances of TPV. Finally, the manner in which activities (that might in another jurisdiction be termed P/CVE) that address TPV emerge in Ireland, both North and South, is a lesson in how existing, community-led, grassroots-driven activities can be central to dealing with the complex social issues often at the root of TPV. These initiatives are often concerned with cross-community collaboration, crime prevention, youth support, and shared cultures.

In summary, the existence of a two-tiered system for addressing TPV in both NI and the Republic of Ireland (ROI) serves not only to nullify the potential for knowledge sharing of the vast body of peace-building activities carried out during and since the Troubles, but also creates a false dichotomy based on the relevance of particular ideologies and the power these ideologies play in motivating and explaining involvement in TPV. As a result, how we might imagine solutions to TPV is limited by this framework.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biography

Orla Lynch is a Psychologist and Senior Lecturer in Criminology at University College Cork, Ireland. Her work focuses on extremism and political violence. She is a senior fellow with Hedayah, a member of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) editorial board, and a member of the research advisory council with the Researching Solutions to Violent Extremism (RESOLVE) Network (U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID]).

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Counter Extremism in Ireland: An Overview of the Landscape

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Setting the Scene—The Troubles

Post 9/11 and a New Terrorism

The State of Play—TPV on the Island of Ireland

Countering Terrorism and CVE in Ireland, North and South

TPV: Irish Prisons and the Legacy of the Troubles

Conclusion

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

Notes

Author Biography

References