Building Democratic Resilience: Protecting the Public Sphere From Violent Extremism

Abstract

This paper focuses on the challenges violent extremism poses to the functioning of the public sphere—a critical aspect often overlooked in discussions surrounding violent extremism. It proposes a novel framework of democratic resilience to examine and improve the public sphere responses to violent extremism. Combining insights from the normative theory of deliberative democracy with the empirical study of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) initiatives in New South Wales (NSW), Australia, the paper lays out the concrete steps democracies can take to protect the public sphere from extremist threats and attacks. While the primary focus of analysis is NSW, the empirical insights have implications for other jurisdictions and countries seeking to counter violent extremism without compromising democratic commitments and principles.

Introduction

Violent extremism is a serious challenge confronting contemporary societies. Globally, thousands of people are killed every year because of acts of violent extremism (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2022). While the loss of lives may be the most visible and measurable effect of violent extremism, it is not the only one. Other potential impacts include increased community tensions, psychological trauma, and repressive security and surveillance responses. Often overlooked however, is how violent extremism impacts the functioning of democracy in contemporary multicultural societies. This happens mainly through the public sphere, a crucial component of any democracy that serves multiple essential functions.

The public sphere is the communicative space where social and political problems are identified and discussed, public opinion is formed, and collective identities are constructed, validated, or challenged. Extremists seek to undermine these democratic functions by sowing division and distrust. They seek to redraw the cultural, ethnic, and religious boundaries of the public sphere, and damage inclusive notions of collective identity (Della Porta et al., 2020). The success of violent extremists depends on their ability to disseminate divisive discourses within the public sphere, and polarize an ideally tolerant, pluralistic society into an intolerant and exclusionist one. In this context, how democracies respond to extremist threats becomes crucial in determining the failure or success of violent extremism (Foley, 2018; Krause, 2018). Extremists are most likely to achieve their objectives in contexts where public spheres are fragile. Fragile public spheres are easily polarized, and do not have the discursive and institutional capacity to respond to shocks without losing their democratic character. Resilient public spheres, in contrast, can withstand the challenges posed by violent extremism, and maintain or even deepen their commitment to democratic norms in response.

But what exactly makes the public sphere more or less resilient in the face of violent extremism? What institutions, mechanisms, and practices are required for facilitating and maintaining democratic resilience? While resilience is a widely used phrase in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) discourse and policy (Grossman, 2021b), what resilience is and who is responsible for it remains contested (Holloway & Manwaring, 2023; Humbert & Joseph, 2019; Walklate et al., 2012). Resilience in CVE policy typically centers on the individual or communities as actors or sites of resilience in resisting extremist radicalization. In this context, the aim of enhancing resilience is to make individuals or communities more resistant to extremist ideologies and narratives (Stephens & Sieckelinck, 2020). How this resilience is to be built and maintained is often less clear, but policies tend to focus on strengthening social cohesion to better withstand the risk of polarization and radicalization (Grossman, 2023, 2021a; Stephens & Sieckelinck, 2020).

In this paper, we introduce a novel perspective on defining and applying the concept of resilience within the context of CVE efforts. We advance the idea of democratic resilience by drawing on the theory of deliberative democracy and its practical implementation in the public sphere. Democratic resilience here refers to the ability of the public sphere to respond to extremist attacks and threats without losing its democratic capacity, understood in deliberative terms: reflective, competent, and inclusive. To illustrate the relevance of this idea in practice, we conducted an in-depth analysis of CVE initiatives in the Australian state of New South Wales (NSW). This involved a qualitive analysis of publicly available policy documentation, as well as 14 semi-structured expert interviews with stakeholders in government, academia, news media, and the community sector. Our analysis identifies seven key factors that scholars and policy makers should consider to establish and maintain democratic resilience against violent extremism.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First, we provide a brief theoretical background, outlining what we mean by violent extremism, the public sphere, and the relationship between them. Next, we outline our novel conceptualization of democratic resilience, positioning it within the broader resilience literature, and examining its application in CVE and social cohesion policies in NSW. Based on these empirical insights, we then outline seven key factors that matter for the democratic resilience of the public sphere. The paper concludes with a discussion of the practical actions public sphere actors can take to promote democratic resilience, and future avenues for research.

The Public Sphere: An Overlooked Target of Violent Extremism

The acts of violent extremists, especially (but not exclusively) mass casualty events, aim not only to kill but also to destabilize democracy and its key institutions (Alexander, 2006). As we elaborate below, violent extremists seek to disrupt social networks, sow fear, and create and exacerbate polarization through their violent acts. The public sphere is an often-overlooked target of these acts.

A healthy public sphere is central to the functioning of democracy, especially as understood in deliberative terms. Deliberative democracy is a normative theory of democratic legitimacy based on the idea that those affected by a collective decision have the right, capacity, and opportunity to participate in consequential deliberation in the making of those decisions (Dryzek, 2002). It is often described as a “talk-centric” rather than “vote-centric” approach to democracy (Chambers, 2003). However, listening and reflection matter just as much as expression (Ercan et al., 2019). Deliberation involves a process of mutual justification where participants offer reasons for their positions, listen to the views of others, and then reconsider their preferences based on information and arguments they are exposed to during this process. Deliberation takes different forms, and occurs in various sites including deliberative forums, everyday conversations, and the public sphere (Ercan & Dryzek, 2015).

The public sphere is where citizens communicate and exchange opinions about issues of common concern as free and equal members of society, and so form public opinion. It is where social and political issues are identified, articulated, and furnished with possible solutions (Habermas, 1996). The health of the public sphere, Habermas (2008) argues, is so vital to democracy that we can measure the state of democracy “by taking the pulse of the life of its political public sphere.” Apart from potentially being home to deliberation, the public sphere is also a cultural and performative site where collective identities are constructed, validated, or challenged, through both verbal and non-verbal communication, symbols, and performances (Mendonça et al., 2022). A well-functioning public sphere facilitates the free flow of information and communication among citizens, mediates between state and society, and enables the formation of shared identities, alliances, solidarities, and connections across difference (Calhoun, 2002; Hendriks et al., 2020).

Violent extremist attacks can disrupt these democratic functions of the public sphere. Following Berger (2018), we understand extremism as “the belief that an in-group’s success or survival can never be separated from the need for hostile action against an out-group,” including both violent and non (physically) violent acts (p. 44). It becomes violent extremism when violent action against an out-group becomes inseparable from in-group success or survival (Berger, 2018, p. 46). Such hostile acts work to damage the democratic public sphere by changing its terms of engagement, by “reordering society” and “rewriting the basis for belonging in that order” (Fuji, 2021, p. 19). Specifically, violent extremism damages the public sphere in three key ways.

First, it hinders the prospects for constructing an inclusive collective identity by sowing division and distrust. This can be targeted at those perceived as belonging to an out-group in an attempt to “push” or “pull” them out of the public sphere. The act of violence, and the messages it communicates, is used to make those deemed Other feel unsafe and unwelcome, and so vacate the public sphere through reduced participation and visibility. In this sense, acts of far-right white supremacist terror like the 2019 Christchurch Massacre in Aotearoa New Zealand to smaller-scale acts of violence like the assault and harrassment of members of minoritized groups, have a dual effect: first of causing violence against individual members of a target community, and second, sending a message to that community as a whole that it is unwelcome.

Second, violent extremism can distort the processes of deliberation and opinion formation in the public sphere. This is partly a product of the above effect, wherein any loss of identities, for example Muslims, from the public sphere reduces the range of positions included in deliberation. Violent extremism further distorts opinion formation by attempting to induce a securitized (over)reaction from government. Such a response, especially when couched in a polarized framing of “us” versus “them”, limits the prospects for nuanced discourse. The 2001 September 11 attacks in the United States exemplifies how responses to violent extremism can set the terms of the debate in the public sphere. In the aftermath, President George W. Bush (2001) declared that “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” In this context, “even to pursue nuanced thought was deemed a performance of antipatriotism” (Berlant, 2005, p. 46). When the public sphere loses its capacity to host nuanced discussions, its democratic quality diminishes.

Third, violent extremism can further the spread of exclusionary and anti-democratic ideals. Violent acts can generate notoriety and interest in the perpetrator(s) and their motivations, and can also promote narratives that support the cause of violent extremists (Parker, 2019). For example, web traffic on the neo-Nazi website Stormfront doubled in the weeks following the 17 June, 2015 Charleston church shooting in the United States, where a white supremacist opened fire at a historic Black church (Fisher, 2015). Such views are antithetical to a democratic public sphere, based as they are on the violent marginalization and elimination of those considered Other.

To summarize, when riven with fear and distrust, the public sphere loses its capacity to generate the inclusive deliberation on which democracy depends. It becomes a site where nuanced debate is undesirable or not possible, and where exclusionary ideals seek validation. In such a state, the public sphere is no longer able to adequately fulfil its democratic functions such as identifying social and political problems, and transmitting these problems to government and policy makers. It is therefore vital that efforts to address violent extremism are attentive to these dangers and their effect on the public sphere. Having said that, violent extremists cannot damage the public sphere alone. As already noted, how key actors in the public sphere—such as civil society, news media, and political leaders—respond to the challenges of violent extremism is key for determining their success or failure.

Our emphasis on the democratic vitality of the public sphere distinguishes our approach in key ways from some long-standing treatments of how to defend democracy against extremists. Almost all of these treatments address the question of how best to protect the state from being captured or overrun by extremists. Of these strategies, militant democracy (Kirshner, 2014) would restrict the political rights of extremists through bans on organization and expression. So, it is illegal in Germany to revive anything that resembles the Nazi Party, or to deny the Holocaust. Defensive democracy (Capoccia, 2005) would broaden the repertoire of engagement to include inducements to extremist parties to moderate their stance, and civic education. Immunized democracy (Pedahzur, 2018) rejects heavy-handed bans, focusing instead on long-term strengthening of the political culture of a society, which would include education, but also cultivation of moderating media. A concentric circles approach (Rummens & Abt, 2010) involves imposing restrictions or sanctions that become tougher as we move closer to centers of decision making: extremist individuals are free to say and do what they like (short of criminal acts), extremist organizations less so, parties still less (to the point of possibly being banned, or at least subject to principled non-cooperation by all democratic parties). What Malkopoulou and Norman (2018) call a social approach stresses promoting social cohesion through material equality and social justice, to reduce the attraction of extremism to the disaffected.

For all their differences, these approaches conceptualize democracy in terms of a state at the core, and a public sphere as a periphery. In these terms, the state needs defending against threats originating in the public sphere. The public sphere is seen only as a potential source of trouble. In contrast, we put the public sphere at the center of democracy, not its periphery. Its fracturing (as sought by violent extremists) is itself a key intrinsic democratic loss that should not be seen only in terms of its consequences for the state. Conversely, we regard the critical vitality of the public sphere as the best front line defence against violent extremism.

To develop an empirically grounded understanding of democratic resilience in response to violent extremist threats to the democratic public sphere, we focus on CVE initiatives in NSW, which emphasize “community resilience.” We use this case as a springboard to identify factors that enable or hinder democratic resilience in the face of violent extremism, and so inform improved public sphere responses, offering pathways for recovery from its repercussions.

Research Design

Our research design combines normative insights from deliberative democracy with the empirical case of CVE efforts in the Australian state of the New South Wales (NSW). As the country’s most populous state, NSW is extremely diverse, with more than 275 different languages spoken and 144 religions practiced (NSW Government, 2020a). The state has experienced diverse forms of violent extremism, including major counter terrorism (CT) incidents such as the 2014 Lindt Café siege, during which a gunman held 18 people hostage in Sydney’s CBD. To date, the NSW Government has implemented a range of CVE, CT, and wider community engagement initiatives with the aim of improving societal resilience. The state’s proactive approach to addressing violent extremism, coupled with an emphasis on community-driven solutions, provides a rich case to explore the prospects for democratic resilience understood in deliberative terms.

Our empirical insights are based on 14 semi-structured expert interviews (Dexter, 2006) with stakeholders working on and around violent extremism and CVE in the NSW Government, news media, community sector, and academia. Thus, insights were gathered from a range of key public sphere actors with different expertise and experience; from policy making to reporting to on the ground service delivery. Interviews centered on the views and experiences of these actors regarding the public sphere as a target of violent extremism, as well as existing CVE initiatives and their implications for the public sphere. Interview transcripts were thematically analyzed to identify factors conducive to the protection and promotion of a democractically resilient public sphere.

We supplemented the interviews with a document analysis of publicly available NSW Government CVE policy documentation as of December 2021. This includes program evaluations, parliamentary submissions, and other public-facing NSW Government documents relating to CVE collected from sources such as the NSW CVE Evaluation Tool’s program finder (https://www.cveevaluation.nsw.gov.au/program-finder). Qualitative analysis helps to reveal taken-for-granted assumptions and allows researchers to better understand the meaning various actors ascribe to their experiences (Ercan & Vromen, 2023). In our case, this involves unpacking the threat violent extremism poses to the public sphere, and the ways this threat can be countered from the perspective of the actors working in the CVE space in NSW.

Countering Violent Extremism in New South Wales: The Community Resilience Approach

The NSW Government’s Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program was launched in 2015. It aims to “ensure that violent extremists are disengaged from violent extremism, at-risk individuals are diverted from violent extremism, and community resilience in prevention and response to violent extremism is improved” (NSW Government, n.d.). A hallmark of CVE in NSW is that it is treated as “a social issue with security implications” not a “security issue with social implications” (van de Zandt et al., 2021, p. 92), and so is considered “distinct but complementary” to the state’s wider CT programs (NSW Government, 2020b, p. 6).

Given the framing of CVE as a social issue, engagement with communities is seen as “fundamental” to the NSW approach (van de Zandt et al., 2021, p. 92). Here, CVE activities are led primarily by social policy agencies such as the Department of Premier and Cabinet’s Connected Communities unit and Multicultural NSW, working closely with NSW communities. These activities aim to build resilience and cohesion in communities, and to protect individuals from violent extremism (NSW Government, 2020b). However, despite being framed in social policy terms, CVE remains tied to CT in NSW as part of the state’s CT Strategy (NSW Government, 2020b).

The NSW Government’s CVE and CT program has five core objectives, of which resilience is the first, treated mainly as community resilience (van de Zandt et al., 2021). This suggests looking for and improving resilience in social processes, rather than in individual behavioral processes. This framing involves generating social capital, emphasizing social connectedness, community trust, and civic participation (Grossman, 2021a; Weine et al., 2013). Community resilience is put into practice by “proactively building networks across the community” as well as “improving community awareness about the pathways that can lead to violent extremism” (NSW Government, 2020b, p. 8). The focus on community-level resilience is consistent with Australian CVE policy and programming (Grossman & Gerrand, 2023).

Community resilience has not been without significant challenges and limitations, in both Australia and abroad. Generally speaking, the focus on individuals and communities in resilience discourses in CVE shifts responsibility away from the state to affected communities and local actors (Christodoulou, 2020; Stephens & Sieckelinck 2020; Walklate et al., 2012). Overlap between CVE and CT has meant that community resilience has come to be seen as a potential “trojan horse or proxy for other agendas related to government concerns with security and control” (Grossman, 2021a, p. 311) and for managing cultural diversity in repressive ways (Abdel-Fattah, 2019; Thomas, 2010). As a result, resilience often becomes intertwined with the stigmatization of specific communities. In the post 9/11 context, the “community” in community resilience has typically meant “visibly racialized and often spatially concentrated Muslim minority communities” (Thomas & Grossman, 2023, p. 294), simultaneously marking them as both responsible for producing and for countering violent extremism. This has contributed to the dilemma where CVE resilience-building initiatives remain “primarily focused on findings ways to tackle the resilience capacity of ‘the’ and not ‘us’” (Grossman, 2023, p. 45), and puts building resilience as a social good “at risk of being dismissed along with CVE as being not good for the community” (Weine, 2016, pp. 198–199). Additionally, the focus on resilience to extremist narratives and ideology ignores more “mainstream” narratives and actors which (re)produce the kinds of polarizing “us” versus “them” discourses that extremist narratives also rely on (Stephens & Sieckelinck, 2020; see also Mondon & Winter, 2020). More generally, the extant social cohesion focus of community resilience is, according to Grossman and Gerrand (2023), unable to adequately address the landscape of violent extremism in Australia “as the continuing escalation in far-right extremism despite years of social cohesion policy and programming attests” (p. 249).

While factors facilitating community resilience such as dense networks of social ties, voluntary organizations, and reciprocal trust between government and communities may contribute to building democratic resilience, they are not sufficient in themselves for a democratically resilient public sphere. More generally, the use of resilience in CVE policy and programming remains (understandably) focused on preventing the radicalization to violence. However, this tends to omit wider democratic implications of violent extremism for the quality of citizen deliberation and the public sphere. Where democratic resilience has been included in CVE policy, it has been poorly defined, giving the impression of “resilience to extremist narratives through promoting [liberal] democratic values or practices’ (Stephens & Sieckelinck, 2020, p. 147). We do not argue that democratic resilience should replace community resilience in CVE efforts but rather complement and enrich the latter by drawing attention to actors and activities in the larger public sphere.

Building Democratic Resilience: Key Factors and Practical Implications for Policy

Democratic resilience is rooted in a normative judgement about what democracy is, and what is worth preserving. In other words, what democratic resilience means is closely linked to what democracy means, and this could change depending on whether one adopts a minimal or more expansive approach to democracy (Holloway & Manwaring, 2023). Our conceptualization of democracy (and democratic resilience) has a deliberative focus, which involves a healthy public sphere, as noted above. We define democratic resilience as the ability of the public sphere (institutions and actors) to respond to extremist attacks and threats without losing its democratic capacity understood in deliberative terms. That is, a democratically resilient public sphere is one that is able to recover from the damage inflicted by extremism without sacrificing key deliberative principles, while also sustaining key democratic functions such as the free flow of information between state and society, and enabling the formation of shared identities, solidarities, and connections across difference.

Our research on the way violent extremism is tackled in the state of NSW enables us to show how democratic resilience may look in practice, and what institutions and actors are key for establishing and maintaining a reflective, competent and inclusive public sphere. Our interviews with key actors involved in developing and implementing CVE policies and practices across NSW revealed seven critical factors that enable or inhibit democratic resilience in the public sphere. In what follows, we outline these factors, and include several practical steps for public sphere actors to support a democratically resilient public sphere.

How Political Leaders Talk About Violent Extremism

The first key insight that our interviews revealed concerns the language political leaders use when talking about violent extremism. The words leaders choose can “either give terrorists what they want, or it can deny them what they want” according to Participant A, ¹ a senior public servant. Avoiding racialized framings that reduce minorities to essentialized characteristics related to criminality, extremism, or violence is crucial to maintaining an inclusive and competent public sphere. As Participant K ² cautioned:

[Australian] political leaders who have been willing to throw particular communities under the bus for political points have been much more damaging to democracy than any terror attack we have had.

Initial statements by government and political leaders do more than just inform and reassure the community in the wake of a violent extremist attack. These statements set the tone for media coverage, and shape later commemoration, memorialization, and policy responses (Vatnoey, 2015). For this reason, it is vital that government and political leaders get the response right the first time. As Participant H, ³ a journalist reporting on violent extremism in NSW explained, the initial press conference following a violent extremist attack will be broadcast on repeat, meaning political leaders have “one shot to say the right thing.” As well as inflaming tensions, a poorly crafted statement from political leaders can undo previous work done to improve community relations with government agencies. As Participant D, ⁴ a representative of a civil society organization explained, government “can mess it up – 20 years of work, building trust – it can really diminish in one statement.”

Of course, this does not mean political leaders should ignore the threat violent extremism poses. Rather, political leaders need to articulate and address these threats in a manner which contextualizes, but also contains. Participant C, ⁵ a civil society representative suggested that it was important that political leaders adopt the language of criminal justice rather than “some kind of civilizational struggle,” framing any incident in a less generalized manner: “so it is not ‘them’ rising up against ‘us’, but individual people who have behaved in a criminal fashion.”

Here, there is a clear need to develop and update strategic communications plans for political leaders. This is because, as our research shows, the public statements of prominent figures like cabinet ministers or state premiers in the face of violent extremist attacks will set the tone for future deliberation and policy formation. The response should therefore use inclusive and unifying language, while reiterating the democratic and inclusive character of society, using where necessary the language of criminal justice, rather than racialized framings that can exacerbate harm. This kind of approach can be seen in the way political leaders in Norway and New Zealand responded to their country’s respective attacks in 2011 and 2019 (e.g., Miller & Beausoleil, 2023; Vatnoey, 2015).

How CVE and Associated Terms Are Understood and Implemented

In NSW, CVE is framed as distinct from CT, with CVE often led by social policy agencies and CT by law enforcement. While this distinction may be clear for government stakeholders, it is not necessarily clear to the wider public, and indeed, CVE remains tied to CT as part of the broader NSW CT Strategy (NSW Government, 2020b). Community concern regarding CVE and its relationship to CT and broader security agendas is well established, and has contributed to stigmatization of Muslim communities in Australia (e.g., Abdel-Fattah, 2019)—an effect which has been elsewhere acknowledged by NSW government stakeholders (van de Zandt et al., 2021). Nevertheless, these same concerns were repeated in several of our interviews, especially with participants from civil society groups. Greater effort needs to be made to clarify between CVE and CT activities. Disentangling CVE from wider security and intelligence agendas may help to open the way for more civil society engagement, making it easier to deliver on social policy objectives.

The lack of clarity around CVE and CT has been partly compounded by the lack of a clear and consistent vocabulary with which to discuss the challenges of violent extremism in NSW, both within government and with the public. There is no standard policy definition of violent extremism in the NSW CT and CVE strategy (NSW Government, 2020b). For NSW government agencies working in CVE, it has meant that some agencies and frontline providers continue to operate by slightly different definitions. While this definitional plurality was not perceived as a major issue by government stakeholders interviewed, it was seen as contributing to confusion among the public regarding CVE in NSW. In addition, as Participant N ⁶ described, the “lack of a clear, consistent definition” of violent extremism was “hugely problematic” in that it makes it difficult to reliably evaluate success in CVE policy and programming.

Moving forward, in addition to clarifying CVE terminology and implementation in both government and public communications, there is a need for better data on CVE implementation and incidents of violent extremism and related phenomena like hate or bias crime. Accurate and reliable information is essential for a democratically resilient public sphere as it provides an evidence basis for good deliberation. The lack of a comprehensive dataset in Australia, at either the state or Commonwealth level, makes it difficult to understand the scope of the problem, and efficacy of programs to address it.

How Minorities Are Included in the Public Sphere

The public sphere cannot be democratically resilient if numerous members of society feel marginalized and unable to participate confidently. Stigmatization happens when a particular group of people is associated with negative stereotypes. It reduces their sense of belonging in society and hinders their free and equal participation in the public sphere, and so acts as a key barrier to a democratically resilient public sphere. As Participant C explained:

Violent extremism flourishes in an environment. . . where the perception of “us” versus “them” takes hold. We need to think about ways of bringing people along on the journey where they don’t feel stigmatised and attacked.

Key public sphere actors like government and news media therefore need to encourage an inclusive sense of belonging, one where everyone can feel that they have a place in society irrespective of identify markers such as language, culture, ethnicity, religious beliefs, gender, or sexual orientation. As Participant D explained, the issue of stigmatization is especially pronounced with respect to Australia’s Muslim community, and can only be resolved when:

the rest of society sees Muslims as a part of this country, and not as people that can be ostracised, marginalised, or simply asked to “go back to where you came from”.

Minority voices need to be better included in government decision-making processes, but not simply as sealed entities or homogenous groups. Public sphere actors should recognize the intracultural diversity that exists within each community. Communications from government for example should emphasize the multiplicity of identities within minority communities and emphasize the commonalities of citizenship, while also engaging with a range of community voices, not just dominant identity groups.

The issue of minority inclusion is not just a matter for government messaging. Media representation and participation of minorities is also crucial for a democratically resilient public sphere. This is because increased representation ideally dampens narrow conceptions of national identity while encouraging those from minority groups to see themselves as part of the public sphere. Additionally, increasing diversity in media through greater minority participation may also help to promote a more nuanced discussion about violent extremism and how it impacts the lives of those communities targeted by violent extremism. As journalist Participant J ⁷ explained, Australian media has a “blind spot” when it comes to “sophisticated discussions of race,” attributable in part to the lack of diversity in Australian media. One way of addressing this is for government and media companies to explore additional avenues to promote multicultural and multilingual media. One such example, the Australian Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), provides a model for increasing avenues for minority participation in the public sphere.

How Inclusive Collective Identities Are Constructed

In the public sphere collective identities are imagined and re-imagined in ongoing processes of communication, as well as through symbolic ceremonies, cultural expressions, public events, and monuments. All these practices, rituals, and artefacts structure the relationship between self and society, and function as crucial ingredients of the social imagery—who are we, what do we value, who belongs to this social imagery, and who is outside of it. When addressing extremism, the rituals and performance of commemoration and the processes of public memorialization can play a crucial role in fostering democratic resilience.

It is important not to treat these practices as tokenistic performances, but as sites of reflection and collective healing. Governments can play an important role in facilitating meaningful practices of commemoration and memorialization. To do so, they must work closely with those affected and the wider community to determine not only how and when to act, but how to balance the competing needs of various stakeholders. The formation of both permanent memorial sites, as well as commemorative efforts, need to include the public—and especially the victim’s families, survivors, and first responders—in planning. This is not an easy task, as research on memorial sites for the 9/11 (Hajer, 2005) and 22 July, 2011 attacks (Salomonsen, 2021) illustrate. Participant L, ⁸ an academic researching terrorism and violent extremism in Australia, explained some of these challenges in developing memorial sites for violent extremist attacks:

There is incredible complexity in the memorialisation of a terrorist attack. . . how do we honour the victims, without retraumatising the first responders? . . .how do we create something that is respectful without reinforcing existing traumas?

Incorporating deliberative and participatory planning processes may mean having to navigate between economic interests and legal obligations, the need to respect those impacted, as well as the desire to “find a symbolic reply” to an attack (Hajer, 2005). But too much government direction may undermine the collective healing commemoration and memorialization affords. As Participant L, suggested:

It should be the role of the state to pay for memorialisation, but it is up to community groups, advocates, and liaisons to talk to the community about what they want. Because at the end of the day, it is their trauma.

In NSW there is a lack of policy frameworks for commemorative activities and memorial development. Any policy guidance should underscore the importance of centring the needs of victims and survivors, adopting time-sensitive implementation strategies, and ensure public consultation and participation in planning.

How News Media Reports on Violent Extremism

As a key pillar of the public sphere, the media has the potential to undermine or enhance democratic resilience. Harmful framing of impacted communities can lead to fracturing through the process of stigmatization outlined above. For example, how Muslim communities have been reported on in the aftermath of a violent extremist attacks in Australia has had a major effect “on the way Muslim’s see themselves as they belong to this country,” according to a Participant D. At the same time, the way in which extremist actors and events are covered can unintentionally further the reach (and harm) of extremist propaganda and provide legitimacy to extremist actors and narratives. While the need for a press free from government intervention or direction is vital for a healthy public sphere, there is a serious and urgent need to address poor media practices in the extremism space.

There are major discrepancies in how so-called religiously motivated violent extremism is framed compared to reporting on far-right violent extremism, namely, that media disproportionately fail to link non-Muslim white perpetrators of mass violence to terrorism (Bell, 2018; Dreier et al., 2022). In the post-9/11 context, terrorism has been framed as a primarily Muslim phenomenon (Corbin, 2017), and this has exacerbated the stigmatization of Muslims in multicultural societies. Such coverage can cause people to withdraw from the public sphere. As Participant E, ⁹ who works in the community sector explained, sensationalized media coverage that links violent extremism to Muslims “really impacts their ability to engage, to stay engaged” as full citizens in public life.

When it comes to reporting on violent extremists themselves, there is a delicate balance between reporting on a matter of very real public interest, while also ensuring such reporting does not incidentally serve the objectives of violent extremists (Phillips, 2018). As Participant M, ¹⁰ a journalist, explained: “the most difficult thing working in this space is the balance between telling the stories that matter and that are important for democracy and society, and platforming [extremists].” It is a balance that Australian media have generally failed to get right according to Participant G, ¹¹ a civil society representative who warned that Australian media often inadvertently “do the propaganda work of extremists for them.” Sensitive coverage of violent extremism is possible, as the protocol adopted by New Zealand’s five major news outlets for covering the trial of the Christchurch terrorist. These guidelines, aimed at limiting coverage of “statements that actively champion white supremacist or terrorist ideology,” helped to keep excerpts from the perpetrator’s so-called manifesto, as well as any symbols, imagery, or gestures made by the shooter promoting his ideology during the trial, out of the news (Stuff, 2019).

According to several of our interviewees, Australian newsrooms are largely under-prepared and under-resourced to report on extremism, particularly far-right extremists. This presents a serious barrier to building a democratically resilient public sphere, as extremists “understand what the weaknesses of the Australian media are and how to use it to their own ends,” according to Participant J. Reporting on extremists like neo-Nazi’s should focus “not on what they say, but what they do. . . and how those actions effect society,” according to Participant M. Civil society representatives tended to agree, with Participant G ¹² noting that reporting on violent extremism needs to be guided by an approach that informs the public “without giving violent extremists the oxygen that gives them celebrity status and helps them recruit and helps solidify their internal strength.” As Participant I, ¹³ an academic researching the Australian far right explained:

On the one hand, you want people to know what the threats are. . . But if every time there is a Nazi swastika scrawled on a street sign and it hits the media, it just gives the extremists exactly what they want, because they are engaged in an information war. . . It encourages them try to do more stunts to get in the media because they want more attention.

Based on these insights, we suggest government (both state and Commonwealth) explore ways to support newsrooms to develop best practice guidelines for harm minimization in reporting on violent extremism, and create opportunities to share lessons from research with media practitioners. Best practice guidelines for reporting on sensitive topics, such as suicide, can provide a starting point or framework for how to better manage reporting on violent extremism (Beckett, 2016). While researchers in other jurisdictions like the US have developed guidelines for careful reporting on violent extremism in collaboration with journalists and editors (e.g., Phillips, 2018), it is crucial that any guidelines are developed with specific attention to context. As journalist Participant H explained, these issues need to be probably contextualized and appropriate for an Australian setting: “we take so many of our cues from American reporting. . . are we making sure that the Australian nuance is properly conveyed?”

How Government Engages With Civil Society and the Public

Building a cohesive civil society network is central to the NSW CVE program. As noted in recent evaluations of NSW CVE programming, “further effort should be directed to community-based prevention,” with an emphasis on “bottom-up” programs (Acil Allen Consulting, 2019), while ensuring that “community networks are being led from within” (Wise et al., 2018). Of course, civil society is not in itself a panacea for violent extremism, as civil society organizations are not necessarily pro-democracy (Lundberg, 2021). Indeed, civil society organizations can and have provided support for illiberal and anti-democratic movements, so it is vital that community-directed CVE efforts support the flourishing of a “pro-democratic civil society” (Pedahzur, 2003).

Interviews with civil society actors working in the CVE space at both the state and national level in Australia highlighted several barriers hindering the formation of a vibrant, pro-democracy civil society network, as well as broader issues of community trust. What our interviews highlight is a pressing need for the government to increase its emphasis on consequentiality in its engagement with community and civil society. Consequentiality is about deliberative engagements having an impact on outcomes (Felicetti, 2016). This includes not only concrete policy decisions via influence on decision makers, but also informal effects such as cultural change (Dryzek, 2010). Government needs to demonstrate how civil society input will be valued, and communicate the next steps.

Trust was frequently cited as the issue inhibiting community relationships with the NSW Government in the CVE space and affecting the resilience building efforts. Several interviewees working in civil society organizations pointed to a series of workshops in 2015-2016 run by the Commonwealth Attorney General’s office as a critical juncture where trust was severely damaged, and this impacted some of those working in NSW. According to Participant E, many community and civil society organizations who attended these workshops were already sceptical of the sincerity (and ability) of government to meaningfully work with community in this space: “they [Attorney General’s Office] weren’t well aware of the communities that were connecting to them. They didn’t know how to engage with us.” When the workshop concluded with no decisive outcome and without follow-up (i.e., a lack of consequential engagement), many participants felt the process to be little more than a box-ticking exercise. The result has been a lack of trust among some in the community sector with respect to the Commonwealth’s commitment to social cohesion, which has carried over into the NSW CVE setting.

To help address this, government should also look to create spaces and opportunities for listening and reflection. While democracy is usually associated with the practice of expression—finding a “voice,” speaking up, and making oneself heard—listening and reflection are equally important practices in a well-functioning democracy. It is important from a deliberative perspective that decision-makers and other empowered elites listen and learn from the lived experiences of diverse communities. Such practices of “institutional listening” shift the responsibility from citizens to express their voice onto government institutions to make themselves receptive and responsive (Scudder et al., 2021).

In addition to trust, the representatives of civil society organizations interviewed for this study pointed repeatedly to issues of funding and the difficulty of sustaining relationships with NSW government agencies. Even the flagship COMPACT Program, which was designed specifically to address these problems by providing multi-year grants through a partnership model (Multicultural NSW, 2023), was still affected by these concerns according to interviewees. While competitive submissions processes are standard for grant funding across a range of NSW Government programs areas, it can introduce unintended problems for civil society organizations. As a Participant E explained:

COMPACT brought together an incredible alliance around social cohesion at a time when it was much needed. But when the next funding round comes around and new projects get picked up, some of those amazing relationships are severed. We need a grants process that can integrate new projects with existing ones so that the knowledge and experience can be shared to better tackle these complex issues.

How Dis- and Mis-Information Are Addressed

The spread of dis- and mis-information, as well as violent extremist content, poses a serious challenge to the deliberative integrity of the public sphere. Particularly in the fast-moving digital space, the proliferation of dis- and mis-information can cause harm by stoking community tensions, increasing political polarization, and undermining trust in government.

Current programs aimed at media literacy in NSW focus on online safety and are targeted primarily at youth via school curriculum programs. While recent research has highlighted a need for further curricular development and application of news and media education in Australian schools (Dezuanni et al., 2020), these programs are not necessarily fit for purpose in terms of addressing the specific challenges of information pollution and extremist content. As Participant B, ¹⁴ a senior public servant explained:

young people feel there is a disconnect between the skills they are learning in the [e-safety] curriculum. . . there is a gap between the real-world experience of what young people are experiencing online and their ability to translate critical thinking skills to that space.

As such, there is a need to think beyond school programs, including as Participant G suggested, broader education initiatives similar to public health campaigns in Australia. But, while digital and media literacy is important, approaches that only address individual critical thinking are not enough. The challenge posed by dis- and mis-information and violent extremist content online also requires addressing the policy and technological structures that allow for such content to proliferate. As Participant J explained:

the biggest issue to action on misinformation is that every technology company gets to set the terms of what information they share and how we understand it. They are all black boxes. . . [transparency] is what government should be pushing for to inform good policy.

Though primarily the responsibility of the Commonwealth, government at both state/territory and federal levels need to push for greater action from major technology companies like Google or Meta, particularly around transparency on algorithmic design and the development and application of standards for content moderation.

Conclusion

To date, the default approach in Australia has been to “strengthen an already startling counter-terrorism law regime—not to develop innovative ways for countering the threat over the longer-term” (Hardy, 2019, p. 274). In this paper, we shift the focus from counter-terrorism law regime to the public sphere in tackling violent extremism. Drawing on the theory of deliberative democracy we focused on the public sphere, conceptualized democratic resilience, and identified the key factors that matter for building democratic resilience.

We defined democratic resilience as the ability of the public sphere (institutions and actors) to respond to extremist attacks and threats without losing its democratic capacity understood in deliberative terms: reflective, competent, inclusive. To unpack and contextualize how these terms might look in practice, we drew on interviews with key public servants and civil society actors involved in developing CVE policies and practices in NSW. The purpose of the empirical research was to contextualize and refine, rather than test, the theoretical ideas discussed in this paper.

Our research shows democracies can take deliberate steps to build and strengthen the resilience of the public sphere in the face of violent extremism. Having said that, the purpose of this paper is not to provide a checklist of required actions. Rather, our aim is to present a set of issues public sphere actors, such as government, need to reflect on and take into consideration in their CVE efforts. While the research conducted for this report focused on possible ways forward for the NSW Government in Australia, it contains lessons for other jurisdictions, and other countries as well, given the global challenges posed by violent extremism.

Our work focused primarily on the democratic resilience of the public sphere in responding to far-right and jihadist forms of violent extremism, consistent with the contemporary threat landscape in Australia (ASIO, 2023, 2024) and the focus of the NSW CVE agenda. As such, our analysis does not engage with other forms of violent extremism, such as those motivated by anti-government or involuntary celibate (Incel) ¹⁵ beliefs—which fall outside the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation’s (ASIO) two main categories of violent extremism: religiously motivated (RMVE) and ideologically motivated (IMVE; ASIO, 2023, 2024)—or left-wing violent extremism, which is not present in contemporary Australia (Campion, 2023; Peucker et al., 2023). Nevertheless, other forms of violent extremism still carry similair considerations for the public sphere in that they can stoke division and distrust, distort the processes of deliberation and opinion formation, and spread exclusionary and anti-democratic ideals, and so the responses of public sphere actors remain critical for containing the harm of such acts. For example, the response to misogynistic violent extremism in Australia has seen commentators and politicians “dismiss or rationalize” this kind of violent extremism (Tomkinson, 2020, p. 160), and has risked “treating this threat only at the point of violent acts” (Agius et al., 2022, p. 697). Future research should consider the way public sphere actors like media or political leaders respond to other forms of violent extremism like those motivated by male supremacism, to better nuance the democratic resilience framework and identify context specific considerations.