This article proves the existence of perplexing cases where individual irrationality is more conducive than individual rationality to producing rational and Pareto-efficient social preferences. Though the existence of such cases does not undermine the overall importance of individual rationality in achieving desirable social outcomes, it does establish that the nature of that importance is `contextual' or `context-dependent'.
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