Identity-Based Irrationality and the Goal-Directed Theory of Emotions

Abstract

This article introduces identity-based irrationality, a form of emotional irrationality that arises when the evaluations eliciting an emotion conflict with a person's deep, identity-constituting beliefs and desires. While the goal-directed theory (GDT) of emotions accounts for apparent (Type-1) and theoretical (Type-2) irrationality, it does not capture cases where emotions are structurally inconsistent with the agent's deep self. Drawing on theories of the deep self, identity-based irrationality is characterized as a conflict between circumstantial evaluative hierarchies operative in the moment and more enduring identity hierarchies that organize the person's commitments. Through illustrative cases, the paper argues that this form of irrationality is neither merely apparent nor grounded in erroneous representations of the situation, but instead reflects an evaluative structural irrationality. It concludes by assessing three ways the GDT might accommodate such conflicts and argues that incorporating identity-level structure is necessary for a complete account of emotional irrationality.