Abstract
The civil wars in Myanmar and Sri Lanka were both long-lasting ethnic conflicts. While the government of Myanmar is still fighting with several ethnic armed groups, a series of ceasefires were reached with around 25 armed groups during 1989–2009, and more after 2011. Sri Lanka also went through a period of seemingly successful peace process during 2002–2003 when the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) agreed to a permanent ceasefire under Norway’s mediation. However, the peace agreement soon failed and the military defeated the Tamils in 2009. Although the two wars had different outcomes—one in relatively successful ceasefires and the other in a military victory, the minorities in both countries are still under the dominance and oppression of the federal government. This paper tries to account for the difference in the settlements of the two wars as well as for the reasons why more durable peace could not be achieved in both cases. It argues that the Myanmar government used the ceasefires as its tool for state consolidation while showing no genuine commitment to a political solution. On the other hand, the Sri Lankan peace process failed because the two parties had completely different visions for a political settlement. Thus, for a peace process to be truly successful, both sides must come to an agreement on a political solution through power-sharing.
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