Countering the Wave of Democratic Backsliding and the Crisis of Democracy in West Africa

Abstract

While the early 1990s ushered in a period of democratic transition in African countries, the last decade has witnessed what many observers have called the process of democratic backsliding in many parts of West Africa. This article examines and analyses some of the main causes of democratic retrenchment in the West Africa sub-region and how to address them. The main argument in this article is that various constraints and challenges, such as the increasing return of the military in politics, electoral manipulations, constitutional reforms to benefit incumbents and the lack of economic dividends for citizens, are undermining the democratic progress initially made in the 1990s. Thus, addressing the challenges that lead to military intervention, including poor socioeconomic conditions, would go a long way in stemming the tide of democratic backsliding in West Africa. Additionally, ensuring increasing trust in institutions such as the judiciary, media, electoral management bodies and the electoral system, coupled with an increasing role for civil society organizations in the political environment, would help combat democratic backsliding in the sub-region.

Introduction

Braimah and Forson (2023, 223) have pointed out that prior to the early 1990s, the African continent was variously described by Western and European political leaders, international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and foreign media outlets as a place of despotic governments, widespread corruption, disease, ignorance, abject poverty, illiterate population, ethnic mobilisation and a theatre of war and rebellion. Similarly, discussing the predicament of some countries in West Africa, Kaplan (1994), for example, had a pessimistic and dire view by suggesting that the sub-region was characterised by worsening environmental stress and degradation, climate change, widespread disease, resource and ethnic conflicts and rural–urban migration. It is within this context that Woldense and Kroeger (2024) argue that facing both domestic and international pressures for change, most African autocrats from the early 1990s became part of what Samuel Huntington (1991) called the ‘third wave’ of democratisation by adopting multiparty elections and initiating other liberalising reforms. Despite the optimism that greeted the onset of the ‘third wave’ of democratisation, this has cooled and there is a trend of global uncertainty regarding the state of democracy. Notably, in the West Africa sub-region, for example, military coups in Mali (2020), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022) and Niger (2023); the extending of presidential term limits in Togo (2024), Guinea (2020) and Côte d’Ivoire (2020); the manipulation of elections to favour a particular candidate or party in Nigeria (2023); and the threats of violence and intimidation in the pre-election phase in Senegal are all indicative of the democratic challenges that are occurring in the region. It is because of these developments in West Africa and around the world that Arriola, Rakner and van de Walle (2023a) and Bellamy and Kröger (2021) argue that we are currently witnessing democratic backsliding, which is a shift from democracy towards autocracy. The instability of many new democracies and the proliferation of stable competitive authoritarian regimes have pushed the issue of democratic backsliding to the centre of political and academic debate (Bellamy and Kröger 2021); thus, the phenomenon is being increasingly researched by various scholars.

The primary focus of this article is to explore broad questions on the state of democracy in the West Africa sub-region and how recent concerns with democratic backsliding can be addressed. The article examines the rise in military rule and the challenges it poses for the democratic consolidation process in West Africa. It evaluates the policies that can help counter the deviation from the democratic system of government in the West Africa sub-region. The article is shaped by the following questions: What is behind the recent spate of military coups in West Africa? What are the consequences of these coups on the democratic processes in the West African region? What can be done to ensure that the democratic processes become more resilient? By addressing these questions, the article contributes to the emerging literature on democratic backsliding in the context of West Africa. Another significant contribution of this article is that it highlights some of the existing explanations and provides some interesting food for thought on the current state of democratisation in West Africa. Additionally, it offers invaluable insights and provokes further investigations into how the recent democratic backsliding could be combated.

The article is divided into five sections. The first section begins with a clarification of the concept of liberal democracy, which theoretically underpins this article. It also discusses the various definitions that are found in the literature on the idea of democratic backsliding. The second section examines the causes that have been advanced by scholars to help explain democratic backsliding. The third section discusses the state of democracy in the West African sub-region, with a particular focus on areas where the democratic process seems to be thriving. It highlights the case of countries such as Ghana, Liberia and Senegal that have been quite successful in consolidating their democratic process. The fourth section analyses the increasing concerns that have cropped up because of developments that undermine the democratic process in West Africa. It draws on the cases of several countries such as Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger and Togo to illustrate the problem of democratic backsliding bedevilling West Africa. The final section highlights measures and strategies that can help to combat democratic backsliding in the sub-region.

Theoretical Discussions on Liberal Democracy and Democratic Backsliding

This article is grounded in the theory of liberal democracy, which, as a concept, has not only been the focus of debate among political theorists but also often invokes different meanings. While there is no single definition, the idea of liberal democracy is very often based on several ideas and propositions, as well as being associated with certain characteristics. As articulated by Dahl (1989) in his discussion of polyarchy, for a country to be considered a liberal democracy, it must exhibit certain features such as elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office and additional institutional characteristics such as associational autonomy and freedom of expression. Mechkova, Lührmann and Lindberg (2017) make a similar argument by noting that the characteristics of democracy include: rule by the people’s consent; the holding of de facto free and fair multiparty elections, including for the executive (whether the vote is direct or indirect); the guarantee of universal suffrage; and considerable freedom of association and expression. If, in addition to those conditions of freedom and competitiveness surrounding elections, a country boasts the rights-securing rule of law as well as effective judicial and legislative constraints on executive power, then it qualifies as a liberal democracy. In addition to the importance of the existence of a free, independent and vibrant media, Mohammed (2023) states that the research by Levine and Molina (2011) merits special attention for their procedural definition of democracy, which emphasises five qualities: electoral decision; participation; accountability; responsiveness; and sovereignty. From these discussions, it can be argued that the fundamental principles and features of democracy include public participation, civic activism, equality, tolerance, accountability, transparency, regular, free and fair elections, accepting the results of elections, economic freedom, controlling and preventing the abuse of power, human rights, multiparty system and the rule of law (Lewis 2008; Masipa 2018).

Although seen as a Western concept, the underlying ideas of liberal democracy have been adopted and contextually applied to many countries, including those in Africa. Seeking to emulate the successes of the liberal democratic system of government, many African countries have adopted the processes, structures and institutions that have underpinned Western liberal democracies. These processes and institutions have included, among others, periodic free and fair competitive multiparty elections; political freedoms such as those of speech, press, assembly, movement and association; as well as minority rights, limited government, and open market economies (Braimah and Forson 2023). The existence of oversight bodies, such as the judiciary and independent institutions, including civil society organisations (CSOs), is also part of the democratic structures in many African countries. Braimah and Forson (2023), however, contend that there is a need to indigenise and Africanise Western liberal democracy to mirror African cultural values and outlook to foster peace and national development. To this end, they propose constitutional limitation of the executive branch of government and the placing of limits on the number of political parties that can compete during elections. They also advocate broader participation in governance and increased participation of women in the political landscape.

Apart from the debate among political theorists regarding the definition and characteristics of liberal democracy, a related issue under discussion is democratic backsliding. Democratic backsliding has been defined by Waldner and Lust (2018, 95) as ‘a deterioration of qualities associated with democratic governance, within any regime. In democratic regimes, it is a decline in the quality of democracy; in autocracies, it is a decline in democratic qualities of governance’. On the other hand, Bellamy and Kröger (2021) see democratic backsliding as involving a situation where the incumbent government retreats from democratic values and practices by curtailing criticism and inhibiting the opposition. For Bermeo (2016), democratic backsliding is when political institutions that help sustain democracy are eliminated or undermined. Besides, as stated by Haggard and Kaufman (2021, 27), democratic consolidation is the ‘incremental erosion of institutions, rules, and norms that results from the actions of duly elected governments’. They argue that democratic backsliding is made up of three causal factors and components: polarisation; the capture of the executive and legislative institutions; and the incremental subversion of democratic institutions or what they call ‘democratic regress by stealth’. Finally, suggesting a detailed concept rooted in a rigorous discussion of democracy itself, Jee, Lueders and Myrick (2022) consider democratic backsliding as any change of a political community’s formal or informal rules that reduces that community’s ability to guarantee the freedom of choice, freedom from tyranny or equality in freedom.

From these definitions, we see that although widely used across different disciplines, there is a lack of agreement on the precise meaning and conceptualisation of democratic backsliding (Wolkenstein 2023). The conceptual imprecision of democratic backsliding, coupled with its subjective starting point and lack of measurement strategies, often leads to suspicions that the phenomenon might not be as relevant as portrayed (Bauer and Becker 2020). It is in this regard that Little and Meng (2024) argue that to make accurate claims of democratic backsliding, there is a need for reliable ways to measure democracy, which is itself a notoriously difficult problem. A similar argument is made by Jee, Lueders and Myrick (2022), who state that the challenge and inattention to the measurement of backsliding and the underlying concept of democracy drive the disagreements found when it comes to defining democratic backsliding. Despite the conceptual quandaries, for this article, democratic backsliding is defined as a retreat by an incumbent government from democratic values and practices with the intention of curtailing criticism and inhibiting democratic opposition (Bellamy and Kröger 2021). It is a loss in the quality of liberal democracy and its key elements of freely and fairly elected governments that help the electorate hold governments accountable (Berlucchi and Kellam 2023). Another conceptual approach, which is influenced by Wunsch and Blanchard (2023) and employed in this article, is that democratic backsliding incorporates actions and activities that threaten to weaken democratic features and safeguards such as repression of opponents of the government, citizens’ capacity to challenge and oppose leaders or specific decisions, institutional constraints upon executive power, and checks and balances in the political system.

Causes of Democratic Backsliding

Almost three decades ago, Fukuyama (1995) explained that we have come to the ‘end of history’ and that liberal democracy is the final form of human government and the ‘only game in town’. However, this assertion is being challenged because of the democratic backsliding that is occurring in various parts of the world. Over the last decade, scholars have taken great interest in the threats to democracy and the interrelated issue of democratic backsliding (Boese et al. 2022). As pointed out by Boese et al. (2022), the last ten years set the world back to the final year of the Cold War in terms of democratic development. The average level of democracy in the world has, as noted by Mechkova, Lührmann and Lindberg (2017), slipped back to where it was before the year 2000, with democracies becoming less liberal and autocracies less competitive and more repressive. Analysing the state of democracy around the world in 2021, Boese et al. (2022) pointed out that in 2021, autocracies were on the rise, harbouring 70% of the world population, or 5.4 billion people. As they note, the level of liberal democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen in 2021 is down to a level last seen in 1989. Not only has there been a substantial deterioration in freedom of expression since 2021 in a record 35 countries, but also only ten countries were advancing on this measure. Moreover, for rule of law, quality of elections and freedom of association, the number of countries in decline by 2021 far outweighed the number making progress (Boese et al. 2022).

So, what exactly are the causes of this trend of democratic backsliding and the increasing democratic crisis? A rich emerging literature has highlighted a wide range of theories on the causes of democratic backsliding. The literature on democratic decline notes that the phenomenon cannot be attributed to one singular factor but rather can be explained by a variety of factors. One of the dominant narratives in the literature on democratic backsliding focuses on the rise of populist leaders who have come to embody the views of citizens who feel disenchanted and cheated by the upper echelons of society, who are perceived as using their positions to take advantage of those in the lower levels (Bernhard 2021). Explained by Berlucchi and Kellam (2023, 819) as a ‘thin-centred ideology that pits the pure people against the corrupt elites and claims that politics should represent the general will of the people’, populism and its conquest of government authority (Bauer and Becker 2020), according to Berlucchi and Kellam (2023), present a threat to democracies because of their inherently anti-pluralist and illiberal elements. As argued by Berlucchi and Kellam (2023, 819), populists exclude and antagonise those who do not belong to it: economic, intellectual and political elites are often seen as the enemies of common people and marginalised social groups, such as ethnic, religious and sexual minorities. This exclusionary ideology thus challenges the underlying ideas of liberal democracy, particularly as it relates to the protection of minority rights. Similar arguments have been advanced by Bellamy and Kröger (2021, 622–23), who state that democratic backsliding regimes attempt to undermine the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law by packing the courts, especially the constitutional court, with individuals who would do their bidding. The attacks on state structures and the other critical elements of a liberal democratic system of governance all serve to weaken the opposition and allow governments to rule unbridled. Moreover, they are justified by using a rhetoric that is avowedly anti-pluralist, intolerant of minority groups and voices, and discriminatory towards racial, gender, religious and ideological differences.

In addition to populism, Berlucchi and Kellam (2023, 822) have observed that governments with supermajorities and their ability to eliminate legislative checks have contributed to the democratic backsliding that is occurring in certain countries. Once populist leaders have secured executive power with their parliamentary majorities, Bernhard (2021) argues that

they then move to curtail horizontal checks and balances, gutting judicial oversight and other autonomous regulatory agencies. Many also try to undermine social accountability by passing legislation or engaging in informal practices that undermine the ability of civil society and the independent media to impose costs on office holders.

Berlucchi and Kellam (2023, 822) add that supermajority governments often change electoral rules in their party’s favour, rewrite the constitution, do away with previous constitutional checks and balances, and maintain control over previously autonomous public agencies that might have served to constrain the power of the government. Thus, having supermajorities not only allows incumbents to push their advantage over a divided or weak opposition (Arriola et al. 2023a), but it also enables governments to use their legislative majority to gain control and influence other decision-making state structures and institutions such as the judiciary and other oversight agencies (Berlucchi and Kellam 2023).

Furthermore, Bellamy and Kröger (2021) provide a good grounding for understanding some of the issues and concerns with democratic backsliding. As they argue, states engaged in democratic backsliding progressively undermine components of the minimal definition of democracy. First, they diminish the fairness of elections and amend the constitution so as to entrench their own ideological preferences, with the implication that they cease to be subject to party competition. Also, backsliding states reduce civil and political rights, diminishing freedom of speech through control of the main public and private media outlets, making criticism of the government liable to persecution on the grounds of defamation, slander or incitement to public disorder; and using tax law and regulations against foreign funding or interference in political processes to limit freedom of association and the organisation of opposition within civil society. A final argument is that by Grumbach (2023), who noted the role played by polarisation in democratic contractions. According to him, in addition to increasing the need to ensure that opponents are unsuccessful in their efforts to win office, an incumbent government in a polarised state has the tendency to undertake policies that impact the democratic process, such as election laws that influence the cost of voting for different groups in the state. Boese et al. (2022) add that the increasing consequences of polarisation in politics have been the increasing tendency towards autocratisation and democratic backsliding. When polarisation becomes toxic, voters are more likely to disregard democratic priorities in favour of loyalty to the in-group (Boese et al. 2022).

West African Democracy in Focus

The preceding discussions have highlighted some of the theories that have been employed to explain democratic backsliding and the scholarly consensus that has emerged regarding the negative impact of the phenomenon on countries. This brings us to the issue of the current state of democracy in the West Africa sub-region. It needs to be pointed out that the experiences of West African countries with the democratic process vary considerably. The variation is epitomised by the fact that there are some very positive signs that point to the consolidation of the democratic processes in the West Africa sub-region. First, apart from the notable progress in areas such as economic growth, there is also a strong preference for democracy among West Africans. As Arriola, Rakner and van de Walle (2023b) suggest, apart from a majority in Africa supporting democratic forms of government, political participation has increased significantly since the onset of multiparty elections in the early 1990s, with the number of civic associations and interest groups in constant growth. The consequences are that even when the electoral playing field is tilted heavily in favour of incumbents, elections do retain the potential to change the political equilibrium. For example, according to Osae-Kwapong (2023), support for democracy was 74% in the survey period 1999–2001, and 70% in the survey period 2021–2023. In Ghana, for example, Oduro, Selvik and Dupuy (2023, 112) note that there is ‘strong popular support for democratic rule. In the most recent Afrobarometer survey in 2022, 76% of Ghanaians expressed support for a democratic form of government as opposed to other forms of governance, and 67% rejected military rule’. Furthermore, Osae-Kwapong (2023) notes that there is still a strong preference for a key democratic activity—the use of elections as the key method for choosing leaders. In the survey period 2002–2003, 81% expressed support for elections; and in the survey period 2021–2023, 78% still expressed support for elections. To add, confidence in elections (the percentage of those who say the most recent election was completely free and fair) has improved. In the survey period 1999–2002, 27% had confidence in election outcomes compared to 40% in the survey period 2021–2023. Finally, Ghana’s strengthening democracy, as noted by Mohammed (2023), is epitomised by the eight successive elections that have occurred in the country and which culminated in three alternations of power in 2001, 2009 and 2017.

Additionally, the achievements of the democratic process in West Africa have been assisted by the increasing improvements in the role of CSOs that have developed the political space for expression and representation (Arthur 2010). As demonstrated by the examples below, with a vibrant civil society central to any democratic society, it is heartwarming that various CSOs are playing important roles in influencing government policy in the democratic period. According to Botchway (2018), CSOs have provided enlightenment to the citizenry on various aspects of democracy, such as helping, for example, the average Ghanaian to comprehend and appreciate major important facets of the country’s young democracy. A clear illustration of this point, as Botchway (2018) argues, is the fact that over the years, CSOs have organised and mobilised people to monitor Ghana’s elections, especially within the Fourth Republic; and that their independent monitoring has helped in ensuring the credibility of elections. Likewise, CSOs organised and led protests in Ghana in 2024 over the increased cost of living and the negative impact of illegal mining, popularly called galamsey, which was destroying local forests and water bodies, as well as contributing to other forms of environmental degradation. Such protests show how CSOs can help hold governments accountable and make them responsive to citizens. Thus, for Botchway (2018), CSOs have inculcated into the citizenry civic virtues and the principles of good governance and democracy in general and contributed to the prevailing culture of cooperation, relative tolerance, respect for the rule of law and mass participation of citizens in public affairs.

In addition, the positives of the democratic process and successful transitions of power in countries like Ghana, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Liberia show that democratic consolidation is occurring in West Africa. For example, Liberia’s October 2023 election for the legislature and presidency, and a November presidential runoff, saw a record 78% turnout rate. The opposition presidential candidate, Joseph Boakai, won by beating incumbent President George Weah by 1.3% of the vote. President Weah conceded and handed over power, noting that, ‘Liberia has won’. Also, as argued by Campion and Jega (2023), electoral management bodies (EMBs), with their role of organising, monitoring and certifying elections, play a central role in the realisation of electoral integrity, and their performance significantly influences how citizens evaluate the quality of elections. Arthur (2010) makes a similar argument by noting that since electoral success or the lack thereof is dependent on how the Electoral Commission (EC) operates, it is critical that the EC is seen as undertaking its responsibilities in an independent as well as fair manner. It is thus positive that in Ghana, for example, apart from the existence of a very independent EC, which has held transparent as well as free and fair elections in the country, the judiciary, one of the key governance institutions, has also remained intact since independence, and its functions have not been suspended during the periods of military and one-party rule (Oduro et al. 2023). The transparency, fairness and effectiveness of the judiciary are some of the key benchmarks against which the quality of justice and the democratic process can be measured. An independent and effective judicial system is critical to addressing issues and problems associated with patronage, corruption and abuse of power, as well as protecting human rights and political and civil rights and liberties (Arthur 2010). Asomah (2020) has also discussed the role of the media in the democratic process. According to him, independent and free private media coupled with media pluralism are playing a constructive role in addressing political corruption in emerging democracies such as Ghana through investigative reporting, agenda-setting, providing a forum for anti-corruption discussions, and acting as a pressure group for institutional and legal reforms as well as political accountability. The media has exposed crime, corruption and incompetence among public officials, developed more critical and demanding attitudes toward their governments, and enabled citizens to participate in issues of importance to them (Arthur 2022).

Is Democracy Backsliding in the West Africa Sub-region?

Notwithstanding the strides and commendable achievements regarding the consolidation of the democratic process in some countries, the democratic trajectory has stalled and in some ways has not advanced in many West African countries. Instead, we are currently seeing concerns as epitomised by manipulations in electoral processes and military interventions that are negatively impacting the democratic processes in some countries in West Africa. For Arriola, Rakner and van de Walle (2023a), although African countries started holding regular multiparty elections in the early 1990s, these elections have become the default option of politics. For example, Mohammed (2023) notes that Guinea’s 82-year-old Alpha Condé disobeyed the two-term constitutional limit to have a third term through a violently disputed October 2020 election in which 20 people were killed. Similarly, President Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire defied a two-term limit and won a third term in October 2020 via an election that was not only boycotted by the opposition but also marred by serious irregularities and violence that claimed 85 lives. Likewise, in Togo, electoral and constitutional changes were undertaken by the country’s lawmakers in April 2024. Togo’s existing constitution had made provision for the president of the country to be elected by universal suffrage for a term of five years, renewable once. However, as noted by Adaba (2024), because the incumbent President Faure Gnassingbé’s Union for the Republic/Union pour la République (UNIR) party already had a supermajority in the legislature, it was able to adopt and approve the constitutional changes and reforms. The constitutional reforms allowed Togo to transition from a presidential system to a parliamentary one and also granted power and authority to parliament to select the president of the country without debate for a single six-year term (Aradi 2024). For critics, including academics, opposition political parties and CSOs in Togo, by resorting to what Schedler (2002) has referred to as the ‘menu of manipulation’, the constitutional reform became an ‘institutional coup’ that was aimed at maintaining and extending Faure Gnassingbé’s grip on power. This is because the constitutional reforms allowed Faure Gnassingbé, who had ruled the country from 2005 after the death of his father, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, to take a new post as ‘president of the council of ministers’. This new post is similar to the role of a prime minister, who automatically is the leader of the majority party in parliament (Booty and Négoce 2024). Finally, in Nigeria, Green, Mitchell and Twining (2023) point out that the 2023 election, which delivered the presidency to Bola Tinubu, the ruling All Progressives Congress party’s candidate, was widely described as ‘flawed’ by both internal and external observers. Apart from the widespread delays in poll openings, the election was characterised by violent disruptions of the voting process and the outright manipulation of results, which left voters in many states disenfranchised.

Furthermore, the rise of populism in the political landscape of some West African countries can be described as being related to the spate of military coups that occurred in countries like Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Guinea from 2020 to 2023. The coups in these countries were led by revolutionary populist military personnel who were pursuing more radical goals than their electoral counterparts and undertaking a comprehensive transformation of political and/or social institutions (Haynes 2022). The coups resulted in ECOWAS suspending and then sanctioning all four countries. These sanctions included a commercial no-fly zone and a freeze on all assets held in ECOWAS central banks. Subsequently, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, which are all currently led by military juntas, announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS in a televised broadcast on 28 January 2024. Formalising their departure from ECOWAS, the three countries signed a treaty in July 2024 to form a new confederation, the Alliance of Sahel States, with a goal of supporting each other against outside threats and aggression, as well as internal security challenges such as armed rebellion. They suggested that ECOWAS had moved ‘away from the ideals of its founding fathers and Pan-Africanism’, and fallen ‘under the influence of foreign powers’. They also accused ECOWAS of ‘inhumane sanctions’ because the regional body closed their borders in response to the coups that had occurred in the three countries. The border closures cut the three landlocked countries off from major trading partners.

However, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger exiting ECOWAS is viewed by most observers of politics in the region as part of an emerging crisis, and there are fears that it could set in motion the disintegration of the regional body. Obadare and Patel (2024) have argued that the exit from ECOWAS does not augur well for democracy in the three countries and the region as a whole. According to them, the leadership of ECOWAS had hoped that the countries’ suspension and diplomatic pressure to set a timeline for elections would pave the way for a return to democracy. Instead, leaving ECOWAS frees members of the new confederation, the Alliance of Sahel States, from their obligations to the body and relieves them of the demand to transition to civilian rule, especially under ECOWAS’ protocol on democracy and good governance. This protocol, which was adopted in 2001, is aimed at deterring military coups and unconstitutional changes of government in the region (Júnior and Luciano 2020). The coups and other issues discussed above are clear demonstrations of not only the detrimental consequences of democratic backsliding but also that the West Africa sub-region is currently devoid of the optimism that greeted the transition to democratic rule from the early 1990s.

Equally worrying is the fact that many citizens in some West African countries (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) have welcomed the staging of military coups and the erosion of democratic norms (Arezki 2022; Chigozie and Oyinmiebe 2022). Citizens in these countries have accused their former coloniser, France, and democratically elected leaders of being complicit in their economic plight by exploiting natural resources for their own benefits (Aina and Al-bakri Nyei 2022). The military rulers, according to Aina and Al-bakri Nyei (2022), are welcomed because they are considered by citizens as rescuers from neo-colonial exploitation and a credible alternative to the band of corrupt and unrepentant political elites that have betrayed their confidence. This shows the disappointments and frustrations that citizens in these countries have developed towards democratic governance, which have contributed to the surge of authoritarianism. Emegwa (2024) opines that in Nigeria, socio-economic factors such as high inflation, widespread corruption, constant threat of insurgents and growing insecurity, as well as poor infrastructure, have had a debilitating effect on any development gains that the country’s democracy might have been able to deliver. These factors have hindered the ability of the Nigerian democratic process to grant its citizens the better life they hoped for after the fall of the military regime in 1999. Thus, the perceptions of not getting ‘a fair share’ and of low relative mobility create feelings of economic resentment (Vachudova 2020), which then makes populist leaders and military coups appealing and attractive to citizens.

A recent Afrobarometer Report (2023) showed that African citizens are committed to democracy and most indicators of support for democratic institutions remain strong and quite steady. At the same time, about 28% of citizens were dissatisfied with the performance of civilian governments and democracy and therefore preferred autocratic systems of government. This, therefore, raises the issue of why some citizens are becoming disenchanted with the democratic process and what can be done to stem the tide of creeping authoritarianism, military rule and democratic backsliding in Africa. There is the increasing perception that governance in democratic African countries is biased towards the wealthy, and has not yielded dividends for many. This has led to dissatisfaction among the public, especially those who are economically less off in society. The stalled political and economic transformation (Cheeseman 2019) and various economic challenges, as shown by high unemployment, income inequality, rising inflation and high levels of poverty among certain segments of the population in West Africa, have sowed the seeds of dissatisfaction and discontent with democratic governance. While the economic concerns of citizens cannot be discounted, the creeping military incursions into the political arena and its embrace by certain sectors of society pose a real challenge for the future of democracy in the West African region.

Aside from the concerns stemming from the military coups in the West Africa sub-region, a country like Senegal, which was often viewed as the bastion of democratic rule, recently saw its share of electoral-related problems. While Senegal has witnessed three peaceful electoral elections and handover of power on three occasions, it is also contending with challenges that fed into the narrative of democratic backsliding. This is because President Macky Sall, who came to power in 2012 and was ineligible to run again for presidency, changed the electoral calendar by postponing the election that was scheduled to be held in February 2024 to December 2024. While the reason given by the government for this postponement was to supposedly ensure that all declared candidates were eligible to stand, the country through the judiciary and Constitutional Council had disqualified several candidates who were said to not have met set criteria. Additionally, the government employed severe force against demonstrators, suspended mobile internet as well as banned marches and demonstrations that were triggered against the government because of the manipulation of the electoral process. The prevailing view of the detention of opposition leaders and the crackdown of civil society was that President Sall was either trying to run for office again and thus hold on to power or that he was manipulating the electoral system to influence the choice of who succeeds him in office. In spite of these attempts by President Sall to stall the elections, it was a welcome development that the country’s seven-member electoral authority and Constitutional Council voided the decree postponing the elections by ruling that the move was unconstitutional and insisted that the elections be held in February 2024. Also significant was the fact that several opposition members and opponents of the government who had championed demonstrations against the government postponing the elections were released from prison. More importantly, a little over a week after his release from prison, Bassirou Diomaye Faye, the candidate of the opposition, won the March 2024 presidential elections in Senegal after defeating Amadou Ba, who represented the ruling administration. Amadou Ba gracefully accepted the results of the elections and conceded defeat. While these were positive developments that showed the resilience in the democratic process in Senegal, at the same time, it demonstrated the fragility of democracy since President Macky Sall tried desperately to weaken and undermine democratic norms and institutions in the country.

Theorists of liberal democracy argue that a free and independent media remain critical to the prospects of democratic consolidation (Arthur 2010). On this issue, not only has a country like Ghana repealed restrictive media, including the decriminalisation of criminal and seditious laws, but it has also passed a right to information law (RTI, Act 989) in 2019 (Oduro et al. 2023). Under the RTI, individuals were empowered to access information on central and local governments as well as non-governmental organisations that are publicly funded. Although the RTI was finally passed into law, Oduro et al. (2023) observed that the implementation has been slow, and there are indications that political elites are deliberately seeking to impede implementation. According to them, there has been a deliberate failure to put in place the required regulations and structures that would ensure the efficient operation of the law. Moreover, the media’s ability to conduct investigative journalism and scrutinise government actions and transactions in Ghana is challenged by the lack of resources and access to official and credible information (Oduro et al. 2023). In recent times, many West African countries have witnessed intimidation and physical assaults on media persons and journalists by political operatives and supporters of political parties, members of state security agencies and apparatuses, chiefly the police and army, and individual citizens (Nyarko and Akpojivi 2017). In Ghana, for example, Kwode, Asekere and Ayelazuno (2024) note that although the country is seen as a poster child of the consolidation of liberal democracy in Africa, the signal evidence of which is the freedom of the Ghanaian media, is currently under threat. As Gyimah-Boadi (2021) states, an undercover journalist, whose works exposed corruption and other criminal activities by government officials, including members of the judiciary, was killed under mysterious circumstances, and the perpetrators of his killing are yet to be captured and brought to justice. According to Nyarko and Akpojivi (2017), the threats to media personnel have not only raised concerns regarding how such actions hinder the independence, growth and development of the media, but also its negative consequences on the country’s democratic consolidation process. Moreover, for Kwode, Asekere and Ayelazuno (2024), the sustained death threats, assaults, use of unwarranted brute force, suspicions and murder of journalists mar the democratic image of Ghana. These incidents have raised concerns about the erosion of freedom and independence of the media in Ghana, a situation that is worrying enough to ignite a debate on whether the dark days of the culture of silence are returning to the country.

Additionally, the judiciary in Ghana, which has been described by Oduro et al. (2023) as performing its role independently, has, according to Mohammed (2023), exhibited inconsistency in its rulings from 2017 to date. This is due largely to the direct attempts to control the Supreme Court by packing it with sympathetic judges or with active members of the governing party. Moreover, because of increasing and escalating polarisation since 2016, the appointment and removal of commissioners in Ghana’s EC has fuelled allegations of bias and produced sustained attacks on the EC, predominantly from the party in opposition (Campion and Jega 2023). The situation is not unique to Ghana. Green, Mitchell, and Twining (2023) state that in Nigeria, the Independent National Electoral Commission’s lack of transparency throughout the 2023 election led to distrust in the results and the challenge by opposition parties of the electoral victory of the ruling All Progressives Congress party’s candidate, Bola Tinubu. All these occurrences in parts of West Africa are examples of the neutering of state structures, the erosion of democratic institutions and the degrading of the responsibilities that their governments have towards the democratic system of governance. It is such concerns that have pushed the issue of democratic backsliding and recession to the centre of political and academic debate.

The Way Forward to Remedy the Challenges to Democracy

Given the preceding discussions, we are faced with the issue of how to stem the tide of democratic backsliding in the West Africa sub-region and advance democratic efforts. The discussions that follow outline some of the strategies that can be employed to counter democratic backsliding in West Africa.

The Importance of Better Economic Opportunities

As noted earlier, unmet economic expectations have resulted in a distrust of established government structures and the turning against democratic institutions. According to Golob, Gorišek and Makarovič (2023), the poor socio-economic performance of democracies has made citizens more prone to endorse conspiracy theories and support authoritarian political leaders. Neerdaels, Tröster and Van Quaquebeke (2024) expound on this by stating that people living in poverty frequently experience social exclusion and devaluation, which is reflected in feelings of shame. The popular protests and the celebration of military coups by citizens that have occurred in many parts of West Africa since 2020 can be explained by the alienation of young people and their aspiration for better living conditions and economic opportunities (Arezki 2022; Chigozie and Oyinmiebe 2022). The consequences are that authoritarian leaders mobilise economic crises and grievances to fuel their own selfish ends, since individuals would turn their support to them mainly due to the promise of addressing their economic needs. Since economic distress makes individuals sceptical of the democratic process and helps to fuel authoritarianism, this article recommends that West African countries need to focus on meeting the socio-economic needs of their citizens. Quite revealing is the argument by Gyimah-Boadi (2021) that the growing public discontent over governments’ failure to address citizens’ need for jobs, health care, education, infrastructure and security have fuelled political discontent and instability in the West African sub-region. Since the value of people’s living standards lies in their living (Ameyaw-Brobbey and Amable 2023), economic dividends represent a key element of democratic consolidation, and democracy is compromised by the effects of poverty and inequality (Masipa 2018). While a hotly contested issue among liberal democratic theorists, the underlying assumption is that democratic consolidation and sustainability require policy-making that benefits the majority of the citizens, especially those who are relatively poor.

According to Masipa (2018), socio-economic crises and challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequality confronting countries often result in social instabilities as citizens resort to the streets to demonstrate their discontent. In Ghana, for example, Mohammed (2023) notes that although there are popular expectations and preferences of Ghanaians for democracy—freedom, socio-economic need for jobs, health care education, security, just to mention a few, these expectations are not being met. Thus, it can be reasonably argued that many individuals are open to supporting the democratic backsliding process because they see democratically elected leaders as corrupt and selfish who are often in power to advance their own interests as opposed to the public good. Thus, for democratic backsliding to stop, it is incumbent on leaders to ensure that the economic situations of citizens are improved. These views and perspectives are reminiscent of those expressed by Deglow and Fjelde (2024) to the effect that citizens’ negative evaluations of the performance of their democratic regimes spill over into wavering support for general democratic regime principles. Significantly, they observe that citizens’ commitment to democracy runs shallow, and that while they display an abstract allegiance to democracy, at the same time, they show acceptance of authoritarian alternatives. Thus, the inability to improve the socio-economic welfare of the people and reduce poverty and inequality has the potential to undermine the democratic consolidation process. While being supportive of democratic values, poverty can serve as a threat to democracy because the poor will feel healthy scepticism towards the way the government implements democracy (Virtanen 2015). Addressing poverty and adopting policies that help grow the middle class act as the drivers of democracy by demanding greater representation and accountability in return for their tax dollars, forcing the ruling elite into a series of concessions that over time, are extended to the lower classes (Cheeseman 2015). Therefore, addressing poverty-related issues and the promotion of a middle class cannot be underestimated. Resnick (2015) points out that a long tradition of scholarship highlights the perceived benefits of a growing middle class for democracy, ranging from a shift away from parochial to more cosmopolitan worldviews to greater demands for accountable government and to providing social cohesion and political stability. Positive economic performance and the growing number of citizens with greater purchasing power offer new opportunities that will limit the tendency to employ patron–client relationships in the political arena and help consolidate the democratic process. Since democratic consolidation requires addressing poverty and the socio‐economic ills confronting a country, Masipa (2018) calls for the adoption of a multipronged policy instrument that would grow the economy substantially and create much-needed jobs, which in turn reduce poverty and inequality.

Building Institutional Trust

Improving economic conditions alone would not be enough to secure and consolidate the democratic process. Thus, aside from ensuring that the democratic process provides economic dividends for citizens, Igwe and Amadi (2021) argue that without resolving the persistent political violence or its predisposing conditions, the prospects for sustainable democracy will remain bleak. Institutional overhaul and the transformation of political violence are thus central to democratisation; given the fragility and struggles to defend itself against illiberal political movements, Yesilkagit et al. (2014) contend that there is a need for what they term a ‘Guardian State’, which embraces liberal principles while acting as a defensive barrier against illiberal tendencies. For them, institutionalising guardianship and the promotion of strong administrative institutions that uphold liberal democratic norms and resist pressures from populist politicians are key norms within society that need to be strengthened in order to help against backsliding. Citizens need to have the trust that the institutions they rely on operate in a transparent, fair and impartial manner. The lack of adequate participation and empowerment in the liberal democratic process contributes to the disinterest and disengagement of citizens. In this regard, White (2024) contends that there is a need for what he calls a ‘radical representative democracy’ to restore confidence and overcome existing disquiet and unhappiness with existing democratic processes. Under this model and processes, which can help democracy to prosper and flourish in the future, White (2024) calls for not only mass participation in the development of party policy but also greater opportunity for party members to recall politicians who fail to deliver on those broad collective and public goods and agreed goals. Likewise, Gyimah-Boadi (2021) states that among other considerations for reversing the trend in democratic retreat in West Africa should be enhancing investments in the rule of law, accountable governance and conflict management at the country level in times of peace and before conflict; and increased investments in the creation and sustenance of democratic citizenship. This should include enhancing civic duties and civic-culture components in basic school curricula as well as national-level civic education.

CSOs as a Countervailing Force

With some West African governments attempting to consolidate their power through illiberal and undemocratic means, the role of civil society groups in helping to resist the democratic backsliding trajectory cannot be underestimated. As Rakner (2021) points out, CSOs remain critical in defending constitutional rights during elections and holding governments accountable. However, CSOs often face challenges, such as the lack of adequate resources and government harassment, which can hinder their overall effectiveness. Despite this, CSOs have served as key players, raising awareness of human rights abuses and electoral fraud while advocating for policy reforms and empowering citizens to engage in democratic processes (Rakner 2021). Thus, mobilising and exerting sustained pressure on governments represents part of the specific actions that CSOs can take to prevent democratic backsliding. For Sjögren (2023), a strong political opposition enhances critical CSO engagement with elections. He argues that a ‘strong opposition is more likely to modify the effects of autocratic state control of dissent in ways that indirectly insulate and encourage government-critical CSOs’ (Sjögren 2023, 25). CSOs can also help to combat anti-democratic processes by engaging in events like protest marches, widespread civic mobilisation, the monitoring of government policies and practices, and the dissemination of the information gleaned through monitoring via their own reports and exchanges with media (Smidt, Johansson and Richter 2024). As observed in Senegal, when the government sought to postpone the 2024 presidential elections to a later date, CSOs mobilised and organised mass demonstrations that eventually led to not only imprisoned opposition leaders being freed but also the elections being held at the time that was originally scheduled. Thus, CSOs can sensitise society to pressing domestic and international issues and help citizens to articulate their beliefs and interests and exercise control over those holding political power. Furthermore, by setting early warning and electoral conflict prevention and mediation mechanisms, CSOs can play a crucial role in preventing democratic recession (Soukolgué 2023). Finally, apart from raising awareness in society about democratic processes and the role of citizens in sustaining them (Vachudova, Dolenec and Fagan 2024), Soukolgué (2023) argues that the most visible and impactful role of CSOs in combating democratic backsliding is in their election observation to ensure the quality of electoral processes.

Role of Regional and International Organisations

From the foregoing, it is obvious that domestic CSOs can champion various initiatives to express their opposition to regimes engaging in democratic backsliding in West Africa. Rakner (2021), however, adds that international and transnational collaborators should emphasise innovative and flexible ways to support local CSO networks by investing in new platforms for information sharing and institutional learning, and expanding country-level networks. For Soukolgué (2023), electoral assistance from donors and international organisations can help mitigate democratic backsliding and enhance electoral integrity in Africa. Through electoral support initiatives and assistance, which take legal, technical and logistical support provided to electoral laws, processes and institutions, Soukolgué (2023) holds that democratic backsliding can be combatted. Along these lines, Campion and Jega (2023, 391) stress that there is a ‘need to redouble efforts to strengthen EMBs across Africa. EMBs need to bolster mechanisms to build consensus with political parties, and work with credible CSOs that can help to facilitate greater transparency and effectiveness’. International organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have been instrumental in undertaking various electoral assistance in Africa to stem the tide of democratic backsliding. The UNDP’s electoral assistance programmes in Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Liberia, for example, have focused on institutional and legal reforms and on building the capacity of critical actors and processes ahead of elections (Soukolgué 2023). As Soukolgué (2023) points out, electoral assistance is critical because it helps to promote credible, transparent and inclusive elections. Aside from the UNDP, the African Union (AU) has been offering electoral assistance in the form of technical and operational capacity building for election management bodies in African countries (Gerenge 2023). Additionally, the AU has undertaken several concrete initiatives and measures to tame the wave of democratic recession. Gerenge (2023) notes that among them is the creation of the AU Peace and Security Council Sub-Committee on Sanctions as a deterrent to unconstitutional changes of governments. Moreover, the AU deploys election observation missions to almost every member state holding presidential and legislative elections, based on the latter’s invitation. According to Gerenge (2023), these electoral observation support missions, which are aimed at tackling risks for democratic recession, entail integrated preventive diplomacy initiatives. These preventive diplomacy efforts were successfully deployed in several West African countries, including Gambia (2021), and Nigeria (2023) in the post-electoral phase, as well as in the pre-electoral phases in Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire (Gerenge 2023). Like the AU’s electoral support, Júnior and Luciano (2020, 1508) point out that ECOWAS’s 1993 revised treaty, as well as electoral missions, has focused on enhancing its regional scope by including topics such as democracy promotion and good governance, and the maintenance of peace and security. Finally, ECOWAS’ 2001 supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance expressed ‘zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means’. In sum, according to Júnior and Luciano (2020), interventions by ECOWAS via political pressure, formal suspension and sanctions can contribute to democracy protection in the West Africa sub-region. As they point out, such measures and various support initiatives would enable ECOWAS to deal with authoritarian regimes engaged in democratic backsliding in the region. It would also ensure that member-states with unconstitutional changes of government are held accountable by the regional organisation.

Conclusion

This article focused on providing an analysis of the current state of democracy in West Africa and offerred suggestions on how to stem the tide of democratic backsliding gripping the sub-region. Using both conceptual and case-studies country discussions, the article noted that the integrity of the democratic process in West Africa that was heralded in the early 1990s is increasingly being undermined and challenged. This is due to the rise of illiberal activities and military interventions in the political landscape of many countries in the sub-region. The findings state that in an era that has been characterised by the democratic systems in West Africa going through various challenges, there is a need to develop structures and institutions as well as adopt measures that would ensure that the democratic process remains robust. This article made several recommendations on how to combat democratic backsliding in West Africa. Among the recommendations are the need to provide for the basic socio-economic needs of citizens. This is because the absence of economic dividends under democratic systems of government is one of the main factors that is contributing to the rise of military coups and populist leaders, as well as fuelling authoritarianism in many parts of West Africa. Other specific actionable insights to counter democratic backsliding that are highlighted in this article focus on the central role of CSOs in empowering citizens to be participants in the democratic process. CSOs have an important role in helping to sustain democratic ideals through advocacy, exerting pressure on and holding governments accountable, as well as raising awareness through civic education of citizens, dissemination information and the monitoring of elections to ensure they are free and fair. In other words, CSOs can actively engage in the provision of encouragement to voters not only by protecting the participation of citizens in the democratic process but also by bringing to light instances of fraud and malfeasance during elections. Finally, the article suggested that CSOs should partner with regional and international organisations to help combat democratic backsliding. Strengthening democratic institutions through electoral assistance and support for EMBs, the judiciary and the media in the discharge of their roles and responsibilities would go a long way to help consolidate the democratic process in West Africa.