Abstract
The assumption of every good probe is to expose the challenge(s) of a given subject within their given terms and proffer solution(s). This article questions Nigerian government and its agencies setting fuel importation probes since 1999, whose terms of reference have been cosmetic and failed to adequately define the challenges hindering the development of refineries in Nigeria. Using empirical evidence from primary and secondary sources of data which build upon the political economy theory of the state, this article highlights the glaring structural challenges which all the fuel importation probes deliberately neglected because of the interplay of class interest and power relations, in ways that enriched the dominant class coalitions and their political loyalties and suggested that these structural challenges must be quickly addressed through a people-oriented oil and gas blueprint by the new Nigeria government, to get it right in the downstream oil and gas sector.
Keywords
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
