Abstract
The assertion of (territorial) nationalism by Nepal has serious implications for its bilateral relationship with India. Once dominant, the singular narrative of the upper-caste Hindu Parbatiya nationalism is increasingly encountering competing narratives emerging from the marginalised Janajatis and the Madhesis of Nepal. Accordingly, several nationality sentiments that were sidelined earlier have now become salient. While the India factor in these competing perspectives of nationalist discourses in Nepal appears to be subtle (but important), the growing territorial dimensions to it invariably locates India in a prominent position. This article investigates the implications of the changing dynamics of Nepal’s nationalism on its bilateral relationship with India. Looking at the internal dynamics of nationalism discourses in Nepal, the article offers a critical analysis of the territorial disputes between India and Nepal, and its implications on nationalism in Nepal and on the bilateral relationships between India and Nepal.
Territorial Nationalism and Bilateral Relations: An Introduction
Territorial disputes act as a conditioning factor in geopoliticising nationalism (Cotillon, 2017). Since the concept of nationalism has blended with geopolitical thinking (Aryal & Pulami, 2023) it influences bilateral relations between states. Nationalism, characterised through territorialisation of space, strongly corelates with geopolitics that impacts states’ political thinking and behaviour (Hughes, 2011). Furthermore, territorial disputes between states, engaged through the discourse of nationalism, reflect on the bilateral relations on the one hand and internal sociopolitical dynamics on the other hand. In the South Asian context, the complexities of territorial disputes, blurred boundaries and bona fide borders, in many ways define the nature of bilateral relations among states (Lal, 2006; Tripathi, 2019). Considering India’s geographical location, in terms of sharing borders with all the South Asian states, the extent of its bilateral relationships, among other factors, has a correlation with its border agreement (formal and informal) with respective states. It is safe to argue that the border disputes that are engaged through a strong nationalist discourse tend to adversely affect bilateral relationships. However, when the nationalist discourse of a state offers multiple and competing narratives, the territorial dimensions to it come across as a unifying factor against an external state.
The rising territorial nationalism in Nepal—the assertion of its territorial claim over some land under India’s sovereign control by the ruling regime in the recent past—offers an interesting area of investigation. Unlike the other South Asian states, the porous borders between Nepal and India have witnessed the free movement of people with minimal restrictions, with credit due to the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950. In such a scenario, the role of nationalism in Nepal, especially the territorial dimensions of it, in influencing its bilateral relationship with India is significant. Taking into account the historical context and the political developments in Nepal, especially the dominance of the Hindu upper-caste Parbatiyas (hill people), marginalisation of the Janajatis (indigenous people) and the Madhesis, and sustained political instability, the article argues that the identity narrative plays a vital role in shaping the multiple, yet competing, perspectives of nationalism. The article further argues that while the territorial dimensions to the discourse of nationalism attempts to overshadow the competing perspectives, as a unifying factor, it also develops a new identity narrative built upon the ideas of anti-India sentiment and ‘Nepaliness’. The assertion of territorial nationalism, through raising the territorial disputes with India, while it affects the bilateral relationship with India, also presents the Nepali political elite with a challenge to this natonalistic discourse fro the Madhesis given their real and perceived proximity with India.
Against this backdrop, the article investigates the varying dimensions of nationalism in Nepal and its impact on Nepal
Nationalism in Nepal: Ethnopolitics, Political Instability and the ‘India’ Factor
The nationalism discourse in Nepal emerges through its ethnopolitics, sustained political instability and the ‘India’ factor. Nepal’s ethnopolitics reflects the dominant narratives of the Parbatiyas and the resistance to it the Janajatis and the Madhesis (people living in the Terai regions of Nepal). The sociopolitical dominance of the Parbatiyas (Onta, 1996, p. 214) established a singular narrative of nationalism that symbolised the state-centric nationalism of Nepal for decades. Although one can observe this singular narrative of nationalism dominating the political discourse, especially during the Panchayat regime (1960–1990), it has its roots in the unification regimes of Prithvi Narayan Shah (1769–1775 AD). Declaring Nepal as ‘Asal Hindustan’, the Shah regime used Hinduism as a political instrument to define and legitimise the Gorkha state (Whelpton, 1997, p. 41). Hinduism at the core of Nepali nationalism was furthered with the introduction of a legal code, the Muluki Ain. (Engl. trans. Nations Code) by the Rana regime in 1854. With the Parbatiyas at the top of the sociopolitical hierarchy, the Muluki Ain institutionalised social hierarchy (Pradhan, 2002, pp. 8–9), which resulted in inequalities leading to grievances by the marginalised sections (Hachhethu, 2003, p. 223).
The abolition of the Muluki Ain, however, did not alter the dominance of the Hindu religion. This continued dominance led to Nepal being declared a Hindu state in 1962 (Hangen & Lawoti, 2013, p. 14). The state policies to create linguistic homogeneity (supremacy of the Nepali language) and universalisation of education (Hachhethu, 2003, p. 225) encouraged the consolidation of Hindu
The fall of the Panchayat regime and the beginning of the multi-party democracy allowed other imaginaries of nationalism to assert themselves in Nepal. Rooted in the geographic distinction between the hill and the plain, the Madhesi nationalism emerged prominent among others during this period. The relative deprivation of Madhesis was directly linked to the dominance of Parbatiyas (Sijapati, 2013). Thus, the Madhesi nationalism is constructed around the dominance of the Parbatiyas in the state institutions, including the identity ascribed to the Nepal state (Hachhethu, 2007, p. 5). Moreover, the Madhesi nationalism functions around demanding the creation of an autonomous province under a federal structure—recognition of Madhesi regional languages at par with the dominant Nepali language, equality in citizenship laws, prevention of migration from hilly areas to the Tarai region and the increase in the representation of Madhesis in state institutions (Hachhethu, 2007, pp. 5–11).
It is interesting to observe that the demands of the Madhesis reflect their upon their willingness to be recognised as ‘Nepalis’—arguably, somehow, converging with the state-centric nationalism of Nepal. However, they also display two divergent trends situated around their exclusivity. The first element of divergence concerns the formation of an autonomous Madhes province, and the second element is the prevention of migration of the people from the hills to the Tarai region.
The Janajatis, like the Madhesis, have also come up with a demand for ethnic autonomy, increased political representation and equal recognition of their languages (Shrestha, 2007, p. 204). However, Janajatis differ from the Madhesis in their opposition to a ‘Hindu-dominated Nepali state’. A significant part of the Janajati movement focuses on preserving their distinct cultures from ‘bahunvaad’(Brahaminism). As a result, some Janajati groups reject the Hindu customs and traditions and embrace non-Hindu religions (Hangen, 2013).
Even though the Janajatis oppose the domination of the Parbatiya Hindus, their redefinition of nationalism has some elements of convergence and inclusivity with the singular state-centric nationalism. The convergence is expressed through an acceptance of the current Nepali state, where the inclusivity elements are expressed through the Janajatis’ demands for proportional representation in parliament. The elements of divergence and exclusivity can be seen with the Janajatis’ demand for a secular Nepal in order to limit the cultural hegemony of the Hindus (NEFIN, 2018, pp. 3–5).
Despite the differences between perspectives of nationalism expressed by Parbatiyas, Madhesis, and the Janajatis, the commonality seems to be the primacy of primordial bonds and ethnic identities than civic bonds. Accordingly, ethnic identities come across as superior to the homogenous ‘People of Nepal’ political identity (Toffin, 2009). While the contested imaginaries built around ethnic lines offer a domestic contemporary discourse on nationalism in Nepal, the nationalistic imaginary built around territorial dimensions attempts to invoke a unified pan-Nepali nationalism. Mostly seen through the prism of political posturing (Behera, 2020) by political elites. Nepal’s territorial nationalism often has an (anti)India factor built into it.
Territorial Nationalism and the Sovereign Nepal
The absence of strong popular support for the territorial dimension in Nepal’s nationalism discourse rests on three factors. The first relates to the imagination of nationalism in Nepal based on ethnic lines, mostly as a Hindu state. The second factor concerns the lack of clarity on a defined territory of Nepal that also contributes to the subtle significance of territory in Nepal’s nationalism discourse. In the absence of a clear territorial demarcation, the imagination of Nepal as a ‘territorial and legal unit’ (Smith, 2001, p. 62), at least in relation to India, has been difficult. The official treaties (Treaty of Sugauli 1816 and Boundary Treaty 1860) that demarcate the borders between Nepal and India were signed centuries back during the colonial period. Through the Boundary Treaty 1860, the British returned the Western Terai region to Nepal acknowledging the latter’s support during the 1857 revolt (Kansakar, 2001, pp. 61–63). Moreover, the incomplete demarcation of the boundary between Nepal and India is also because of damaged border pillars, encroachment by people on both sides of the border and the shifting courses of the border rivers (Baral, 2018, pp. 29–32).
The third reason for lacklustre territorial nationalism relates to the impact of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Nepal and India. This Treaty laid the foundation for an open and soft border between both states, making it an exception in South Asia, where borders are generally strongly regulated and securitised (Tripathi, 2019, pp. 190–191). The soft border is generally perceived by some in Nepal as an impediment to Nepal maintaining its independence and sovereignty (Nayak, 2010). Some key Articles of the Treaty oblige both states to provide certain rights to citizens of the other to engage in their territories. Article 6 relates to the participation of citizens of both states in industrial and economic development, and Article 7 relates to providing citizens of both states the rights of residence, property ownership and movement. Due to India being a large influencer in the region vis-à-vis Nepal, these binding provisions can be viewed as impediments to the exercise of its territorial sovereignty. Hence, it can be argued that the Treaty diluted Nepal’s prospects of firmly engaging with the territorial factor in its nationalist discourse.
Despite its dormant nature, territorial aspects of nationalism in Nepal have evolved under the shadow of ethnic nationalism. For example, the Panchayat regime took the help of a selective interpretation of Nepal’s history to propagate its narrative of nationalism. In particular, the history of Nepal from the 1740s (the beginning of the unification process) to 1816 (the end of the Anglo-Nepalese War) was given importance (Onta, 1996). In these interpretations of history, the territorial factor was implicit mainly because the 1814–1816 war between Nepal and British India was essentially a war for the control of territories. Therefore, teaching selective history in schools to a certain extent enabled a link national identity and territory (Etherington, 2010). The use of history in situating territorial nationalism has multiple focal points. Another factor that is much less debated and often ignored in mainstream literature is the movement for a ‘Greater Nepal’.
The concept of ‘Greater Nepal’ refers to Nepal extending beyond its current territorial boundaries to include a few territories that are under the sovereign control of India. However, the concept of ‘Greater Nepal’ was not created hypothetically, but one that drew life from the history of Nepal that existed before the Sugauli Treaty of 1816. The idea of Greater Nepal has been popular among some Nepalis as extending its territory from ‘Kangra’ in the west to ‘Teesta’ in the east, and in doing so, includes parts of territories of the present-day Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and West Bengal (Thapa, 2017). To enable such imaginations, a significant feature drawn from Nepal’s history was the territorial expanse of the Gorkha kingdom that was consolidated under the Shah rulers’ unification campaign of 1769. The campaign that lasted for almost four decades successfully captured Sikkim, Kumaon, Garhwal and other territories that were under British Indian control. From then till the end of the Rana regime, a nationalist discourse around these interpretations of history through references to the glorious past of the Gorkha nation was not so popular in the political space. Although the grievances to recapture the lost territories were advocated by some groups, the lack of a democratic space during the period under the monarchy prevented the mobilisation of political visions around the project of Greater Nepal (Onta, 1996).
However, some attempts were made during the Panchayat regime to infuse a national consciousness through education and media on Nepal’s ‘brave history’ (Onta, 1996). Following the fall of the Panchayat regime, the Greater Nepal Committee was formed in 1991 in Kathmandu to advance this sentiment. However, the Committee failed to generate a ‘pan-Nepali movement’ due to the predominance of incompatibilities in the domestic sphere, such as the rising regional and ethnic assertions of minority groups (Dixit, 1993).
Further, the element of territoriality found a place in the discourse on nationalism with the emergence of the Maoist movement in 1996. The ‘40 Point Demand’ of the Maoists stressed repealing the ‘Integrated Mahakali Treaty,’ which they claimed resulted in the ‘Indian monopoly over Nepal’s water resources’ (SATP, 1996). Similarly, the Maoists also demanded the abrogation of the 1950 treaty with India. By bringing up concerns over Nepal’s territorial sovereignty, the Maoists invoked a sense of nationalism around the territorial integrity of Nepal. Arguably, in many ways, the decade-long Maoist movement (1996–2006), followed by a Maoist regime in Kathmandu, kept the territorial dimensions of Nepal’s nationalism discourse built around anti-India sentiments alive.
In recent years, the Greater Nepal Nationalist Front has created awareness about the Greater Nepal concept. Under the leadership of Phanindra Nepal, the organisation has made multiple representations and submissions to Nepali and foreign governments and launched campaigns and protests in India (IANS, 2013). The central demand of the movement has been the abrogation of the 1816 Treaty of Sugauli, which they consider as forced upon Nepal by erstwhile British India. To gain support for their cause, the movement had used maps of extended Nepal territories from ‘Sutlej to Teesta’ to create nationalist sentiments among the Nepalis. Similarly, a book published by the Maoists, Nepal: Teesta Dekhi Satlej Samma, sought to propagate the Greater Nepal concept and was widely circulated along the India–Nepal border (Siddiqui, 2005). In an unprecedented move, the cabinet, led by K. P. Sharma Oli, on 18 May 2020 approved a new political map of Nepal claiming sovereignty over a 335 km2 strip that included Kalapani, Limpiyadhura and Lipulekh that are presently under the sovereignty of India. Although this move was mostly seen as a desperate measure by K. P. Sharma Oli to deal with domestic political challenges, it officially established Nepal’s territorial assertion vis-à-vis India. Before getting into its implications on the bilateral relationship between Nepal and India, the following section elaborates on the important territorial disputes between both countries.
Nepal’s Territorial Disputes with India
Kalapani Dispute
The dispute over the Kalapani territory has been one of the major contentions between Nepal and India. The issue has been gaining more space in the domestic politics of Nepal, leading to a rise in nationalist sentiments. The root cause of the dispute has been the difference between both the states on the origin of the river Kali. The river is the western boundary of Nepal with India and was determined by the Treaty of Sugauli in 1816. Article 5 of the Treaty states, ‘… the Raja of Nepal renounces for himself, his heirs, and successors, all claim to or connection with the countries lying to the west of the river Kali ….’
However, the Treaty failed to mention the point of origin of the border river. As a result, both sides present conflicting claims on the river’s origin. The claims from Nepal consider either Limpiyadhura or nearby Lipulekh pass as the point of origin of the river Kali. On the contrary, India holds the river’s origin from a pond south of Kalapani (Shrestha, 2003, p. 124). In both of their claims, the Kalapani area is presented as part of their respective territories. Even though the 1816 Treaty was not accompanied by a map depicting the exact boundary line of Nepal, several maps were produced in the following years as both parties started demarcating the boundary.
A study by some Nepali scholars has shown that the maps published in 1819, 1827, 1846, 1856, 1859 and 1867 presented the river Kali as originating from Limpiyadhura. However, a map published in 1879 shifted the river’s origin eastwards from Limpiyadhura. In what has been termed as ‘cartographic aggression’ and ‘manipulation’ by British India, the river originating from Limpiyadhura was named ‘Kuti Yangti’ and the origin of the Kali River was shown to the south of Kalapani (Dhungel et al., 2020, pp. 6–16). Nepal supports its territorial claim based on the maps published before 1879. Moreover, the release of a new map in 2020 showing Limpiyadhura, Kalapani and Lipulekh as part of its territory is consistent with its earlier claims that state Limpiyadhura as the source of the river Kali.
India’s position on Kalapani is based on three main claims. First, it refers to the map of 1879 as the authentic one. It has been argued that the maps presented before that year were prepared without conducting a scientific topographical survey, and therefore, they are unreliable and unscientific (Shrestha, 2003, p. 148). Second, it bases its claim on the fact that the Kalapani territory has been under its military control. After its war with China, India became aware of the strategic significance of the tri-junction area and has stationed its troops there since then. The lack of any objection to it by Nepal (at least until the 1990s when the matter was first raised) has entrenched India’s control over the territory. Third, India claims its administrative control over the territory and presents documents such as tax records in its support (Pant & Mann, 2020).
The Susta Dispute
The dispute over Susta, an area on the border between India and Nepal, has been longstanding. The territory became part of Nepal after British India returned the Eastern Tarai region in 1816. The disputed area is currently situated to the east of the river Gandak (called Narayani in Nepal) and is considered by Nepal as under the jurisdiction of its West Nawalparasi District in Province No. 5. Like the river Kali, Gandak forms the international boundary between India and Nepal. According to Shrestha (2013), the border maps prepared between 1829 and 1883–1885 delineated the borderline between Triveni Ghat to Susta along the mid-current of the river (Shrestha, 2013, p. 178). At that time, the Susta area lay on the western side of the river and hence was part of the Nepali territory. However, today, the area lies east of the river. The reason for this has been the changing course of the river Gandak over the years from west to east. As this occurs, the territory lying to the west of the river gets submerged, pushing the borderline further into the Nepali territory. Given that the Susta area has shifted to the east of the river, India has claimed jurisdiction over it.
In 2002, the Minister of External Affairs of India blamed the Nepalese nationals for encroaching on some 5,000 acres of land in the Narsahi
The lack of consensus between Nepal and India on this issue can be attributed to the adoption of the ‘fixed boundary principle’ (Baral, 2018, p. 31) to demarcate the riverine sectors of the border during the proceedings of the Nepal
The Kalapani and Susta territorial disputes were given little attention during the Panchayat regime. Some political leaders had raised the issue of India’s alleged ‘encroachment’ of Kalapani. A detailed report was also submitted to the government in 1975 and 1981 (Bhusal, 2020, p. 63). Even though the issues were prevalent in the government discourse, there were hardly any attempts to make it part of the popular discourse. However, the restoration of multi-party democracy in 1990 allowed lawmakers to put the issue in the public domain. For the first time, the ‘Kalapani encroachment’ issue was raised in the Parliament in the early 1990s. Prem Singh Dhami, a leader of the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist
Since then, the territorial aspects (read constructed around alleged Indian encroachment) have been a considerable part of Nepal’s nationalism discourse. More recently, India’s new maps that claimed Kalapani as a part of its Pithoragarh district (Mohan, 2019) has furthered the existing dispute with Nepal as the latter has rejected the claim and issued counter maps with constitutional backing (Bhattacharjee, 2020). The territorial disputes with India, interestingly, do not reveal any lack of consensus among the political parties, and the Janajatis (Tharus and Limbus) are seen to be showing their commitment to defend the borders of Nepal (Lawoti, 2013, p. 249). As a unifying factor, territorial nationalism, arguably, adds to the existing anti-India sentiments in Nepal that affects the bilateral relationship.
Manufacturing Nationalism Through Anti-India Sentiments
Nepal’s geographical location vis-à-vis India and the shared cultural and historical ties have been the bedrock of the bilateral relationship between the two countries. This has enabled the two states to cooperate on security, economic development, water, free movement across borders and energy resource sharing. However, this historical relationship has been scarred over the years and has been ‘uneasy’ (Upreti, 2001) at times.
The starting point of grievances in the bilateral relationship can be traced back to the formative years of Nepal’s engagement with independent India. The role of India in supporting the democratic forces in bringing an end to the Rana regime followed by the Delhi Settlement in 1951 is often seen as the beginning of India’s interference in Nepal’s internal affairs (Mishra & Mishra, 1995). The anti-Rana political elites of Nepal were unhappy with the supposed high handedness of India over the Delhi Settlement. These elites felt that the Settlement reflected the objectives of the Indian government much more than it did that of the anti-Rana leaders (Rose & Dial, 1969, p. 91). The anti-India sentiments of the political elites were reflected through demonstrations during Jawahar Lal Nehru’s visit to Kathmandu in 1951. The opposition parties, mainly the Communist Party of Nepal and Praja Parishad, were vocally critical of India’s role in the anti-Rana Movement (Muni, 1973, pp. 88–94). In later years, such sentiments again came to the fore in opposition to the stationing of the Indian Military Mission in Nepal. These events spurred a modern Nepali national consciousness, with anti-Indianism as one of its defining elements.
Moreover, this element has been entrenched in the Nepali political dispensation, hampering its so-called special relationship with India. The signs of this can be seen in Nepal’s increasing willingness to forge bilateral relationships beyond India. Between 1955 and 1960, Nepal, under King Mahendra, accelerated the process of ‘diversification’ of its bilateral relations, beginning with China in 1955. Further, Russia, Japan, West Germany, Switzerland and Pakistan also formed part of its newly established diplomatic relations (Atique, 1983, p. 99). While its relationship with India in terms of trade remained largely unaffected, Nepal was signalling its wish to decrease its dependence on India, thereby revising the contours of the special relationship. Its diversification, especially with China, became more robust over the years and has formed a significant irritant in India
While the formative years of modern Nepal witnessed the planting of an anti-Indian nationalist seed in its political sphere, King Mahendra, in the following years, sought to strengthen it further and maintained its relevance in the bilateral relationship with India. Mahendra’s brand of ethnic nationalism had, at its core, a penchant to project Nepal as having had a unique or somewhat different national identity from that of India. His project to advance a monolithic sense of ‘Nepaliness’ by promoting the Nepali language and culture attempted to reduce the importance of other languages and cultures that many Nepalis shared with India, thereby attempting to create a cultural boundary between the two countries. Such initiatives contributed to creating and maintaining India as the ‘Other’ (Bhandari, 2016). Accordingly, Nepal instituted policies that were aimed at reducing Indian presence and influence in Nepal. Some of them were making Nepali the medium of instruction in schools—which prevented Indian citizens from teaching, followed by banning the purchase of fixed property by foreigners—directed against Indians who were allowed to own property as per the provisions of the 1950 Treaty and requesting India to withdraw its military presence from Kathmandu (Mishra, 2004, p. 631).
However, the Nepal
The successive monarchs of Nepal continued their assertive stance vis-à-vis India with a belief that one of the pressing problems facing Nepal was the ‘preservation of its identity as a nation’ (Anand, 1977, p. 6); reducing India’s influence in Nepal was one of his intentions. The declaration of Nepal as a ‘Zone of Peace’ in 1975 was a significant step in that direction. While the proposal was coated with maintaining neutrality, especially between India and China, it had a significant tilt towards China. The context that triggered the proposal and tilt towards China was likely to be India’s role in the establishment of Bangladesh in 1971 and the accession of Sikkim. The tilt towards China provided an opportunity for the Mao Zedong regime to support Nepal’s assertive posture. Added to this, during 1976–1977, Nepal for the first time received substantially high aid from the Chinese that was almost equal to the amount of Indian aid (Garver, 2002, p. 150). In continuation of this tilt, and fearing India’s increased involvement, two important steps were taken by Nepal to secure its national interest. First was the secret agreement on intelligence sharing between China and Nepal, and second was Nepal’s purchase of Chinese arms in 1988.
India considered these actions as eroding the spirit of the 1950 Treaty and the 1965 Arms Agreement with Nepal, which regulated Nepal’s arms acquisitions. Moreover, these developments coincided with the ongoing talks over renewing the Trade and Transit Treaty with Nepal. India’s priority on its security over economic interests and Nepal’s unwillingness to respect it resulted in the expiry of the Treaty, leading to the imposition of an economic blockade on Nepal in 1989, closing 13 of the 15 transit points on the border. On the one hand, the closing of the transit points dealt an economic blow to Nepal; on the other hand, it led to the erosion of the bilateral relationship between the two countries.
While this disruption of bilateral relations allowed Nepali political elites to assert their sovereignty firmly, it also laid the foundation for strongly emphasising the territorial separation between Nepal and India, which otherwise encouraged free movement across the border. The closing of the transit points in 1989 is arguably one of the crucial factors that contributed to the territorial nationalism in Nepal. This rising nationalism, brought into the mainstream by the Maoist parties, propelled Nepal under G. P. Koirala to raise the issue of the Kalapani territory for the first time with India in 1998 after having ignored it since 1961 (Rose, 1999, p. 157). These issues continue as an irritant in bilateral relations. For Nepal, the consequences of the strengthening of political nationalism through the lack of real sovereignty have primarily shaped how it has perceived and engaged with its bilateral relationship with India. This has partly contributed to Nepal’s ‘fear psychoses’ towards a supposedly hegemonic India (Upreti, 2003, p. 258).
Nepal–India Future Relations Through the Lens of Nationalism
While several aspects of the nationalism discourse in Nepal have evolved over time, the India factor occupies a prominent place in it. Although in the recent past, Nepal has experienced territorial disputes with China in Nepal’s Humla District (BBC, 2022), the disputes have a very limited role to play in the territorial nationalism of Nepal. A possible explanation can be that unlike India, China does not carry the social and cultural baggage of interfering in the internal affairs of Nepal.
A significant determinant of Nepal’s relationship with India is its shared sociocultural values. Nepal’s national identity, for the longest time, was defined by Hindu religion and culture, and until 2006, it was officially a Hindu kingdom. Moreover, a shared Buddhist heritage between both sides further contributes to their cultural relationship. These cultural links are manifested in the migration and settlement of Indians and Nepalis in each other’s territories (Shukla, 2006, p. 356). As a result, the sentiments around territorial nationalism—predicated upon rigid political boundaries—often encounter flexible and accommodative cultural frontiers. However, the ‘roti–beti’ relationship with Nepal (as expressed by a former External Affairs Minister of India) is often seen to be more with the Madhesis than with the people living in the hills of Nepal. Accordingly, the India factor in Nepal also contributes to the competing dimensions of nationalism. As a result, the Madhesis are often resented by the Parbatiyas who believe that the formers’ political fortune is tied to their nationhood and interests in India (Prasad, 2016, p. 100). A fallout of the Madhesi nationalism triggers the political elites in Kathmandu to alter its foreign policy to harm India’s interest in Nepal.
This phenomenon was observed in the aftermath of the 2015 border blockade by the Madhesis in protest against Nepal’s newly formed Constitution. This blockade, an internal conflict between the Madhesis and the Parbatiyas, was seen as India’s interference in Nepal, which adversely affected the bilateral relations (Shakya, 2023). As a landlocked country, Nepal has historically depended on India’s seaports for its trade with other countries. However, just a few months after the blockade, the Nepalese government sought to reduce this economic dependence by entering a transit treaty with China for the first time. Moreover, China’s influence in Nepal has been rising through investments in several projects related to connectivity and infrastructure, mainly through its Belt and Road Initiative (Murton & Lord, 2020). It has led to China surpassing India’s foreign direct investment in Nepal during 2015–2016 (Solanki, 2018).
From the territorial perspective, the 2015 blockade only reinforced the territorial sentiments in Nepal. The blockade also contributed to the intractability of Nepal’s longstanding border issues with India. The dismal track record of the joint resolution mechanisms between the two countries to solve the issue can illustrate this point. The Joint Technical Level Boundary Committee created in 1981 to demarcate the disputed territories of Kalapani and Susta was dissolved in 2008 without much progress. Similarly, the formation of the Boundary Working Group to complete the border demarcation process is yet to take off (Giri, 2020). The absence of a credible political will from both sides keeps fuelling the territorial nationalism in Nepal that is often used against India.
In Nepal, while the nationalism discourse is still based upon ethnic lines, the territorial dimensions are becoming increasingly salient, especially in reference to its relationship with India. As Nepal is steadily ensuring political stability that would accommodate regional and ethnic sentiments, the territorial dimensions of nationalism will further consolidate in the absence of the resolution of border disputes with India. The increasing Chinese presence in Nepal will also contribute significantly to this. Additionally, Nepal’s limited capability in challenging India’s territorial sovereignty over the disputed areas and the former’s dependence on the latter would allow the political elites to keep the territorial sentiments alive for their interests. Each of these scenarios has the potential to impact the bilateral relationship with India.
Conclusion
Nepal’s territorial nationalism, especially the one emerging from its border disputes with India, and its impact on the bilateral relationship merit detailed explanation. Unlike the positions taken by the earlier studies (Aryal & Pulami, 2023), the events of 2015 blockade and the 2019 disputes over the territories offer different insights into the territorial dimensions of nationalism in Nepal. The 2015 blockade by the Madhesi groups highlights competing nationalism narratives—Parbatiyas versus the Madhesis. The territorial sentiments of the Parbatiyas view this event through the prism of the Madhesis’ close proximity with India. Accordingly, the 2015 blockade consolidates both the existing hill–plain divide and anti-India rhetoric. However, the disputes in 2019 have potentially created a pan-Nepali nationalism built around the territorial integrity of Nepal and India as an aggressor.
With the changing dynamics of nationalism in Nepal, the bilateral relationship with India requires further interrogation. Driven by cooperation and conflict, Nepal’s relationship with India has been paradoxical in nature. The landlocked geographical positioning and the historical relationship with India make Nepal expect the former’s assistance. At the same time, the sustained political instability offers opportunities to the political elites to manufacture an anti-India narrative. In the changing political scenario—the presence of China and the gradual political stability—the bilateral relationship between Nepal and India encounters some challenges. As India’s influence on Nepal politics is perceived to be shrinking (Behera, 2021), Chinese financial aid, assistance and investments in Nepal are steadily increasing (Rajan & Gurung, 2021). However, recent studies on the comparative popular perceptions between India and China reveal that India still has an edge over China in popularity, trust and historical connections (Reddy, 2023). It is interesting to note that China is not far behind India on these parameters. While the anti-India sentiments, manufactured by the political elites of Nepal, can adversely impact its relationship with Nepal, the onus also lies on India to take the territorial disputes with Nepal seriously. Thus, it is not wise to undermine the repercussions of India’s interference in the internal affairs of Nepal. An assertive stand and indifference towards Nepal’s concerns will only invite assertive responses from the latter.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.