The purpose of the study is to develop a theoretical model to ascertain if the IT investment in the banking sector is capable of generating a new equilibrium with increased efficiency. The empirical strategy is to seek an indirect test for Jordanian banking sector by looking at the time profile of banking profits as a temporal function of IT investment. The study enquires if the banking sector, as an iterative process of credit allocation and information acquisition through IT investment, lead to a stable equilibrium? Does IT investment ensure stable market shares for Jordanian banks in the long run? The study finds that investment in IT has led the banking system in Jordan away from an efficient equilibrium. We also find that the banks in Jordan directly interact with each other, although they may have collusive arrangements with some of their rivals, this means the banking market is not fragmented.
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