Teaching for Global Citizenship Education Online: An African Philosophical Approach

Abstract

Global citizenship education (GCE) has been in vogue for the last decade. The term has been used mostly to espouse and rearticulate some of the democratic, responsible and activist aspirations linked to forms of transformative higher education (HE) in the world today. Southern African HE is no exception, particularly invoking some of the (post)critical and decolonial virtues within matrices of HE for change. In this article, it is described how reflections on a massive open online course brought to the fore several poignant moments in the pursuit of cultivating a (post)critical and decolonial notion of GCE. Such reflections focused on enacting an African philosophy of HE, particularly showing how, first, ukama (iterative action) can be used to engage humans in perspicuous and deliberative ways; second, ubuntu (critical and dissonant action) is drawn upon to show how agreement and dissent about educational and societal matters can be resolved; and third, the notion of umsibenzi (activism) is couched in moderate terms to emphasise the potentiality and impotentiality of action that could subvert societal dystopias on the African continent and elsewhere. In this way, the cultivation of an African philosophy of HE could broaden the notion of a (post)critical and decolonial understanding of GCE.

Introduction

The concept of global citizenship education (GCE) has been much publicised in the literature in and about higher education (HE). There seems to be a dominant view from the global north that influences understandings of the concept as if the global south has nothing to offer in the realisation of HE. On the contrary, there are HE discourses available that advance a more tenable notion of GCE, that is, discourses that integrate local and global understandings of the concept. In this article, it is shown how reflections on a massive open online course (MOOC) brought to the fore several poignant moments in the pursuit of cultivating a (post)critical and decolonial notion of GCE. My interest in MOOCs happened because of Stellenbosch University’s strategic vision to open its research to the broader public through partnerships with the private sector, in this instance, the UK-based company FutureLearn. Whereas we had to prepare the content for presentation on the FutureLearn online platform, the latter provided the technical and administrative support in expediting its realisation. In the main, the content of the MOOC centred around notions of HE and GCE. Consequently, I take a reflective glance at the pedagogical implications of such an approach to HE and GCE. The MOOC (taught online between 2016 and 2018, and which attracted between 4,000 and 6,000 participants), entitled ‘Teaching for change: An African philosophical approach’, can be considered a forerunner of an African philosophy of HE, aimed at cultivating ubuntu justice. To my knowledge, this is the first MOOC to be implemented on an African philosophy of HE (Waghid et al., 2018). It is over the last few decades that an African philosophy of HE expanded into the realm of higher teaching and learning with our MOOC being considered as pioneering in the cultivation of ubuntu justice. An unexpected outcome of the course is related to the enactment of GCE and its concomitant link with ubuntu justice (Waghid et al., 2018). The point is that GCE seemed to have been constituted by virtues of democracy, citizenship and localised human actions such as ubuntu—literally, human dignity and interdependence. These virtues, in turn, informed the pedagogical actions associated with the MOOC (Teaching for change).

Our own intellectual work on an African philosophy of HE integrates liberal and communitarian understandings of education (Waghid et al., 2018). Our view of education as a social practice is grounded in what people do in association with one another without abandoning their autonomy as persons. In other words, people can still influence what they do together without them having to relinquish their self-determination and independence of thought. They are humans based on their capacity to act independently and collectively. And when they act in the aforementioned ways, they are capable of exercising their freedoms equally in the presence of one another without being constrained also to act deliberatively with one another (Waghid et al., 2018). The MOOC (Teaching for change) can be considered a HE online initiative to facilitate pedagogical encounters between students and me. In collaboration with FutureLearn and Stellenbosch University, I presented course content in and about an African philosophy of HE with a clear focus on the notion of ubuntu justice. Whereas ubuntu became associated with recognising all participants engaged in the MOOC based on the capacities to articulate speech, justice in turn recognised the equality of speech proffered by all students and teachers (Waghid et al., 2018). Put differently, ubuntu justice seems to be concerned with the equal participation of teachers and students in the MOOC based on their capacities to freely articulate their reasons on the FutureLearn platform. Equally, teachers and students were encouraged to deliberate about pedagogical matters in an atmosphere of reflective openness and a recognition of difference and otherness. The MOOC was instigated by a demand for online education on the African continent especially in the field of African philosophy of HE. Such a philosophy of HE has a distinctly Southern African orientation based on its interconnectedness with indigenous actions such as ubuntu (human interdependence), ukama (relationality) and umsebenzi (activism).

At least four themes were presented over a period of 1 month with four such presentations over 2 years. The themes (approaches to and concepts, practices and purposes of an African philosophy of HE) revolved around discussions favouring a communitarian understanding of such a philosophy of HE and the cultivation of ubuntu justice—a notion of justice that has a compassionate and restorative purpose. Whereas compassionate action involves recognising the vulnerabilities of others and doing something about it, restorative action denotes a connection with bringing about change in an equal and just manner (Waghid et al., 2018). By means of self-supporting discussion forums and podcasts, students were encouraged to engage deliberatively, responsibly and riskfully in pedagogical encounters (Waghid et al., 2018). Through deliberation they were summoned to speak their minds, to listen to one another’s speech and to talk back to one another without undermining one another’s truth claims. Afterwards, they were asked to post comments related to their (mis)understandings and justifications of an African philosophy of HE. Their justifications were subjected to rethinking, rearticulation and repositioning. In many ways, our understanding of an African philosophy of HE was reinforced by one another’s thoughts in and about the practice of African philosophy, which invariably provoked us to reposition our thinking and actions about the concept of an African philosophy of HE differently. In other words, although students were initiated into a discourse of an African philosophy of HE through the content provided, they were expected to (re)construct and deconstruct their own autonomous understandings of such a philosophy of HE without having been told to do so. This form of teaching was aimed at evoking the potentialities of students so that they could come to their own understandings of what constitutes an African philosophy of HE. That is, our teaching was one of provocation whereas their learning was evocative.

In this article, I first analyse our philosophical approach based on its interconnectedness with an African notion of HE. Second, I elucidate some of the pedagogical virtues associated with such a philosophy of HE, more specifically how such virtues enhance an ethics of human dignity and co-responsibility in the forms of ukama (relationality), ubuntu (humaneness and interdependence) and umsebenzi (activism). Third, I show how iterative action, taking risks and rupturing as acts of HE contribute to the enactment and expansion of a defensible notion of GCE.

Towards a Reimagined Notion of an African Philosophy of Higher Education

The notion of an African philosophy of HE centres on the idea of education as an encounter (Martin, 2013). Education as an encounter is different from established views of education, which focus primarily on the acquisition of skills and capacities of individuals through experience (Dewey, 2016) and moral development (Oakeshott, 1970). When humans engage in encounters, they not only acquire capacities and skills but, through engagement with other humans, also consolidate and extend capacities and skills based on yoking them together with cultures, histories, languages and traditions. For instance, people can possess cultural abilities, such as farming skills, prowess in ethnic languages and folklore and compassionate ways of responding to humans’ vulnerabilities together with cultural disadvantages, such as racism, bigotry and parsimony. These capacities of people or their cultural stock constitute their social practices embedded in local contexts—that is, their education. It thus seems that the histories, cultures, languages and traditions of African people inform and guide the social encounters within which they engage. If one considers that an African philosophy of HE is constituted by human encounters grounded in socially embedded communitarian actions, it follows that understanding such a philosophy of HE involves ascertaining what it does, more specifically, how such a philosophy is enacted.

First, following the thoughts of Hountondji (2002), an African philosophy of HE is both dialectical and argumentative. Simply put, an African philosophy of HE is a mode of analysis. Hountondji’s (2002) view is insistent that analysis should take the form of reasoning according to which meanings should be interpreted and justified. That is, understandings of concepts should not be taken at face value. Rather, meanings should be (re)constructed based on argumentation and justification of claims proffered. Another philosopher, Wiredu (1980), avers that an African philosophy of HE is a matter of critique, according to which meanings should be subjected to critical scrutiny and that the implications of such meanings for transformative societal change be considered. Whereas Hountondji’s view accentuates the use of interpretation, Wiredu (1980) announces the notion of critique as an act of doing an African philosophy of HE. Of course, interpretation is important for any notion of philosophy of education because it uncovers meanings that constitute thought and practice. Interpreting an artefact, proverb or oral narrative of an African community is important in terms of what philosophical action involves. There is just no point in doing philosophy of HE without the disclosure of meanings that underscore human action. Similarly, critically examining human action and texts is necessary to ascertain the justifications for human action and the potential of the latter to cultivate change. Critique is thus an empowering act of scrutiny that accentuates the transformative potential of human action. It is not that critique merely points out what actions mean but rather how these actions could bring about change in societies. However, the philosophical approaches to HE of both Hountondji and Wiredu do not take us beyond the exposure of established meanings. In my own work (Waghid, 2014), I therefore propound that an African philosophy of HE also has a deconstructive dimension. Deconstruction requires that one looks beyond meanings presented towards an unexpected and unimaginable otherness (Derrida, 2004). Interpretation and critique are necessary but not sufficient actions to pursue an African philosophy of HE. If one wants to reveal meanings not necessarily elucidated about African people and their communal practices, deconstruction assists in asking questions about that which is unrepresented and other. For example, interpreting and assessing the impact of colonisation and racism on African societies is important. Equally important is an analysis of how reinterpreted meanings of the concept impact societal living. However, it is deconstructive scrutiny that enables one to ascertain understandings about colonisation and racism on the African continent not previously considered. It could be that deconstruction helped to uncover some of the debilitating consequences of colonialism and racism on the lives of women in the milieu of patriarchal actions. An African philosophy of HE consequently has an interpretive, critical and deconstructive task of explaining, evaluating and deconstructing human action on the African continent. It is this latter approach to an African philosophy of HE that we have used in reflecting on our MOOC dealing with an African philosophy of HE. As argued elsewhere—

Central to such a philosophy of [higher] education is that the practices of African people are guided by the human understandings that constitute their actions. In turn, such peoples draw on their own contextualised knowledge in relation to other external understandings of knowledge to respond to specific problems at hand. As has been said before, an analysis of their actions in the pursuit of solving Africa’s problems is what can be understood as an African philosophy of [higher] education because together with an identification of problems, an examination of the educational implications for society is also given priority. (Waghid et al., 2018, p. 12)

Second, influenced by the seminal thoughts of Oladipo (1992), an African philosophy of HE ought to be concerned with an eradication of African predicaments, such as poverty, hunger, famine, unemployment, political oppression, civil wars, corruption and colonialism. It cannot be the task of an African philosophy of HE to eradicate such predicaments; however, as an authentic philosophy of HE, it can identify and interpret, assess and deconstruct such societal dilemmas. Moreover, it can determine the presence of such dilemmas and then evaluate their implications for HE. This was one of the primary tasks of the MOOC: students had to come up with a major philosophical problem on the African continent, and then had to proceed to find some of its implications for higher teaching–learning. For example, political autocracy was identified as a major philosophical and pragmatic problem on the African continent. As a philosophical predicament, political autocracy undermines both individual autonomy and communitarian action. Political autocracy implies that humans are unfree and do not deserve to be treated with dignity and mutual respect. The recognition that they can enhance a sense of community is ignored by political autocrats who suppress any inkling of co-operative, interdependent human action. Once the problem of political autocracy had been analysed, assessed and deconstructed, students advocated the concern that such a dilemma could affect higher pedagogy adversely. This meant that university classrooms would be considered potential pedagogical sites of contestation where teachers and students would either endorse autocracy or vehemently oppose the practice. Some student comments related to political autocracy acted as a hindrance for both democratic citizenship education and human flourishing on the African continent. This is because autocracy inherently subverts the liberty of people to engage cooperatively in society. The problem with autocracy—as remarked by some students—is that it constrains human freedom and equality based on the dismissiveness autocrats show towards the rest of civil society. If such understandings were to be endorsed by university teachers, they would emerge as agents of the state denying the legitimate political rights of people to oppose autocracy. The task of an African philosophy of HE seems to point out the philosophical complexity associated with such a dilemma and how it could adversely affect deliberative action in a university classroom. A pragmatic pedagogic implication of such a problem as maintained by a few students would be that deliberative iterations among university teachers and students would probably be curtailed. In this way, the mode of transmissive HE—so devastatingly used during the apartheid days—could resurface and undermine the very idea of education as an encounter. Transmissive education refers to a form of education whereby teachers uni-directionally transfer knowledge to learners without such knowledge being questioned. It is not as if transmission is wrong. Rather, when transmissive education is considered the only way of teaching–learning at universities, it dilutes any genuine form of HE.

Third, based on the seminal thoughts of Appiah (2007, p. 158), an African philosophy of HE is aimed at cultivating justice for all humans. In his words, ‘justice requires us to feel about everyone in the world what we feel about our literal neighbours’. To have feelings towards all humans obliges us to act in their interests, such as responding to the dystopias with which they might be confronted. In this way, an African philosophy of HE has an activist dimension according to which problems need to be assuaged, and to take risks in doing so. One of the societal dystopias on which students wanted to comment was the sporadic acts of violence, which surfaced in some African communities and the attendant use of excessive speech, commonly known as hate speech. For instance, in 2020, violence erupted randomly among some Muslims and Christians in parts of Western Africa, which resulted in the exchange of insults among members of these two dominant religious groups. Of course, exchanging insults about the religious beliefs of two different faith groups to ridicule and exorcise members of the groups only exacerbated acts of violence among them. In this regard, it seems prudent to disrupt acts of excessive speech, which could quell the escalation of violence within troubled communities. It seems plausible for an African philosophy of HE to use its activist feature to subvert excessive speech acts.

To sum up, an African philosophy of HE seems to be concerned with three matters: identifying societal dystopias on the continent and perhaps elsewhere and elucidate, evaluate and deconstruct these kinds of problems, evaluating the implications of human dilemmas for HE and responding actively to eradicate such predicaments.

Next, I examine some virtues of an African philosophy of HE with reference to notions of ukama (relationality or iterative action), ubuntu (humaneness and interdependence or critique and dissonant action) and umsebenzi (activism)—all referred to as indigenous virtues of human action.

Virtues of an African Philosophy of Higher Education and Their Commensurability with Ukama, Ubuntu and Umsebenzi

The argument against the actualisation of an African philosophy of HE is considered now. It makes sense to talk about the potentiality of an African philosophy of HE because it is possible that such a philosophy can be actualised and not be actualised. To suggest that something could happen is to highlight its potentiality; simultaneously, to imply that an occurrence could also not happen is to accentuate its impotentiality. My understanding is that an African philosophy of HE is both potentiality and impotentiality because it can be actualised and not be actualised, which is where, philosophically speaking, my interest lies. If an African philosophy of HE is actualised, the possibility that it could develop further becomes an impossibility. Put differently, actualisation depicts finality and that a concept cannot evolve any further. The implication is understanding would remain static without any further elucidation of a concept. However, if the potentiality of a concept lies in its actuality, then it seems possible that the concept might be developed further—a view supported by Agamben (1993). The following actions suggest that the potentiality of an African philosophy of HE is constituted in actuality: iteration (ukama), criticism and dissonance (ubuntu) and activism (umsebenzi), and therefore an African philosophy of HE has the potential to be developed further. The point is the potentiality of such actions lies in its actuality. In this way, ukama, ubuntu and umsebenzi all have potential to be actualised with the possibility that it can be further enlarged. I have already used these concepts in an extended form by altering their meanings in the context of their actualities: relationality was linked to iterative action on the basis that ukama does not signify un-relational action, that is, human relations are bound together by acts of iteration; humanness and interdependence involved in acts of ubuntu imply that the co-existence of humans is harnessed through acts of criticism and dissonance; and activism as a form of (post)critical and decolonised action could be extended to co-belonging in action without any condition of belonging itself—a matter of acting with umsebenzi. Next, I examine aspects of the etymology of ukama, ubuntu and umsebenzi in relation to seminal works produced in this field of semantic inquiry.

First, scholars of an African philosophy of HE hold the view that doing philosophy is a matter of acting iteratively in relation to one another (ukama). Tempels (1959) posits that one way of understanding European views on reality is to bring their views into iteration with African cultures and vice versa. According to him, languages, beliefs and practices of cultures influence the ways humans of different cultures engage iteratively (Tempels, 1959). Likewise, Mbiti (1969) opines that all Africans—past, present and future—spiritually interact by announcing themselves to one another as they endeavour to contribute towards cultivating an African civilisation. What Tempels’ and Mbiti’s views on relationality (ukama) bring to an African philosophy of HE is that human engagement happens on account of people’s different cultural orientations, communicative thinking and emotive dispositions. For human understanding to become cogent, people in relation with one another announce themselves in perspicuous ways—a matter of performing iterative action (ukama).

Second, proponents of an African philosophy of HE suggest that such a philosophy is grounded in acts of criticism and dissonance (ubuntu) (Waghid et al., 2018). If one considers the African dictum, ubuntu ngumntu ngabanye abantu (a person is a person in association with others), then human engagement is influenced by people’s articulations, listening to one another and talking back to one another. In this way, ubuntu is an act of criticism and dissonance because humans’ interdependence does not occur without the rigour of engagement, which requires of them to do so with some eloquence, listening and critical scrutiny. For Wiredu (1995) and his colleague, Gyekye (1997), the integration of European and African ways of thinking should not be subjected to assimilation by one or the other. As proponents of conceptual decolonisation, these authors resist the uncritical engagement with human thought—whether European or African—and argue that African and non-African sources of knowledge with their cultural variations should be equally considered to develop an authentic notion of human action in response to the problems that confront Africans. By doing so, the idea of human interdependence (ubuntu) becomes an act of decolonisation where views of non-African sources are critically considered relevant or not for African experiences. This is not an outright rejection of non-African sources of knowledge but rather a critical engagement with ideas presented in those sources and their relevance being considered for African thought and practice and vice versa.

Third, an African philosophy of HE has been advanced by scholars who accentuate the importance of activism (umsebenzi). Two proponents of such an idea of philosophy are Fanon (1963) and Cabral (1979) who wrote eloquently about the lived experiences of Africans, in particular their struggles against European colonialism and neocolonialism. For them, an African philosophy of HE must involve liberating humans from imperialist colonisation and its neocolonial imperatives. For instance, Fanon’s opposition to racism could lead to the liberation of Africans from oppression, separation and discrimination. Similarly, Cabral (1979) argued against colonialism and neocolonialism and posited that the quest for human freedom is a heightened form of activism to be realised by Africans. Most notably, the presence of activism in an African philosophy of HE emerged in the post-apartheid HE discourses. Influenced by the seminal works of revolutionaries, such as Mandela (1994), Mbeki (1999) and Biko (2002), activism became synonymous with the cultivation of democratic (higher) education in South Africa. If HE cannot contribute towards the liberation of people from racial, societal, economic and environmental subjugation, there is no point in doing HE.

Thus far, I have exposited the notion of an African philosophy of HE. Such a view is underscored by virtues of relationality (ukama), interdependent (iterative) action (ubuntu) and activism (umsebenzi). Next, I examine how these virtues of an African philosophy of HE are commensurate with and could possibly expand a notion of GCE.

Cultivating an Expansive View of Global Citizenship Education

There is a plethora of literature where at least four genres of GCE are espoused. These connect with enunciations offered by participants in the aforementioned MOOC. First, GCE is presented as a participatory form of human engagement that foregrounds the recognition of citizens’ rights and responsibilities. Such a view of GCE is key to understanding notions of active citizenship, listening, articulation and (dis)agreement (Arthur et al., 2008). A notion of GCE emphasises the possibility of agreement and disagreement on educational matters. For instance, some participants argued that human engagement could not just be procedural as opposed to other views that engagement must be substantive. The latter implies that participants must communicate in an atmosphere of co-responsibility. Second, GCE is regarded as a human rights discourse that opposes war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against peace through attentiveness to democratic public life (Peters et al., 2008). Many participants on the MOOC platform expressed their dismay at escalating levels of violence, such as human rights abuses in some parts of the world, most notably, in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, South Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic. GCE, as a human rights discourse, is geared towards reducing and eradicating human rights violations and crimes against humanity, especially during times of war. Third, GCE is considered a discourse that recognises the equal moral respect for all humans (Wallace-Brown & Held, 2010). Such a view of GCE focuses on eradicating human inequalities (race, culture, class), and the unequal access to basic civil liberties (such as education, health, welfare, security, shelter, protection). Some participants on the MOOC platform were quick to point out the need for an African philosophy of HE to respond to human insecurity and unsafety during political upheavals on the African continent. Fourth, in our own work, a convincing argument is made for a (post)critical and decolonial notion of GCE that could be attentive to injustices, exploitation and inequalities pervasive in some parts of the world, especially in developing countries in the global south (Bosio & Waghid, 2023). MOOC participants were quick to point out the need for a philosophy of HE to respond more adequately to the crises of conflict and war on the African continent and elsewhere. Many of them opined that if a philosophy of HE cannot contribute in resolving such crises, there would be no point in doing a philosophy of HE in decolonised ways.

The aforementioned genres of GCE in the form of cultivating an active citizenry, resisting human rights violations and crimes against humanity, recognising the equal moral respect of all humans and decolonising societies in which injustices, exploitation and inequalities persist emphasise a collective effort to subvert the societal dystopias present in the Global South.

Next, I want to show how an eclectic notion of GCE could be actualised in relation to interrelated practices of iteration (ukama), criticism and dissonance (ubuntu) and activism (umsebenzi) through co-belonging and taking of risks. Specifically, I show how acts of iteration (ukama), criticism and dissonance (ubuntu) and activism (umsebenzi) through co-belonging and taking of risks could enhance a (post)critical and decolonial view of GCE in higher teaching–learning.

Higher Teaching–Learning in the Context of Ukama, Ubuntu and Umsebenzi

GCE can be expanded through reconstituting higher teaching–learning in online university education. In reference to the aforementioned MOOC, I argue how a (post)critical and decolonial notion of GCE can be actualised. First, although participants have been mostly Africans, we also had representations from the United Kingdom, the United States, Europe and Latin America. Participants expressed themselves freely and unconstrainedly. Some of them did not hesitate to take issue with unjustifiable views expressed by their co-participants and vice versa, which implies the presence of rigorous levels of iteration. On the issue of whether an African philosophy of HE could be used as a decolonising idea, some participants advocated a position that such a philosophy could rupture the hegemony of thought and practice. In other words, they claimed that an African philosophy has the potential to disrupt understandings of philosophy of HE that seem to advance only dominant views as the only legitimate understandings of the discourse. Instead, participants suggested that HE discourses ought to be initiated that would perpetuate local understandings of human action that are often marginalised and excluded by dominant notions of HE. What seemed to have emerged very poignantly was that some participants were prepared to engage iteratively with others about the possibility and impossibility of practicing an African philosophy of HE beyond the borders of the continent. Participants in the MOOC course therefore considered themselves jointly responsible for the cultivation of an African philosophy of HE in both its actuality and its potentiality. In relational fashion, participants were also prepared to deliberate—ukama—about the potentiality and impotentiality of an African philosophy of HE. It can thus be asserted that GCE as a (post)critical and decolonial discourse showed some promise in guiding higher online teaching–learning to more authentic forms of engagement.

Second, many of the participants were prepared to speak their minds. Their autonomy as legitimate participants in the MOOC was corroborated by their willingness to articulate their understandings about an African philosophy of HE, and how such a philosophy could potentially affect a (post)critical and decolonised notion of GCE. For some of them, the practice of ubuntu gave GCE its critical and post-critical impetus in the sense that the self-empowering potential of GCE was accentuated concomitantly with the possibility that human engagement could evolve into action not thought of before. The mutual respect participants showed towards one another’s contending viewpoints at times highlighted the importance of remaining iteratively engaged without the consideration of withdrawing from the MOOC discourse. In other words, mutual respect coupled with the recognition of difference and otherness emerged strongly throughout deliberations on the MOOC platform in much the same way ubuntu rigorously advocates recognition of plurality and difference in human thought and action. Hence, what a decolonised GCE seemed to have actualised is the notion that, in higher teaching–learning, participants are prepared to engage one another without the possibility that difference, and otherness, will be subverted. Instead, a decolonised notion of GCE holds people together in deliberation without the possibility that participants will be prejudiced and excluded from such an educational discourse. And one of the reasons why dissent on the MOOC platform came vehemently to the fore was the fact that participants experienced a kind of hospitality where they felt welcome and safe to speak their minds irrespective of how, at times, ill-conceived their views might have been. In fact, dissent seemed to have flourished in an online atmosphere of recognition of the other’s point of view irrespective of how deeply flawed such assertions might have been.

Third, many of the participants in the MOOC expressed their views to make their understandings of an African philosophy of HE and GCE count. This meant that they wanted to bring about a change in their societal lives. For them, a (post)critical and decolonised notion of GCE had to be enacted in public life and should not just be confined to deliberative inquiry in an online higher teaching–learning course. The point is that learning about an African philosophy of HE should provoke them to act anew beyond the confines of online HE. In a way, participants seemed to have been aroused to become societal activists who can resist and eradicate forms of human injustices, inequalities and disparities in their societies. An example in point is the view of some participants who seemed to have been evoked to oppose child labour and the abuse of migrant domestic workers, especially women, in Southern African communities. When participants thus realised the dominance and repressiveness of human exploitation in some African communities, they were internally urged to changing such dystopias. It would not be inappropriate to assert that the notion of umsibenzi as a provocation towards social activism came to the fore during the MOOC implementation.

Of course, undeniably there were some dissenting views espoused on the MOOC platform by a minority of the participants in the sense that an African philosophy of HE claims to be a new form of universalism that would be impossible to implement even on the African continent. If by a new form of universalism is meant that such a philosophy of HE integrates and foregrounds local traditions, customs, languages and ways of doing, then I do not see anything murky about the concept. What can be so harmful to educational philosophising if informed by what people do? In this way, such a new universalism might not necessarily be a weakness at all. Alternatively, if by a new form of universalism, the local is brought into conversation with the global then such an understanding of philosophy of HE would be more intellectually enriched because a plurality of views and arguments cannot be detrimental to any human discourse. Likewise, to be presumptuous to claim that an African philosophy of HE will not work is to deny the possibility of its actuality. If colonial education policies have worked through repression and coercion, it then becomes highly likely for decolonised philosophical repositioning to manifest especially in an atmosphere of non-repression and non-exclusion. The point is that an African philosophy of HE has the potential to flourish based on the willingness of people to remain reflectively open to what might possibly still come about. And, to think about an African philosophy of HE and its implications for higher teaching–learning (i.e., intertwined notions of teaching–learning instead of teaching and learning separately) is potentially a way to make what has hitherto been difficult to realise highly likely. If non-coercion, non-repression and non-domination prevail, the cultivation of an African philosophy of HE will hopefully manifest openly and reflectively in institutions of HE on the African continent.

Conclusion

In this article, I have shown how the notion of an African philosophy of HE in the form of (post)critical and decolonial GCE could, in its potentiality, be actualised through a MOOC. The notions of iteration (ukama), criticism and dissonance (ubuntu) and activism through co-belonging and taking of risks (umsebenzi) could enhance GCE in its (post)critical and decolonial form. It is not enough that humans deliberate about public matters that concern them in autonomous and communitarian ways. Similarly, it is insufficient to talk about an African philosophy of HE independent from possible societal change for that would subvert what philosophising means: thinking and acting in the pursuit of change. Rather, the iterative actions of humans should provoke them to act anew to counteract and eradicate societal dystopias. Otherwise, what would be the point of doing African philosophy of HE? It is then that an African philosophy of HE can be considered authentic enough to actuate lasting change in societies where it is most needed. Only then potentiality of a (post)critical and decolonial view of GCE would have manifested.

The MOOC (Teaching for change) with all its flaws offers HE an opportunity to be bold and risky to think differently about its purposes. What we have espoused in this article is to remain reflectively open towards that which we have become used to and simultaneously, like we have intimated through the MOOC, to remain widely open to the possibility of what is still to come. It is not as if the MOOC should be considered a panacea for all Africa’s higher educational challenges and problems. Instead, our MOOC provides some opening for indigenous culturally oriented actions like iteration (ukama), criticism and dissonance (ubuntu) and activism through co-belonging and taking of risks (umsebenzi) to advance a heightened form of GCE in a (post)critical and decolonial way. In essence, the MOOC espoused an African philosophy of HE where notions of deliberative engagement, autonomous action and the recognition of cultural otherness can be used in pedagogical approaches in non-African societies (Waghid et al., 2018).