Consistent with other evidence on short-run effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) announcements on acquiring firm’s shareholder wealth in emerging markets, our study reveals that M&A deals in India, irrespective of the payment method, are not value destroying. Cash deals and stock deals create shareholder wealth on deal announcements. We offer ‘pseudo-cash deal hypothesis’ to explain this phenomenon. We also observe that bigger the relative size of the deal, greater is the abnormal return on deal announcements. We observe that acquirers with high promoter holdings are highly reluctant to offer stock when they acquire a majority stake. However, bigger deals, deals for listed target firms, and deals in the information technology sector, command stock offers.
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