Abstract
Perceptions about the German Resistance against the Nazis (
A Brief Historical Background to the Widerstand
During the course of the 12-year Nazi reign between 1933 and 1945, there were many Germans who ‘were far from passive or paralyzed by fear or propaganda’ (Wolfgram, 2006, p. 202). Tens of thousands of Germans of all walks of life actively opposed the Nazi regime, but what is known today as the German Resistance (
In 1933, most Germans had perhaps been swept up by a national desire for a new dispensation, but many had begun sobering up even before the war started in 1939. The majority of Germans had not noticed nor directly experienced the criminality of the Nazis at first, and many had enthusiastically joined the party because of the palpable changes in the country regarding infrastructure, housing and jobs. Yet, while the achievements heaped up and were praised, the terror steadily increased (Beer, 2018, p. 269; Dönhoff, 1994, p. 48; Scarre, 2009, p. 515). This terror motivated different forms of open and covert resistance by both individuals and nascent resistance groups.
Pastor Eberhard Bethge (1995, p. 19f) wrote that many clergymen in 1934 still believed the efforts and goals of the Nazis to be ‘in the best interests of Germany’. But especially after the nationwide pogrom against German Jews on 9 November 1938, the
Even though there were small groupings like
The resisters involved with the plot of 20 July 1944 transcended class, party and religion, drawing their mandate to act from their conscience or belief in God (von Klemperer, 2016, p. 53f). Nevertheless, within certain
Sociological and psychological studies based on post-war interviews with individuals who had helped Jews concluded that motivations for doing so could not be based on age, gender, religion nor socio-economic background (Beer, 2018, pp. 22, 35). Although about two-thirds of the helpers were women, it is not conclusive as to motive because of the fact that more women were at home during the war than men (Beer, 2018, p. 59). The quantity of information about the various helpers also differs considerably, often depending on how well-known they were and about whom there were written memoirs and other documents; about most helpers there is simply no information.
Regardless of motive, having been identified as an opponent of the Nazi state or ideology had serious consequences. Every German in the Nazi state knew that helping Jews was seen as treason (Beer, 2018, p. 74). Even based on suspicion of anything considered to be an act of opposition, the Gestapo could arrest anyone and place them in so-called protective imprisonment. Without legal recourse, this led to imprisonment or internment in a concentration or labour camp; the duration and conditions thereof were entirely dependent on arbitrary decisions made by Gestapo leaders (Beer, 2018, p. 76; Dams & Stolle, 2008, pp. 70f, 169). Conditions in the Gestapo prisons were notorious for their inhumane treatments of prisoners including torture, malnutrition and unhygienic and insufficient facilities—more often than not ending terminally (Tuchel, 2014, p. 89ff). Family members of the resisters had to reckon with
Perceptions About the Widerstand
The German population did not change overnight at the end of the war, and far from being honoured for their moral courage and integrity, for almost half a century after the war perceptions of the
Especially after German unification, thus from the 1990s onwards, narratives of people who had acted against the Nazi regime gained more serious public and academic interest, and the German Resistance Memorial Centre in Berlin became the locus for the commemoration of the
At the official commemoration occasion on 20 July 2019 in Berlin, both German Chancellor Angela Merkel and German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier portrayed the individuals of the
Merkel’s reflections of the resisters readily correlate with what is perceived of as the ‘honourable man’:
The honourable man is an example to all humanity and he must not only live with his actions, but with the knowledge of an authentic being who is aware of his ontology and must choose between his own judgment and that of the authority of the group(s) to which he chooses to affiliate. The honourable man is distinct from a man who follows rules because they exist; his agency is always his own and his character is exemplified in the totality of his actions. (Oprisko, 2012, p. 152)
Today, it is appreciated that the people of the
Worth mentioning is that with regard to both popular and academic publications in German about the
However, while English literature on the
The
The aim of this article was to consider the moral example of the
Morality and Moral Theory
At its broadest morality is understood to consist of what individuals perceive as right or wrong (Krause, 2002, p. 147; Oprisko, 2012, p. 151; Palomera & Vetta, 2016, p. 429; Ratnapala, 2003, p. 216). Another basic distinction with morality lies with being expressed positively by ‘exhortations to engage in virtuous acts, and on the negative side […,], the observance of rules forbidding certain types of action’, or simply put ‘the do’s and don’ts’ (Ratnapala, 2003, p. 216; see also Oprisko, 2012, p. 151).
Nevertheless, a simple definition of morality seems to be problematic because there are a number of ways to approach a description of what morals are. At a basic level, definitions of morality can be distinguished to be descriptive or normative (Gert & Gert, 2020). A descriptive definition of morality refers to specific codes of conduct individuals or a specific group or society perceive as morals, while a normative definition is concerned with an universal understanding of morality, one which will always find application in a certain set of similar circumstances (Gert & Gert, 2020). Morality in the normative sense, ‘refers to a code of conduct that would be accepted by anyone who meets certain intellectual and volitional conditions, almost always including the condition of being rational’ (Gert & Gert, 2020). Individuals are seen as moral agents who would conduct themselves similarly in certain circumstances. Thus, should similar circumstances arise, people’s moral decisions could be similar, and this in turn confirms the value of historical examples.
On the normative side of the definition of morality, there are three main theoretical approaches: consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2018). Consequentialist theory, and with it, utilitarianism, are both concerned with the consequences or use of actions performed in order to maximize the good and minimize suffering. The main focus with these theories is on the action and not so much on the agent or person (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2019). Deontological theory, originating with the work of Kant, also focusses on the act; yet, it is lesser concerned with consequences as people are believed to operate out of a sense of duty or obligation to follow rules (Alexander & Moore, 2016). Virtue ethics, with its origins in the work of Aristotle, solidly grounds morality in the virtuousness of the character of the agent and is not primarily about the act, nor about the consequences (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2018). While each of the theories have their own special angle and the theories do overlap, as will be seen below, no one theory could sufficiently cover all the examples of individual moral decisions selected here.
The vast heterogeneity of individuals in the
Nevertheless, morality is subjective.
Nobody inhabits the same emotional realm. Many people live in a world so singular that what they see when they open their eyes in the morning may be unfathomable to the rest of humanity […] Because people trust their senses, each believes in her own virtuality with a sectarian’s fervour. (Lewis et al., 2000, p. 120)
Thus, even within the same state, the same community and the same family, people have different ideas of right and wrong and different motivations for their moral or ethical choices.
For instance, in ‘the corrupt state there often seems to be no conscious feeling of moral guilt among some individual characters who actually believe that they were doing the right thing’ (Dams & Stolle, 2008, p. 198, own translation). The Nazis truly believed what they were doing was the right thing, but latest from 1939 onwards the Third Reich had decayed into a morally dissonant state in which nobody knew what was right or wrong anymore. The Nazi state became a ‘moral vacuum’ in which all ‘civilized standards of behaviour and judgement, from the Ten Commandments to the Prussian penal code, having been suspended, only the raw imperative of survival prevailed’ (Malkin, 2006, p. 71; see also Krüger, 2015, p. 162).
To survive in such a ‘moral vacuum’, the individual resister’s motives had to align with Sharon Krause’s confirmation that for the individual rebel ‘the honorable act of resistance vindicates his “manhood”, or what he calls his “essential dignity” as a human being, not his status as a member of some particular social class or the inhabitant of a specific social role’ (Krause, 2002, p. 146). Given the circumstance or experience of something that affects personal morality, for the resister, ‘it was not sufficient for him simply to be; he also had to act […] individual action was the key’ (Krause, 2002, p. 147). Thus, resistance springs forth from the conscience of the individual (von Klemperer, 2016, p. 24). This confirms the notion that ‘moral capital refers to individual conduct’ (Ratnapala, 2003, p. 216), and hence, the
When the laws of the regime fail individuals rely on ‘higher laws’ or moral laws which often find expression in religion (von Klemperer, 2016, p. 36). To justify their actions in a more general way, the resisters relied on an
This finding matches with Mahatma Gandhi’s sentiment that ‘civil disobedience was related to non-cooperation with injustice when it reached evil proportions’ (Haksar, 2003, p. 409). Furthermore, in his reading of Gandhi, Akeel Bilgrami saw the alternative possibility of moral judgement sans moral principle (Bilgrami, 2002, p. 79f). Thus, instead of invoking moral theory, one could well argue that the moral judgments of the people involved in the
Interestingly, Gandhi was read among German intellectuals at the time, including some leading resisters (Dönhoff, 1994, p. 83). Bonhoeffer had even tried on several occasions to meet with Gandhi, and in 1934 Gandhi had invited him to visit, but that never materialized (DeJonge, 2016, p. 370). On his own accord, Gandhi had written a letter to Hitler in 1939 to urge him not to go to war, and another letter in 1940 to urge discontinuance of the war (Jacobs, 2015). In the 1940 letter, Gandhi wrote:
It is based on the knowledge that no spoliator can compass his end without a certain degree of co-operation, willing or compulsory, of the victim. Our rulers may have our land and bodies but not our souls. They can have the former only by complete destruction of every Indian—man, woman and child. That all may not rise to that degree of heroism and that a fair amount of frightfulness can bend the back of revolt is true but the argument would be beside the point. For, if a fair number of men and women be found in India who would be prepared without any ill will against the spoliators to lay down their lives rather than bend the knee to them, they would have shown the way to freedom from the tyranny of violence. (Jacobs, 2015)
While in 1940, the Nazi state was already on the course of ‘complete destruction’ of (not only) resisters, Gandhi reflected the absolute freedom of the individual soul. Gandhi confirmed that no one can take the soul from the individual and the individual is courageously willing to die for it. The individual’s morality is supreme and governments need to respect that.
Nevertheless, as the mission here involved the application of moral theory, in the following section, a selection resisters’ individual moral decisions are closer evaluated with the corresponding moral theories of consequentialism, utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics.
A Selection of Individual Resister’s Moral Decisions
The decision to resist the Nazis was an individual, very personal and solitary decision as every German knew the risks of opposing both the system and the vast majority of the population (von Keyserlingk-Rehbein, 2018, p. 9f). People could not reveal their thoughts openly, even in the closest circles, and because of the constant danger of denunciation or betrayal, one mistake could prove fatal. On the other side, if two people could trust each other, the trust grew stronger in the face of the dangers. In turn, this confirms the individuality of the initial decision to push back (von Keyserlingk-Rehbein, 2018, p. 10).
Decisions to resist were particularly difficult for military officers who felt bound by their oath. After the death of German President von Hindenburg in 1934, the military oath was not sworn to the country Germany anymore, but to the person of the It is time that something be done. However, whoever dares to do something has to be aware that he will enter German history as traitor. But if he does not act, then he will be a traitor of his own conscience. (Pröse, 2019, own translation)
Fritz-Dietlof von der Schulenburg said at his trial that the resisters had taken action to prevent unthinkable damage to Germany and he knew he would be hanged for his part in it, but he had no regrets for his deeds (Dönhoff, 1994, p. 98). With a focus on action and consequences, these examples fit consequentialist thought. While von der Schulenburg perhaps expressed a lesser concern for personal consequences as von Stauffenberg did, both were motivated to maximize good and minimise suffering—wanting to get rid of Hitler for a better Germany, and even a better Europe. Similarly, Adam von Trott zu Solz resisted National Socialism because he saw it his duty to avert a European catastrophe (von Trott zu Solz, 2016/2009, pp. 41–42).
A note in preparation of the plot of 20 July 1944 written by General Beck and Carl Goerdeler reflects that each had come to terms with his own conscience (Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand, 2016c). Their
A moral trade-off, less about the consequences and more about virtue ethics, is reflected by resister Erwin von Witzleben. In notes written in preparation for an address to the army, von Witzleben argued that because Hitler had broken his oath to uphold the values of the
The more religiously orientated resisters expressed a Kantian belief in God as the source of all morals. Thus, before Henning von Treskow shot himself, after he had realized that the plot of 20 July 1944 had failed, he explained to his adjutant that he would meet God with a clear conscience for what he had done in the fight against Hitler (Dönhoff, 1994, p. 72). Heinrich Graf Lehndorff’s last letter before he was executed on 4 September 1944 reflected maturity, deep Christian convictions and the confirmation that after extensive examination of his conscience, he did not regret anything he had done (Dönhoff, 1994, p. 152f).
Further examples that would reflect deontological theory are found in the flyers of
Germans who had helped Jews in Berlin expressed their individual moral calculations reflecting virtue ethics. Ernst Golgowski said in an interview after the war: ‘I had carried out my resistance with full conviction’ (Wolfgram, 2006, p. 212f). Another surviving resister, Helene Jacobs, also said in an interview that her motivation for resisting Nazis was ‘[o]ut of the conviction, that this all had to fail’ (Wolfgram, 2006, p. 215).
However, Germans who had helped Jews were not people with some ‘special sense’ as help often happened in unplanned and serendipitous ways. The decision was more a question of being confronted with a situation and consciously deciding to help (Beer, 2018, p. 56). The helpers’ type of resistance was private, individual and spontaneous, and sprang from a deep disconnect with Nazi ideology (Beer, 2018, p. 264). These examples represent both virtue ethics and deontological theory. But then political and military resistance obviously had the motive to damage or destroy the Nazi regime, and some of these actions had been collective and organized. These motives clearly reflect consequentialist or utilitarian intentions.
The civilian resisters of the
The individual’s autonomy over their own morality may cause the individual to suffer when forced to compromise moral values, consequently the individual
may reach a breaking-point after which he can no longer be himself if he follows the actions prescribed or mandated by laws, norms, and honour-codes that require him to act against his conscience. Reaching the breaking-point will result in either the breaking of the individual and the shattering of the self, the breaking of the self’s relation with the group(s) that cause suffering, or rebellion. (Oprisko, 2012, p. 184)
Rejecting the legality of the national-socialist laws in the totalitarian state meant that resisters could replace these morally and ethically objectionable laws with their own moral reasoning and guidance. In particular, those helpers with a legal background relied on this argument (Beer, 2018, p. 147). Berlin jurist Irene Block who had helped Jews explained that with the fact that the Nazi state had become unjust, she could justify doing things she would usually, as a decent person, not do, like steal or lie (Beer, 2018, p. 148). Most helpers came to a point where they had to break the law in order to help Jews: they hid them, stole food, produced fake identity documents or bribed Gestapo officials, things they would not normally have done.
Of course, it caused deep concern for these people that this continuous breaking of the law could result in their own lowering of moral standards, which could, in the long-term, influence what they would perceive as right or wrong (Beer, 2018, pp. 146, 281f, 296). At a discussion among priests of the
Germans who had helped Jews did so out of their own conviction and not because they had followed the moral example of someone else (Beer, 2018, p. 63). Neither did the political (civilian) nor military resisters follow any example; in their case, many of them were already people with rank and status: aristocrats, top-level bureaucrats and leading military officers (Dönhoff, 1994, p. 36f). The resisters did not act or risk their lives because they were after positions, benefits, belonging in a group, nor any honour. Quite the contrary, they knew they would receive harsh punishment for their actions.
Those who were ‘somebody’ already wanted to help and serve others in need (Dönhoff, 1994, p. 93), they felt a conservative-aristocratic duty, a
There are of course many more examples of resisters’ moral decisions but the selection above has shown how normative moral theories apply to the
Geoffrey Scarre (2009, p. 499) argued that in situations of general moral decay and out of a necessity to survive, the individuality of morality comes stronger to the fore. Scarre elaborated that while
we may all need to trust in others’ moral guidance from time to time, we cannot shrug off our own moral responsibilities by claiming that we were only doing what we were told. Though the guidance comes from others, ultimately the decisions are ours. (Scarre, 2009, p. 516)
In states of general moral dissonance, others’ moral guidance could be so diluted that individuals have only themselves left for guidance to survive. Because individuals cannot rely on a collective sense of right and wrong to guide them, they turn to their own moral compass.
Conclusions
To oppose the system and the majority of Germans was obviously extremely risky; nevertheless, the resisters did what they felt was right. The huge variety of resisters had one thing in common: moral dissonance with the Nazi regime. The
A democratic state, through its constitution which seeks to determine what is morally right, aims at harmonizing the multitude of individual moral perceptions. While staying within the ambit of its constitution, the state has to practice temperance in its guidance, especially when individual freedoms are curtailed—for whatever reason—as the moral buy-in of citizens is required to achieve harmonious coordination of society. However, Ratnapala (2003, p. 229) has lamented that ‘the modern state has a record of attempting to compel temperance by law’. This record has only increased in recent years.
To harmonize a multitude of individual moral perceptions could be a daunting task for governments, but von Moltke (of the Kreisau Circle) warned that failing to harness public moral buy-in causes citizens to become excluded from governance. Citizens then feel that they have no part in any achievements of the state and hence also no responsibility for what happens, while those who exclusively govern feel that they as the ruling class are not responsible towards anyone and can do as they please (Dönhoff, 1994, p. 183), and a morally corrupt state developed.
The year 2020 has been marked not only by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and consequential authoritarian lockdown regulations in many countries, but also by intensified outbreaks all over the globe of intolerance, racism and totalitarianism in countries that are deemed to be democracies. Racism and intolerance have become burning issues in the United States, there is growing right-wing extremism in Europe and the United Kingdom, and totalitarian regimes are sprouting in the Eurasian zone. People resisting these phenomena may well echo the way individuals of the
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Rhodes University Postdoctoral Fellowship, s1900039.