Abstract
The transition towards a more circular economy (CE) is advancing slowly and is even faltering. Recent CE literature has therefore urged for a more plural-political perspective and for more focus on the region as a practical site or ‘ecosystem’ of transformation. Meeting these calls, this paper develops and applies a conceptual framework bridging plural politics, policy-making and a view of the region as value-based ecosystems. We thus contribute to a plural-political framework of transformation (ranging from top-down formal politics to bottom-up ‘subpolitics’), propelled by ambitions and initiatives towards change from all institutional spheres (business, communities, authorities, education, etc.). Our case study entails two Dutch CE frontrunners, Rijk van Nijmegen and the Province of Friesland. We draw various conclusions. The regions differ markedly in how they navigate different (sub)political modes, through different forms of collaboration. Yet they all meet wider market and regulatory limitations, which need to be overcome for the transition to advance. Moreover, ecosystem development and impact strongly depend on ‘heroic’, well-connected individuals, thereby limiting concerted policy impact.
Introduction
What political role do, and can, regions play in the transformation towards a circular economy (CE)? In this paper, we build a conceptual framework for understanding that role, followed by an application to two Dutch cases: Friesland and Rijk van Nijmegen (Nijmegen Region). Our framework draws on three insights, namely the call for a more plural and imaginative political approach to CE (Fratini et al., 2019; Genovese and Pansera, 2021; Pansera et al., 2021; Scoones et al., 2020), CE as a practical strategy for pursuing sustainability and climate policy (Dagilienė et al., 2021) and the significance of the region in doing so (Arsova et al., 2022; Bourdin and Jacquet, 2025; Dąbrowski et al., 2024; Davies et al., 2024; Deutz et al., 2024). To contribute to a plural political approach, we include a broad spectrum of political modes (Göpel, 2016), extending the notion of the political towards ‘subpolitics’ (Beck, 1997; Latour, 2007). To contribute to CE as a practical strategy focused on the region, we adopt the notion of a ‘regional ecosystem’ as a source of collective, transformative change (see also Nuur, 2025; Torre and Bourdin, 2026). That change works threefold, namely through value-based narratives, collaboration & leadership, and positioning & advocacy. Our core argument is that this threefold ecosystem dynamics, bottom-up narrating, collaborative bottom-up initiatives and regional showcasing, serves to bring transformative change and impact from the ‘subpolitical’ to the (mainstream) political level.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. ‘Theory: Regional CE ecosystems as sites of transformative change and impact’ and ‘Conceptual framework: Plural transformational politics and ecosystem dynamics’ sections explain our main approach (a political take on regional CE ecosystems) and main framework (how ecosystems encompass political modes). ‘Method: Cases, data and analysis’ section outlines our methods. ‘Findings (1): Value-based narratives’, ‘Findings (2): Collaboration & leadership’ and ‘Findings (3): Positioning & advocacy within the wider CE transformation’ sections present the empirical findings from our two case studies, Nijmegen and Friesland, discussing value-based narratives, collaboration & leadership and positioning & advocacy. ‘Conclusion’ section concludes this article. Our conceptual work benefits from our dual embedding in academic and policy circles working on the CE. Our data stem from policy documents and interviews (Table 1).
List of interviews.
CE: circular economy.
Theory: Regional CE ecosystems as sites of transformative change and impact
The CE transformation is proceeding slowly and is even faltering. In a serious critique of the current state of the CE transformation, Pansera et al. (2021: 472) warn that ‘CE may become yet another instance of neoliberal environmental governance’ dominated by private parties and growth-oriented economic policies. They base this conclusion on evidence of greenwashing, the techno-managerial focus of much policy and the lack of policy learning. Hence, they call for a more political, bottom-up approach. A core question is then how to invest in responsibility and capacity in other actors and ‘new public structures’, notably from the bottom-up, enabling a more inclusive, democratic and fair transformation. In their own words: ‘How bottom-up practices (including social activism) can re-appropriate and reshape the CE discourse is crucial to enable a fair and just transition’ (Pansera et al., 2021: 474). Pansera et al.’s verdict echoes broader work on ‘transformative change’ (Hermans et al., 2016), as well as Calisto Friant et al.’s (2020) distinction between different CE discourses, and Fratini et al’s (2019) focus on the role of imaginaries. It also echoes Dąbrowski et al.’s (2024: 101) conclusion that a ‘shift towards a circular city or a circular region entails developing a place-based and critical approach to CE policy that considers the often-overlooked social and political aspects of sustainability, going beyond the technical aspects of resource efficiency and waste management’. Here, we embrace a fundamentally civic view on transformation, in which actors and organisations from spheres (communities, authorities, business, etc.) work from shared market and nonmarket values. Importantly, however, the pursuit of political transformation does not play down the practical role of conventional worldviews and policy-making. Rather, the challenge is to build effective bridges between bottom-up drivers for ‘transformative change’ and ‘mainstream’ perspectives and policies (Lekan et al., 2021).
A suitable site to build such bridges, amongst others, is that of the region, because of concrete capacities to build well-integrated ‘ecosystems’ (Berghuis et al., 2023). The term ‘ecosystems’ refers here to open, territorially anchored socio-economic networks with their own structures, values and practices. We thus adopt a dynamic, relational and reflexive approach of ecosystems always ‘in process’ (Spigel and Harrison, 2018). Hence, regional ecosystems are bundles of multiple, variegated assets, capabilities and various alignments between the spheres of business, state, community, education, shaping and coordinating material loops, inside and outside of the region (Bourdin and Torre, 2025; Torre and Bourdin, 2026). Benefitting from proximity and embedding (Berghuis et al., 2023; Bourdin and Jacquet, 2025; Chembessi et al., 2024; PBL, 2021), ecosystems shape the workings of leadership and collaboration, which, in turn, reshape the very modes of politics in which they operate. As discussed further below, this dynamics is spurred by value-based narratives that provide a sense of regional identity, purpose and focus (Dagilienė et al., 2021; McBeth et al., 2014). Value-based narratives serve as dynamic constructs that do not simply mirror pre-existing beliefs but rather actively capture and structure political struggles (Meyer, 1995). As such, these narratives provide a framework for negotiating, contesting and ultimately transforming forms of collective action and positioning (Feola, 2020; Sergeeva and Winch, 2021). In the wider context of transformative change, a key outcome is the positioning of a regional ecosystem in wider economic and political circuits of CE development, through bridging, navigation and advocacy (Lekan et al., 2021). In doing so, bottom-up dynamics meet and bridge top-down mechanisms and influences in a place-specific manner (Prendeville et al., 2018). We thus distinguish three core ecosystem features:
Value-based narratives capture the crucial role of political debates and struggles about core socio-economic values, and the role of regional imaginaries to motivate and pursue transformation (Fratini et al., 2019).
Collaboration & leadership entail both shaping economic organisation (governance) and the set-up of concrete material loops (value chains) (Berghuis et al., 2023; OECD, 2020).
Positioning & advocacy highlight the ways regions navigate between bottom-up aspirations and initiatives, and top-down drivers and barriers, seeking transformational impact. That also includes ways of diffusing and scaling regional achievements and practices, and lobbying and negotiating at higher spatial levels.
From an economic viewpoint, this emphasis on bridging, navigation and advocacy chimes with a ‘diverse economy’ approach, including an engagement with mainstream economic thinking and practices (Deutz et al., 2024; Lekan et al., 2021). In practical terms, for regional actors to respond to top-down challenges, they are required to meet and navigate top-down political–economic registers. Hence, we concur with Scoones et al. (2020) to consider the relevant spectrum of economic modes as necessarily complementary. According to Scoones et al (2020: 66), ‘contemporary debates about transformations to sustainability should draw on deep, contrasting political traditions, which reflect distinct but overlapping understandings of social processes that generate transformative change’. Our study here can accordingly be seen as a further operationalisation of the coming together and navigation of such diverse understandings. We thus follow Scoones et al’s (2020) and others’ recommendation to grasp the inherently deep political nature of transformations, tread plural pathways and account for diverse knowledge. Such an approach avoids what Blythe et al. (2018: 1218) call the ‘dark side of transformation’ stemming from a neglect of social, structural and political pluralities. To those pluralities, we turn now.
Conceptual framework: Plural transformational politics and ecosystem dynamics
Our plural framework draws on five political modes, inspired, in particular, by the work of Latour and Beck. In his seminal paper ‘Turning around politics: A note on Gerard de Vries’ paper’, Latour (2007) depicts a political spectrum ranging from politics based on ‘modern’, ‘technocratic’ politics drawing on fact-finding, deliberation, voting and decision-making to open, inclusive and territorially rooted ‘grassroots’ politics. This echoes Beck’s (1997) earlier work on formal politics versus ‘subpolitics’, that is, the ways interest groups shape politics beyond the standard process of voting, administration and policy-making. Both Latour and Beck thus expand the political realm to wider ‘publics’. Figure 1 depicts two core dimensions of this expansion, namely the move from a single, universal to a pluriversal basis of political worldview and expansion of public involvement (cf. Hendriks, 2024). Based on these ideas and dimensions, we apply the following modes to the ecosystems perspective elaborated above (mapped in Table 2).
Modes of transformational politics.
Our framework: Regional ecosystems as sites of plural transformational politics.
CE: circular economy.
At the top of the spectrum, we start with techno-economic politics (Dąbrowski et al., 2024). This mode is rules-based, drawing on the narrow, ‘rational’ powers of expertise, based on a universal ‘modernist’ perspective on the world (Radaelli, 2017). It seeks to build a world that, through science, uniform categories, data, rules and instruments, planning and control, fosters rational – preferably quantitative – models and predictive, rational behaviour and policies. It follows technocratic and economic (‘promarket’) doctrines, which require strong institutions (e.g. state bureaucracies, education) and conventions (e.g. rules of the game, codes of conduct), ensuring that agents behave ‘rational’, notably in the pursuit of economic growth. Important means are subsidies, registries and corrective mechanisms (regulation) from higher-level authorities. The role of (in our case, regional) actors is instrumental, and collaboration is limited to the organisation of compliance and implementation (Centeno, 1993).
Second, this techno-economic mode has a participatory variant, presenting a response to the need felt to be more inclusive and democratic, and to draw on capabilities beyond top-down technical expertise. A participatory techno-economic approach, as recently embraced by the EU (Rodríguez et al., 2020), assigns much of the institutional design of the policy system to core system actors. Rooted in corporatist state traditions, a participatory techno-economic approach seeks to overcome self-interest-driven behaviour by, and to elicit commitment from, businesses, education and other parties by making them part of the institutional process. In the case of transformation, this has resulted in engagement and consultation practices by state organisations (e.g. EU . . .), and a plethora of ‘multi-level, multi-actor’ approaches (Knill and Liefferink, 2013). Top-down thus meets the more bottom-up operational capacities of sub-national authorities and bodies, although higher-level authorities typically retain decision-making power (Dąbrowski, 2014). In such more collaborative contexts, the development of rules, policies and instruments is more gradual and strategic, with a stronger role of visioning, sharing ‘best-practices’ and communication. Different from a rules-based approach, a participatory approach provides scope for taking into account differences between (and within) regions and places, fostering specialisation and new divisions of labour. However, such ‘multi-level’ coordination remains handicapped through its techno-economic imposition (Knill and Liefferink, 2013).
The third mode is stakeholder governance, encompassing a more discursive, inclusive and horizontal form of politics and policy-making. Rather than assuming pre-given roles and doctrines, stakeholder governance facilitates shared leadership and consensus building around ‘innovative’, ‘co-created’ solutions (Ansell et al., 2022). Collaboration helps stakeholders to pool resources, knowledge and expertise, and to try out and scale up initiatives (pilots, experiments) that guide transformations. While such collaboration may also suffer from conflicting interests and wavering commitment, its hands-on nature encourages to build effective organisational structures (Avoyan et al., 2024) pursuing ‘transformation management’. That effectiveness, however, is confined to what actors, with their different backgrounds, interests and resources, manage to agree upon. Hence, the emphasis on consensus building may pose major limitations (Scott et al., 2019). ‘Transition management’ programmes generally involve a firm role of incumbent players, such as ruling political and business actors. Incumbents are often willing to employ a broad scope for ‘niche’ developments, some diffusion (‘scaling’) and their showcasing (as forerunner, through awards, etc.). However, they are much less prepared to accept the changes in the ‘regime’ defining the rules and codes identified within techno-economic modes. This also has a marked spatial manifestation. Stakeholder governance allows regions with stronger collaborative traditions, and more change-oriented, less ‘selfish’, actors, to make much more progress than others.
The fourth mode further widens the ‘publics’ through ‘subpolitics’, fully opening and politicising the debates and roles of societal values. As Latour (2017) has argued eloquently and repeatedly, issues like wealth and sustainability can only be truly addressed if they are addressed as ‘matters of concern’, charged with moral and political capacities, in a wider, democratic setting of ‘publics’. Such ‘publics’ may consist of proactive business communities, grassroots movements, committed ‘policy entrepreneurs’, amongst others, and their combinations. Rather than consensus, a critical factor is momentum. Such momentum stems from the capacities within the region to orchestrate debate, notably on values and commitments, to build up political clout for change, and to mobilise resources in tandem with formal politics. Importantly, while subpolitics still involves facts and procedures, it consciously guides their interpretation and use through the joint debate on, and elaboration and narration of, the issue (‘matters of concern’). A major challenge is to bring ‘principled’ concerns, values and care to the ‘factual’ foreground in such a way that it makes inroads into stakeholder governance and techno-economic political modes.
There is a variant of the subpolitical mode in which the latter challenge remains largely unanswered. This entails the fifth and final mode, in which local values guide local action both at a discursive and practical level. Illustrations include, for example, Repair Cafés, Transition Towns, amongst many others (Wittmayer et al., 2023). These entail niche initiatives that are often propelled by charismatic leaders and inward-looking group norms, producing highly context-specific practices and outcomes but with limited broader engagement. They critically depend on the competencies and commitment of a passionate group of volunteers. While they embrace a pluriversal worldview in general, they only cater for one public. Politics then turns largely sectarian (‘my way or the highway’, ‘practice what you preach’), leaving broader engagement to others.
In sum, our framework (Table 2) involves a horizontal and vertical dynamics. Horizontally, value-based narratives motivate different forms of collective action and positioning, adopting different political modes. Vertically, the movement is from grassroots and bottom-up ‘subpolitical’ spheres to the techno-economic political spheres (Antonini et al., 2020), along the three lines of narrating, collaborating and positioning (and back). Let us now examine these double dynamics in practice.
Method: Cases, data and analysis
We apply our framework to two Dutch cases, Rijk van Nijmegen (Nijmegen Region) and the Province of Friesland (Figure 2). We have selected these regions because they stand out nationally in pursuing high CE ambitions, albeit in different governance settings. The movement to a CE in Rijk van Nijmegen builds on an intermunicipal business support agency Lifeport@ and various grassroots initiatives. The region has circa 325,000 inhabitants, and a mixed economy specialising in health, education, micro-electronics, recreation, logistics, business services and horticulture, including all enterprise types (social, small and medium-sized enterprises, large). In Friesland, the main platform for the transformation to a CE is the prominent business-led association Vereniging Circular Friesland (VCF). The province has circa 660,000 inhabitants, with an economy specialising in agriculture, tourism and small-scale manufacturing and construction. Both regions face similar environmental conditions, that is, roughly similar exposure to climate change, high energy prices and resource scarcity. Both regions stand out in waste recycling, due to the forerunner roles of waste collection and processing companies (DAR, ARN in Nijmegen and Omrin in Friesland). Friesland hosts some smaller urban centres (Leeuwarden, Heerenveen and others); overall, the province is more rural. More generally, in the Netherlands, the main CE policy document, the ‘National Circular Economy Programme 2023–2030’ (NPCE) (MIWM, 2023), sees a strong role for regions in forging collaborative networks, experimentation and policy implementation. However, while national efforts often set broad targets and frameworks, regional actors frequently operate outside these structures, investing in their own modes of transformation through bottom-up initiatives, collaboration and showcasing. Consequently, the evolving relationship between national policies and regional initiatives is not without tension.
Case study regions: Friesland and Rijk van Nijmegen.
To understand ecosystem dynamics, we collected documentation, such as standing CE policy in the region (visions, activity plans, etc.), background reports, information on websites, etc. In addition, we have interviewed 5 national experts and 15 regional stakeholders covering public authorities, triple-helix organisations, CE platforms, established business, SMEs, social entrepreneurs, grassroot and knowledge organisations. We have also attended various circular ‘festivals’ in both regions and made notes. The data – documents, transcripts, meeting notes – have been coded along value-based narratives, collaboration & leadership, positioning and advocacy. We have jointly interpreted the outcomes, and refined them through discussions with other experts in our organisations, who have a broader view of what is happening across the country (and beyond). We have also debated our views on Nijmegen and Friesland in other parts of the country, to get a clearer idea about what outcomes have a more case-specific versus a more general significance. Table 3 lists the various research steps.
Research protocol.
CE: circular economy.
There are various limitations. While immersing ourselves in both regions’ CE activities, we have primarily met the devoted and the willing, possibly limiting exposure to more critical voices. Moreover, we only study two unique cases, clearly calling for more studies elsewhere. Finally, by focusing on the politics of strategising and tactics, we pay less attention to the controversies around the CE concept itself (Davies et al., 2024; Lekan et al., 2021). Following our three ecosystem features, we now discuss our findings from Friesland and Nijmegen. Interviews are listed in Table 1.
Findings (1): Value-based narratives
Narratives are seldom neutral, as they are sites of contestation and inflection, where dominant narratives (such as those emphasising rules-based techno-economic approaches) are challenged by counternarratives informed by other (sub)political modes (Feola, 2020; Van Mierlo et al., 2020). These counternarratives offer explicit or implicit opposition to the status quo by revealing alternative pathways and advocating for those as credible objects of policy and social action (Gibson-Graham, 2008). Joint action, as well as the shaping of collaboration, critically depends on shared narratives. In particular, creating and sharing transformative narratives of circularity helps to articulate shared (and sharpened) concerns and values, and how these are translated into views and actions of change (Barba Lata et al., 2023; Calisto Friant et al., 2020; Hobson, 2020). Transformative narratives and self-reflection help collaborations to overcome partisan interests and beliefs, to find resources for new ideas and experiments, and to build environments of learning and strategising at the edge of, and beyond, mainstream activities and policies (Van Hoof et al., 2023). From a broader political–economic perspective, such steps may serve ‘to accommodate other forms of accumulation, distribution and creative action’ (Barba Lata and Duineveld, 2019: 1770). Such narratives putatively become conducive to processes of differentiation that enable local CE initiatives to take root and evolve (McBeth et al., 2014), and to shape ‘normative directionality’. In the words of Hendriks (2024: 19), ‘Normative directionality plays a key role in identifying the underlying assumptions, values, and interests that influence the transition process. It concerns the desired direction of change, the preferred future states, and the values and principles that underpin them’. This has important implications for how emergent regional ecosystems align with the national, as well as broader CE agendas and ambitions (Bourdin and Torre, 2025; Silvestri et al., 2020).
The emergent regional ecosystems in Friesland and Rijk van Nijmegen display rather contrasting value-based narratives in their pursuit of circularity. Friesland is home to a well-articulated narrative that seeks to establish a coherent SME-based ecosystem. The region’s short-term ambition is to position itself as a national frontrunner in CE practices. This narrative importantly dwells on the role of SMEs as main catalysts for innovative circular value-chain development (notably in building, biomass and waste use). It promotes a strong sense of regional identity and cultural cohesion, as a foundation for economic and social values to converge. A phrase commonly heard is that circularity will soon present ‘It Nije Normaal’ (Frisian for the New Normal; Interview 1). Planning and policy practices run bottom-up from VCF and IP to provincial and (sub)national documents and discourse on the circular transformation. This also provides a channel to signal how local ambitions and aspirations are stifled by regulatory constraints, as discussed further below. By contrast, Rijk van Nijmegen evokes a more heterogeneous mix of circular initiatives and practices that lack a coherent main narrative and ways to embed bottom-up values and aspirations in policy settings and processes. Nevertheless, despite this diversity, there is much motivation to build local circular value chains (e.g. Emmerik circular hub), to innovate (world’s first diaper recycling; Interviews 7 and 8), and to pursue the ambition to become a collaborative leader in circular thinking and sustainable action at both national and European levels. Notably from the grassroots communities, there is a strong call for changing (inter)national regulatory frameworks, and even for a more fundamental makeover of the economic system, in order to move to a more sustainable, circular and fairer economy (Interviews 7 and 9).
Concerning the role of formal politics and policy-making, the case of Friesland draws on a longstanding legacy of consensus and collaboration among various stakeholders, with a seemingly strong focus on balancing economic growth with ‘broad welfare’ in the region (Interview 10). This allows for flexibility and responsiveness in navigating multifaceted decision-making. However, despite the ambit of the circular transformation in Friesland, decision-making processes are primarily limited to interactions between the business community and the public sector, hence reinforcing a relatively closed deliberative structure. Due to its rather fragmented character, the Nijmegen ecosystem shows a disposition towards more principled debates and calls, emphasising that only a coordinated approach to transform the economic system can effectively drive the CE transformation (Interviews 7 and 9). The current patchwork of support, initiatives and regulations is thus deemed insufficient for the scale jump required on a regional level. Consequently, calls for such a more coordinated approach carry a dual focus here. On the one hand, there is an emphasis on decisiveness and the urgency of making clear, informed choices in charting a course of action for the (regional) circular transformation. On the other hand, there is a recognition of the complexities inherent in decision-making processes, marked by long deliberations and the challenge of balancing diverse interests. To fully grasp and articulate such ‘matters of concern’, extending trust would be essential, that is stimulating a greater commitment from the business sector and a broader collaboration among regional stakeholders.
The interplay between formal politics and various manifestations of subpolitics at the regional level represents a vehicle both for ongoing differentiation processes and developing more comprehensive vocabularies of mutual recognition and understanding. In both cases, subpolitics bears a symbiotic relationship to formal politics, whereby the former could be best understood as a complementary response to the limitations of the latter toward realising the transformative potential of circularity. In Friesland’s case, the interplay between formal politics and subpolitics reinforces the importance of regional identity in collaborative efforts, giving SMEs much effective voice. The resulting narrative is that cultural identity and a shared sense of belonging underpins regional collaboration as the desirable scale to achieve an embedded circular ecosystem. This grassroots orientation is a shared feature of both cases. Yet, while Friesland distinguishes itself through a fairly cohesive narrative of change, Rijk van Nijmegen relies on a multitude of narratives that are less anchored in shared specific regional identity and more focused on inspiring a patchwork movement toward circularity. The manifestation of these multiple narratives and seemingly more inclusive nature of the Nijmegen ecosystem means that various voices are given space to articulate their visions, thereby enriching the overall discourse on circularity (Moreau et al., 2017).
Findings (2): Collaboration and leadership
Collaboration is, in many senses, everywhere: it is not a new phenomenon, nor is it confined to any particular sphere of society. Scholars from various disciplines have long acknowledged that individuals, organisations and institutions often rely on collaborative arrangements to articulate interests and values, pool resources, mitigate risks or pursue shared objectives (Avoyan, 2022b; Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015). What is noteworthy, however, is how collaboration beyond policy networking and multi-level governance can serve as a formula for forging new intersections and balance within and between top-down and bottom-up efforts. In this sense, collaborative arrangements in regional CE ecosystems do not present a one-dimensional construct but rather dynamic, adaptive processes that do not merely follow standard organisational templates. Two challenges stand out. First, collaborative efforts must employ joint circular projects and initiatives that can reshape and align the very modes of politics in which they occur—altering power distributions, influencing policy frameworks and redefining priorities in ways that may echo far beyond any single project or region (Emerson et al., 2012). Second, collaboration must be cultivated in a context dominated by linear, market-based relationships. When incumbent firms whose revenues depend on linear throughput models dominate, alliances risk entrenching the status quo—steering projects toward incremental tweaks or coordinating lobbying that postpones more ambitious CE regulation (Fischer and Newig, 2016; Kirchherr et al., 2018). The transformative capacity of collaboration emerges only when it is recognised – and deliberately managed – as an evolving practice of alignment and continuous learning, operating across different transformational modes of politics in response to complex, systemic challenges (Innes and Booher, 1999). This reveals the critical role of collaboration in the success and evolution of regional CE ecosystem.
Collaboration requires overcoming challenges related to coordinating diverse interests, building mutual trust and ensuring sustained commitment from all stakeholders while navigating the complexities of resource-sharing and decision-making (Huxham et al., 2000). In order to be effective, collaborative governance must rely on both structural and functional elements that bring diverse actors together. Structurally, this may include formal and informal partnerships and alliances, often organised through regional platforms or clusters and supported by digital environments (e.g. websites) that facilitate communication and coordination (Torfing et al., 2024). Functionally, principled engagement (Avoyan, 2022a; Emerson et al., 2012) is key: open dialogue, deliberation and negotiation among stakeholders ensure that diverse perspectives are integrated and that common goals emerge. In such settings, key players or ‘heroes’ often surface, providing (often unofficial) leadership and access to resources that sustain the CE ecosystem (Ebbekink and Lagendijk, 2013). Through building trust and common understanding, such ‘heroes’ leverage community networks, partnerships and resources to sustain situated processes of collaboration, experimentation and value creation. They thus help navigating challenges in the functioning of regional CE ecosystems.
Our findings reveal strong differences in the composition and coherence between the two ecosystems of Friesland and Nijmegen, with different styles of and approaches to collaboration. Yet in both cases, the CE ecosystems are formed through collaboration, shaped by narratives, values, and the drive for transformation, while straddling multiple political modes. The Friesland CE ecosystem exemplifies this complexity, demonstrating how CE initiatives operate across a spectrum of political configurations rather than fitting neatly within a single mode. Collaboration here is primarily rooted in stakeholder governance through structured platforms namely the VCF and the Innovation Pact (IPF), where businesses, policy-makers and educational institutions engage in narrative-driven strategising and cross-sectoral partnerships. In a way, the two platforms exhibit a substantial role for, and commitment (including financial) of, the local business community. Community and grassroots initiatives are negligible, although there is community engagement for instance through one of the local professional football clubs (SC Heerenveen). The platforms underpin strong collaboration and narrating and, hence, provide clear direction and attention, notably through the prominent role of certain business leaders. The platforms unite all main authorities (municipal, provincial), core businesses, education (all levels) and support organisations, and encompass all CE initiatives. Currently, this focuses on crossovers between agriculture, construction, tourism and small-scale manufacturing. Overall, CE initiatives fit neatly in the focused development of the ecosystems. Strategising is rooted in well-articulated operational narratives, helping to focus and create commitment. Notably in biomass, housing and waste processing, this has helped to foster pathways in which niche initiatives are, step by step, rolled out across the province and even neighbouring areas (Gemeente Heerenveen, 2022; Gemeente Leeuwarden, 2024; Vereniging Circulair Friesland, 2021) (Interviews 1, 2, see Table 1).
Through its formalised platforms, nevertheless, the Friesland CE ecosystem embraces ‘publics’ consisting of local businesses and societal actors driving bottom-up change, often ahead of government intervention. Unlike Nijmegen, this does not include grassroots movements. Friesland’s CE movement is business-led, demonstrating self-organised momentum in the absence of strong top-down mandates (Interview 2). While this bottom-up agency generates energy and drive, it also requires selective engagement with participatory and rules-based techno-economic approaches to secure policy alignment and long-term support. A key challenge remains bridging these governance layers. Grassroots initiatives and direct community involvement (communal mode) remain relatively limited, which can be attributed to Friesland’s rural, and more closely knit social character. Nevertheless, localised engagement strategies – such as football-club-led CE initiatives – illustrate potential avenues for broader public mobilisation (Interview 3). Accordingly, the Friesland CE ecosystem’s ability to engage across these political modes, bridging stakeholder governance, subpolitics, techno-economic policy engagement and communal outreach, underscores the necessity of fluid and adaptive governance strategies for transformation.
Rijk van Nijmegen exhibits an equally vibrant yet more divided CE ecosystem than Friesland. Unlike Friesland, where structured platforms drive coherence, Nijmegen’s CE landscape reflects a more complex interplay of political modes. At its core, Nijmegen’s CE ecosystem relies on stakeholder governance (third mode) with a more conventional policy-based cluster composed of an intermunicipal cluster agency (Lifeport@), incumbent firms and education, enabling networking, exchange, project acquisition and implementation and visibility (media, circular festivals, etc.) (Interviews 5 and 6) (Circulaire Raad RvN@, 2024). Waste, construction and food are key sectors. An iconic project is the state-of-the-art diaper recycling facility – one of Europe’s first full-scale plants – which aggregates regional diaper waste and synchronises downstream plastics processing. However, governance in Nijmegen remains fragmented, with provincial and municipal strategies lacking cohesion, making long-term planning and coordinated implementation challenging. This fragmentation forces local CE actors to carve out their own forms of collaborative governance, with some aligning with institutional clusters, while others seek alternative, decentralised approaches. A set of emerging coordination mechanisms is beginning to help Nijmegen’s circular initiatives to become competitive vis-a-vis existing linear models. For example, the diaper-recycling facility acts as an anchor hub, concentrating material flows that single firms could not mobilise alone (Interviews 5 and 6). Lifeport@ brokers consortia through networking events and circular festivals linked to national portals such as Versnellingshuis Nederland Circulair, lowering search and transaction costs for SMEs (Interviews 5–7). In contrast to Friesland’s structured business leadership, Nijmegen’s ecosystem relies more on self-organised collaboration between public, private and civic actors, often navigating the gaps left by formal policy frameworks. Simultaneously, there is a vibrant community-based movement operating across subpolitical and communal modes of politics sprouting small-scale food and logistics activities and businesses, such as the circular hub Emmerik (recycling polystyrene) and the collective farm concept ‘Herenboeren’. The ‘Herenboeren’ presents a cooperative organisation, which pursues circularity in food production, in the words of a spokesperson, ‘in our way’ (Interview 9).
Overall, the community initiatives exhibit a more foundational language, including advocacy for alternative pathways to CE transformations (including the use of ‘circular money’). Yet, many businesses struggle to align their circular ambitions with rigid policy frameworks, highlighting the tension between grassroots momentum and top-down regulatory structures (Interviews 6 and 7). The lack of a unifying framework remains a critical challenge, as bottom-up actors struggle to scale up their influence within institutional structures, while policy-driven efforts risk overlooking the transformative potential of community-led CE practices. This contrasts with Friesland, where business-driven platforms more effectively integrate policy alignment into their operations.
Our analysis thus illustrates how collaboration interweaves political modes: while collaboration is structured and pursued notably at the ‘grassroots’ (‘publics’) levels, it actively reshapes broader political frameworks, influencing institutional and technical approaches to circularity. In Friesland, structured stakeholder governance within VCF and IPF has created a coherent CE strategy, yet this formalised approach has also influenced regulatory frameworks, integrating CE into provincial economic policies and shaping funding mechanisms, through active and detailed involvement of VCF partners in policy processes (Interviews 1 and 10). Meanwhile, in Nijmegen, grassroots initiatives and civic-led projects have challenged existing governance structures, pushing policy-makers to acknowledge alternative CE pathways beyond the structured clusters like Lifeport@. In both cases, engagement across multiple political modes enables circular ecosystems to navigate institutional constraints, scale up initiatives and influence regulatory adaptation, in highly region-specific ways.
Findings (3): Positioning and advocacy within the wider CE transformation
To play a role in the wider CE transformation, at national, European and even global levels, regional ecosystems position and articulate themselves in large value chains and policy networks in multiple ways. Hence, what warrants theoretical and concrete elaboration is how regional activities become ‘cogs’ in wider material loops, political movements and policy processes (Dąbrowski et al., 2024; Lekan et al., 2021; OECD, 2025). This, in turn, depends on matches between, on the one hand, regional capacities to innovate, invest and lobby, and, on the other hand, the characteristic and transformation needs of the particular material loop at stake. In material terms, we can see such matches for instance in the way capacities to build innovative diaper recycling in Nijmegen match the position of the regional waste-processing sector in wider flows of recycled plastics. In Friesland, a combination of agricultural specialisation, a significant section of the local building sector that is transformation-oriented and organised (semi)public demand for circular buildings resulted in local production and use of biomass material (Interviews 1, 2, 10 and 12). Policy positioning is complex and multifaceted, covering the whole spectrum of Table 2. We make four observations.
First, through a variety of channels, regional actors put pressure on higher ‘powers’ to structurally change rules-of-the-game and policy-making. This includes the signalling of bottlenecks notably for scaling up, or even maintaining, local CE initiatives. For instance, progress in the building sector is slow due to a lack of priority being given to circularity (relative to tackling the housing shortage and to the reduction of carbon emissions from the built environment) and the persistent emphasis on affordability and risk-avoidance (Interviews 2 and 13; Verwoerd et al., 2025). Progress in the plastics and textiles sectors are even halted and reversed due to the lack of protection against overly cheap, ‘linear’ imports. Overall, in line with rules-based techno-economic thinking, there is consensus that proper market restructuring at (inter)national levels could dramatically boost investments in, and the scaling up of, CE activities. In our cases, the signalling works well in Friesland, due to the close connection between VCF and the province, and also via the unified Environmental Agency (FUMO). In Rijk van Nijmegen, while marketing is strong, advocacy is more ad-hoc (Interviews 5–7).
Second, regional and provincial agencies are part of wider arenas at (inter)provincial and national levels (co)designing and implementing top-down economic policy and support programmes (Circulaire Raad RvN@, 2024: 15645; GMR, 2024; Roemers et al., 2016; Vereniging Circulair Friesland, 2021). In our terms, this navigates between a participatory techno-economic approach (multi-level planning) and stakeholder governance (with more regional initiative). An important role is played here by the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), such as the NOM for Friesland, Groningen and Drenthe, and Oost-NL for Gelderland (encompassing Rijk van Nijmegen) and Overijssel. At these levels, the need is felt for a mutual coordination between regions, notably to avoid needless duplication of knowledge development, piloting and investments, and to foster local links. That should not come with predefined foci or specialisations, however (Interview 6). At present, however, a dialogue about specialisation does not have a high priority. RDA officers make ad-hoc suggestions on where to invest in which activities, but also indicate that, in time, more research, debate and orchestration will help new activities to cluster and scale (Interview 15).
Third, regions benefit from a developed interregional infrastructure of knowledge exchange involving entrepreneurs, network brokers and local policy-makers, amongst others (Lijzen et al., 2020; PBL, 2021). This includes generic organisations and networks such as Versnellingshuis Nederland Circulair, het Groene Brein and CIRCO. These bodies and networks support an intensive exchange of experiences, good practices and success stories, and also help to signal opportunities and bottlenecks, such as the ‘Rode Draden’ (red thread) reports (Versnellingshuis, 2024). Here, we see that our two case ecosystems work in full swing, notably through the sphere of stakeholder governance. All our interviewees, notably entrepreneurs, report to be part of such exchanges, participating in regional and national events, and showcasing through all kinds of outlets (including many websites). VCF and Lifeport@ play pivotal roles, also by attracting the national CE convention to the region, to Friesland in 2025 and to Nijmegen in 2024. Interviewees (12–14) also experience quite some fragmentation, as well as gaps. A question remains to what extent there is scope and need for more orchestration and investment in these networks.
Fourth and finally, there is a strong sentiment that the CE transformation requires more vigour and results than currently prompted by formal politics and policy-making, giving rise to alternative political pressures. In Friesland, VCF spokespersons and members sketch how, in their engagement as stakeholders, they push the boundaries, and work ‘out of the box’, ‘crossing boundaries’, even in ‘subversive’ ways (Interviews 1 and 12). Formal policy work is considered as too slow, viscous (‘syrupy’), meeting ‘too little force’, ‘too much resistance’ and ‘too much confrontation’ (Interviews 1 and 11). Friesland stands out, in that respect, by manifesting a cohesive, broadly supported, well-equipped and vocal strategy, through which local entrepreneurs literally script formal policy processes and documents (Interview 10). In Rijk van Nijmegen, that movement is primarily a matter of advocacy stemming from civil society and local entrepreneurs. A key recommendation to the Nijmegen Council is to become more systemic and coherent in gearing its policy processes and scripts towards circular ambitions (Interview 7).
Conclusion
This paper set out to conceptualise the political role of regional CE ecosystems in the transformation towards a CE. We do so to contribute to a plural, political framework of transformation, propelled by ambitions and initiatives towards change from all institutional spheres (business, communities, authorities, education, etc.). We specify how regional circular ‘ecosystems’ contribute to the wider CE transformation by navigating top-down and bottom-up dynamics. We do with the help of five distinct (sub) political modes, aided by ‘hands on’ processes: narrating, collaborating and advocating (Table 2). Accepting that these (sub)political modes are more complementary than rivalling, the key question is how ‘bottom-up’ initiatives stemming from grassroots (‘niches’, ‘publics’) and stakeholder political modes make an inroad into techno-economic modes. We apply this framework to two frontrunner cases, Rijk van Nijmegen and Friesland. We conclude with three core insights.
First, responding to the key question, both Rijk van Nijmegen and Friesland manifest ‘injections’ of the subpolitical into conventional politics (stakeholder governance, formal policy-making). In Friesland, such injections occur primarily through region-wide value chains of (recycled) waste and (biobased) construction; in Rijk van Nijmegen, they occur within more confined networks of waste, recycling and others. So far, these developments thrive mainly on personal and organisational commitment and goodwill, remaining largely at the pilot and niche level. What the local subpolitical is not capable of is changing wider market and regulatory conditions to bring the transformation further. Further change would require a willingness notably from (inter)national political levels to create genuine tipping points from ‘linear’ to ‘circular’. ‘Bottom-up’ drives and successes can inspire and substantiate such moves, but not force them. It is thus essential to recognise the limitations of civic aspirations and initiatives in meeting CE transformations, and the need for change across all political modes.
Second, what stands out in the two cases is how bottom-up, civic modes of politics are driven by ‘heroic’, well-connected individuals, and how this yields benefits as well as limitations. The Frisian cohesive business community (led by VCF’s leaders) has a strong impact on the regional narrative and advocacy, but this remains dispersed across different channels and some policy anchoring. Despite the relentless efforts of community and business forerunners, the more fragmented Rijk van Nijmegen still has to make a concerted impact on policy-making and regulation. The result is misalignment with policies and initiatives at the national level (and European level), which may then pose serious limits to the transformative power of these regional ecosystems. It is not clear whether this finding will also hold for other regional ecosystems – additional case studies will be needed to affirm this. But this finding would seem to point to a potential disconnect between different levels of scale in the transformation to the CE (see also Dąbrowski et al., 2024; Davies et al., 2024).
Third, we point out the significance of collaboration. Each regional ecosystem manifests its own dynamic relationship between the way collaboration between various actors takes shape, and how different (sub)political modes link together. Existing patterns of collaboration are indicative of the (sub)political roles and features that predominate (e.g. strong stakeholders in Friesland, fragmentation and community in Nijmegen). Moreover, the comparison between the two cases indicates how vital the spatial context of collaboration is, notably in how bottom-up (sub)political modes are shaped and navigate more techno-economic modes (cf. Prendeville et al., 2018). Further conceptual and empirical research will help to get a better grasp of how regional differences can underpin customised transformational paths across different geographies and levels of development. At an (inter)national level, this may help to inform national ambitions and instruments that take into account and enable these different paths. Policies should not only become more people-oriented and place-sensitive, as the OECD (2025) recently called for, but they should also firmly embrace other (sub)political modes helping ‘people’ and ‘places’ to play an effective transformational role.
In sum, while both case studies manifest strong drives and motivations towards the CE transformation, they navigate in their own, ‘place based’ ways between different (sub)political modes. Friesland presents a strong, well-organised nexus between the ‘public’ of territorially embedded business entrepreneurs and affiliated policy-makers, through the shaping of stakeholder governance towards techno-economic registers at (inter)provincial/national levels. In Rijk van Nijmegen, there is a stronger subpolitical movement, including a strong grassroots level, which connects more loosely to stakeholder governance and techno-economic modes. Conceptually, our study provides a common vocabulary of how regions, as territorial ecosystems, shape and link multiple channels of political influence towards the CE transformation. Empirically, it reveals significant variation between these channels from region to region, shedding light on how specific ecosystem configurations result in unique forms of political navigation, while also posing limits to the transformational capacities and potential of civic ambitions and initiatives. Future research should therefore test the framework in different territories to establish how far these political modes travel under contrasting socio-economic and environmental conditions, and to refine policy mixes that are both people-oriented and place-sensitive.
Footnotes
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.