Post-Soviet Nuclear Proliferation Risks

1 Declaration of the CSCE Council on Non-Proliferation and Arms Transfers, Prague, 30 January 1992, Text in English in: Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation Newsbrief (Southampton, UK) Spring 1992, no. 17, pp. 15-16.

2 See: Diplomatitcheskiy Vyestnik, no. 1, 15 January 1992, pp. 9-10.

3 Joint control over the dis-assembly was a rather difficult issue for Russia to agree upon since, indeed, a release of secret design information could well result, thus constituting a violation of the NPT. Though technically the issue can be resolved through electronic monitoring of all movements of warheads and the amount of fissile material taken out, the issue was resolved in a simpler way. After Ukraine demanded a implementation of that closure, the Russian military, without having consulted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, negotiated the modalities of a joint control that committed the observers not to release sensitive information. Though theoretically this arrangement may provide an opportunity for the transfer of sensitive information, practical implementation of that agreement was reduced to providing Ukrainian observers with the documentation on the amounts of removed warheads etc.

4 This interpretation is usual among both proponents and opponents of a nuclear status for Ukraine. It has been suggested, in particular, by faculty members of the Ukrainian Institute of International Relations of Kiev University at various recent conferences in Moscow and Kiev.

5 English translation of the agreement in Arms Control Today, vol. 22 no. 1, January/February 1992, p. 39.

6 That closure implies that, after all nuclear weapons in the three CIS states are eliminated, the remaining Soviet nuclear forces will become Russian, whereas today they are considered to be a collective CIS force.

7 See, for instance, Nyezavisimaya Gazeta, 28 January 1992.

8 Nyezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 February 1992.

9 See also: Posle Raspada SSSR: Rossiya v novom mire. Doclad tsentra mezhdunarodnykh issledovaniy MGIMO (`After the disintegration of the USSR: Russia in a new world'. Report of the Centre of International Studies of MGIMO). (Moscow: MGIMO, February 1992.)

10 Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 2 February 1992.

11 See interview with Burkutbay Ayaganov in Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 February 1992.

12 This investigation was conducted by Vladimir Orlov within the framework of a broader project conducted in cooperation with the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the Association for Nonproliferation in Moscow and the Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Results of this investigation are reflected in a paper by Vladimir Orlov presented at the second Conference held within the project in Monterey on 6-9 April 1992 as well as in a number of publications by Vladimir Orlov in the Moscow News weekly.

13 See in particular William C. Potter, `Exports and Experts', Arms Control Today, vol. 22, no. 1, January/February 1992, p. 33.

14 On the CHETEK investigations see, in particular: Vladimir Orlov, `Rossiyskiy Yaderny Biznes: Ugroza ili Blef?' (Russian Nuclear Business, a threat or a bluff?), Moskovskiye Novosty, no. 19, 10 May 1992.

15 See Izvestiya, 19 March 1992.

16 See, for instance, interview with the Deputy Minister of Atomic Power, Yevgeny Reshetnikov in Moskovskiye Novosty, no. 22, 31 May 1992.

17 Representatives of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were invited to Warsaw as observers, but only Ukraine could attend.