The Proliferation Security Initiative and North Korea: Legality and Limitations of a Coalition Strategy

Abstract

As a US-led coalition operation designed to obstruct weapons proliferation, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is especially applicable to North Korea. Though practical measures have been developed to implement the interdiction of seaborne weapons shipments in particular, the PSI has yet to be rendered consistent with the international legal regime supporting free navigation of the high seas. Nor has it attracted specific United Nations support. A review of the 1962 ‘quarantine’ of Cuba demonstrates that in the absence of a more restrictive approach towards Pyongyang and conclusive evidence that North Korean weapons capability poses a current threat to the United States, the appellation ‘Cuba Lite’ is not inappropriate. Furthermore, in the context of multilateral diplomacy intended to persuade North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons programs in exchange for security guarantees, the PSI may be interpreted as pressuring Pyongyang and thus may not be perceived – even by PSI coalition partners – as consistent with that diplomacy.