Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

Conspiracy theories have been treated mostly as a homogeneous phenomenon in empirical research. However, to fully understand their causes and consequences, a multifaceted approach to conspiracy theories would be useful. Here, we propose an organizational framework with three facets (groups, ideology, and status) to conceptualize conspiracy theories. Based on a review of recent research, the current contribution highlights the psychological differences between (a) perceived conspiracies within or outside of one’s valued community; (b) ideological versus nonideological conspiracy beliefs, based on whether conspiracy beliefs are directly relevant for people’s core values; and (c) upward versus downward conspiracy beliefs, that is, whether the perceived conspiracy involves a relatively high- or low-status group. Finally, we discuss some distinct consequences of these facets in affecting societally consequential behaviors, such as collective action, protest, hostility, or polarization.

Keywords

conspiracy beliefs groups ideology status typology

Many people endorse conspiracy theories, defined as beliefs that a group of actors collude in secret to pursue malevolent goals (Douglas & Sutton, 2023; van Prooijen et al., 2023). These conspiracy theories may pertain to a wide variety of topics, such as climate change, diseases (e.g., COVID-19), immigrants (e.g., great replacement theories), and beliefs that an evil elite is suppressing citizens. A key assumption guiding research has been that conspiracy beliefs are a homogeneous phenomenon that share similar causes and consequences and that support each other in a mutually reinforcing belief network (a “monological belief system”). This has led researchers to identify conspiracy mentality as a generalized mindset that attributes events in the world to conspiracies (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014).

Although conspiracy mentality is conceptually and empirically distinct from specific conspiracy beliefs about concrete (often negative) societal events (Imhoff, Bertlich, & Frenken, 2022; Sutton & Douglas, 2020; Sutton et al., 2024), specific conspiracy theories may also be less homogeneous than often assumed. For example, van Prooijen et al. (2023) found that the positive correlation between contradictory conspiracy beliefs (e.g., Princess Diana was murdered vs. faked her own death) was mostly caused by participants who disbelieved both theories. Some specific conspiracy theories are believed more by the political right, whereas others have more support on the left (J. Uscinski et al., 2022). Moreover, different conceptualizations of specific conspiracy theories may have different antecedents and consequences (e.g., Imhoff, Bertlich, & Frenken, 2022; Mao et al., 2024). Empirical studies that consider only a small number of specific conspiracy beliefs may not yield conclusions that are generalizable across various categories of conspiracy theories (see also J. Uscinski et al., 2022).

Although it is impossible to examine every specific conspiracy theory, we propose that a more fine-grained conceptualization may enable more focused predictions of how different conspiracy theories elicit different psychological dynamics. Based on a synthesis of previous research, this article proposes at least three facets that are important: whether the perceived conspiracy is located within or outside one’s community, whether the conspiracy theory is directly relevant for people’s core values, and how much power or status the perceived conspirators have. We describe this organizational framework in terms of the acronym GIST (groups, ideology, and status—typology). Table 1 summarizes the GIST model of conspiracy theories and the key antecedents and consequences of conspiracy theories depending on these facets.

Table 1.

The GIST Model of Conspiracy Theories

Facets	Categories	Example	Key antecedents	Key consequences
Groups	In-group conspiracy theories	Own government is perceived to be conspiring	Internal threats (e.g., corruption, inequality)	Protest and hostility toward own government; decreased political participation
Groups	Out-group conspiracy theories	Foreign government is perceived to be conspiring	External threats (e.g., historical victimization)	Support for own government; increased political participation, hostility toward out-group
Ideology	Ideological conspiracy theories	Climate change conspiracy theories among U.S. conservatives	Threats to core values (e.g., political, religious)	Partisan hostility and polarization
Ideology	Nonideological conspiracy theories	Antiestablishment conspiracy theories	General beliefs in the deceptiveness of authorities	Hostility and polarization toward authorities independent of their ideological orientation
Status	Upward conspiracy theories	High-status groups are perceived to be conspiring	Relative deprivation; precarity	Prejudice and power-challenging attitudes toward high-status groups
Status	Downward conspiracy theories	Low-status groups are perceived to be conspiring	Threats to the majority group’s traditional norms and values	Prejudice and hostility toward low-status groups

Note: The GIST model offers an organizational framework with three facets to conceptualize different conspiracy theories. GIST = groups, ideology, and status—typology.

Groups: Perceived Conspiracies Within or Outside a Valued Community

People may perceive conspiracies within their own community such as a national government, own political party, or own religious community; or people may perceive conspiracies outside of their community such as a foreign government, a rival political party, or other religious communities. This distinction is often referred to as “in-group” versus “out-group” conspiracy theories and has important implications. In-group conspiracy theories are likely to influence how people think, feel, and act within their community, but out-group conspiracy theories are likely to influence how people think, feel, and act toward outsiders.

The notion of “in-group” conspiracy theories contains a paradox because people are likely to untie their identity from a group they believe to be conspiring. Indeed, one might argue that perceived conspiracies are often psychologically construed as out-groups; for instance, conspiracy theories predict feelings of alienation from one’s own government (Douglas et al., 2019). At any level of categorization, however, groups differ in how permeable their boundaries are, meaning that for some groups it is difficult to detach oneself from it (e.g., nationality, religious beliefs, gender). A perceived conspiracy can occur as an antagonistic subgroup within a broader collective that may be an important part of one’s identity, which is fundamentally different from a conspiracy entirely outside of such a collective.

For example, being a citizen of a country is often part of the core in-group identity of people. In that setting, in-group versus out-group conspiracy beliefs are associated with attributing problems within one’s community to internal versus external factors. In-group conspiracy theories (e.g., Chinese participants who believe that their own government is hiding the truth about the COVID-19 pandemic) are associated with anomie (i.e., the belief that society is breaking down) and decreased system justification. Out-group conspiracy theories (e.g., Chinese participants who believe that the coronavirus is a biological weapon made in the United States), in contrast, provide a favorable intergroup comparison and therefore increase collective narcissism (i.e., a belief in the inherent greatness of one’s own community) and system justification (Mao et al., 2024).

People can also perceive conspiracies within versus outside of their political affiliations. For instance, people may strongly attach their identity to a political party yet believe that subgroups within that party are harmful and possibly conspiring (e.g., “traditional” Republicans who are highly critical of the Trump movement). This is a fundamentally different experience than believing the opposing party is conspiring. During the 2020 U.S. presidential elections, Wang and van Prooijen (2023) found that in-group conspiracy beliefs among Biden and Trump voters (i.e., Biden voters believing Biden rigged the elections, or Trump voters believing Trump rigged the elections) declined over time as the election results increasingly polarized the electorate. Out-group conspiracy beliefs, however (e.g., Trump voters believing Biden rigged the elections), declined among Biden voters but increased among Trump voters between the pre- and postelection waves.

Situational factors influence in-group and out-group conspiracy beliefs differently. An external threat to a person’s in-group identity inspires mostly out-group conspiracy beliefs (Biddlestone et al., 2021). For example, out-group (but not in-group) conspiracy beliefs increase particularly among groups that lose a competition (J. E. Uscinski & Parent, 2014; see also Bertin et al., 2023). Relatedly, groups that have experienced historical victimization are more likely to believe conspiracy theories about the perpetrator group (an out-group; Pantazi et al., 2022). These effects are also moderated by culture: Chinese participants reported higher out-group conspiracy beliefs about the United States than vice versa (van Prooijen & Song, 2021). At the same time, an internal threat to one’s community—such as corruption or widespread distrust—mostly inspires in-group conspiracy beliefs (Chayinska & Minescu, 2018).

As a result, in-group and out-group conspiracy beliefs lead to different action tendencies. In-group conspiracy theories may decrease political participation (Douglas et al., 2019), whereas out-group conspiracy theories may increase it (Gkinopoulos & Mari, 2023). Furthermore, both in-group and out-group conspiracy theories can inspire collective action but toward different goals and targets (Gkinopoulos & Mari, 2023; Imhoff et al., 2021). Out-group conspiracy beliefs may lead people to submit to traditional authorities (e.g., their government) and endorse aggression against outsiders (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). For example, holding conspiracy theories about Jewish people predicts antisemitism (e.g., Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012). In-group conspiracy beliefs, in contrast, may increase negative emotions and attitudes toward people’s own government, which may incite violent extremist intentions and other forms of nonnormative collective action (Imhoff et al., 2021). Altogether, in-group versus out-group conspiracy theories involve different attributions, which in turn trigger different action tendencies.

Ideology: The Relevance of Perceived Conspiracies for Core Values

Conspiracy theories differ in their relevance for people’s core (e.g., political or religious) values. For instance, conservatives are more likely to support conspiracy theories that accuse liberals of malpractice, and vice versa (Smallpage et al., 2017). Examples include conspiracy theories about Barack Obama’s birth certificate and Donald Trump’s alleged dealings with Russia. Other conspiracy beliefs may have little to do with people’s core values and reflect a general distrust of authorities that can emerge across the political spectrum (e.g., the belief that the Earth is flat, antiestablishment conspiracy theories). Such relevance for values suggests that conspiracy theories differ in how ideological or nonideological they are.

This value facet differs from the distinction between conspiracy theories inside or outside one’s community in at least two important ways. First, conspiracy theories that are not ideological can be located within or outside one’s community, or both (e.g., beliefs that politicians around the world—including own and other countries’ government—are lizard people). Second, values often are domain-specific, and the link with political identities is not always clear. For example, if people see climate change as a threat to their core value of ensuring economic growth, they are likely to believe in conspiracy theories that downplay the dangers of climate change. This view may be closely tied to partisanship (conservatism) in the United States (Sutton & Douglas, 2020). However, this does not appear to be universal (Hornsey et al., 2018). For example, many countries (e.g., France, Italy, the Netherlands) have a multiparty system in which both specific values and general political ideology resonate with multiple political identities.

Ideological versus nonideological conspiracy beliefs show different functional relationships across the political spectrum. In a study comprising 26 nations, political extremism was associated with higher conspiracy mentality (which arguably is nonideological for many perceivers), although these effects appeared stronger on the far right (Imhoff, Zimmer, et al., 2022). Although this finding may partly reflect a generalized rigidity and did not replicate in all countries (e.g., the United States), the notion that nonideological conspiracy theories can emerge across the political spectrum is different from ideological conspiracy theories, which often primarily thrive at one extreme of the political spectrum depending on their content (e.g., Obama’s birth-certificate theories are prominent mostly on the far right; the theory that the Bush administration lied about the motivations to wage war against Iraq is prominent mostly on the far left; Enders & Uscinski, 2021; Sutton & Douglas, 2020).

Ideological and nonideological conspiracy beliefs contribute to hostility and polarization in different ways. Ideological conspiracy theories aggravate partisan conflict, intensify polarization, and potentially trigger collective action (Smallpage et al., 2017). Such polarization, for instance, can affect health-related decisions. For example, Donald Trump often disseminated conspiracy theories about COVID-19 and fueled the perception of such theories being tied to a conservative ideology. This particularly influenced Republicans’ health-related decisions (e.g., declining vaccination), resulting in higher rates of infections and mortality among Republicans (Van Bavel et al., 2022).

Nonideological conspiracy beliefs, in contrast, are likely to increase hostility and polarization toward authorities or groups independent of their political orientation. For example, antiestablishment conspiracy theories are common in both left-wing and right-wing populist movements and construe society as a dichotomous struggle between “the people” and “the establishment” (Erisen et al., 2021). Such polarization can unite people to take collective action against the establishment regardless of their political orientation. In Western Europe, conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19 were less clearly tied to political values compared with the United States, and these theories have united far-left hippies with far-right Neo-Nazis in their protests of the restrictive measures during the pandemic (Liekefett et al., 2023). Ideological versus nonideological conspiracy theories hence polarize people in different ways; moreover, the extent to which a conspiracy theory is considered ideological may differ across cultures.

The Perceived Status of the Conspirators

The last facet pertains to the societal status of the conspirators. Some conspiracy theories implicate relatively high-status groups that have privileged access to valuable resources such as bankers, governments, or industrial groups. Other conspiracy theories implicate relatively vulnerable or low-status groups that are restricted in their access to those resources and often are victims of discrimination, such as migrants, people from a lower social class, or LGBTQ+ people. Nera and colleagues (2021) referred to this distinction as “upward” versus “downward” conspiracy theories. One might expect upward versus downward conspiracy beliefs to differ in how common they are across social groups and their associations with political orientation, power-related motives, prejudice, and hostile intergroup behaviors.

These high- versus low-status groups often differ in their objective power and influence in society (Nera et al., 2021), although people sometimes may subjectively ascribe unrealistically high levels of power to low-status groups as well (e.g., great replacement theories accusing ethnic minorities of conspiring with powerful forces to replace the White population in Western nations; Obaidi et al., 2022). In addition, sometimes one can debate whether a group should be classified as “high” or “low” in status; a case in point may be Jewish people, who in many countries have high economic and social achievements but also suffer from antisemitism. But for many groups, one may infer their societal status in a relatively straightforward manner.

Upward conspiracy theories originate from the motive to challenge power and therefore are more likely supported by members of low-status groups such as disadvantaged ethnic or cultural minorities, people experiencing economic insecurity, or people with lower educational attainment and social class (e.g., Casara et al., 2022; Douglas et al., 2019). These group characteristics are associated with precarity, defined as the subjective experience of permanent social and psychological insecurity, stemming from objective conditions of affiliative and economic deprivation (Adam-Troian et al., 2023). Accordingly, upward conspiracy beliefs are associated with prejudice of high-status groups and feelings of powerlessness (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014), power-challenging attitudes (e.g., rejection of society’s leadership; Nera et al., 2021), and negative moral evaluations (Zeng et al., 2024) and distrust (Adam-Troian et al., 2023) of high-status groups.

Downward conspiracy theories, however, are rooted in the perceived threat that minorities pose to the majority group’s traditional norms and values (Obaidi et al., 2022). Conspiracy beliefs that blame low-status groups (such as immigrants, gender activists, and African Americans) therefore are associated with conservative ideology (e.g., Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; Miller et al., 2016), whereas upward conspiracy theories appear on both extremes (Nera et al., 2021). In line with this, downward conspiracy beliefs are associated with perceiving low-status groups as threatening, which may translate into insulting, intimidating, or using violence against low-status groups. For example, Obaidi et al. (2022) found that the great replacement theory increased anti-Muslim attitudes. Altogether, upward versus downward conspiracy theories are endorsed by different societal groups, and their underlying psychological processes and behavioral consequences are different.

Conclusions

This contribution highlights the need to look beyond the presumed unidimensionality of conspiracy beliefs. To understand the societal consequences of conspiracy theories, one needs to take their specific conceptualization into account. Although previous theorizing has made some steps toward classifying conspiracy theories (e.g., Enders et al., 2021; Franks et al., 2017), the current contribution seeks to expand on previous work by integrating and deepening different perspectives. We have proposed an organizational framework (GIST) by categorizing specific conspiracy beliefs along three important facets (groups, ideology, and status) to stipulate how different conspiracy theories have different antecedents and consequences. Although new conspiracy theories continuously emerge online, these three basic facets enable researchers to classify them and make predictions about their causes, the groups that are likely to endorse them, and their consequences.

In some settings there may be overlap between the three facets of conspiracy theories discussed here. For example, the conspiracy theories that liberals and conservatives may hold about each other can construed as both ideological (e.g., Smallpage et al., 2017) and out-group conspiracy theories (e.g., Wang & van Prooijen, 2023). Although such overlap is unavoidable, the current facets also are sufficiently independent. For instance, identity-based conspiracy theories may partly depend on what level of categorization is salient in the mind of perceivers, and as such, an ideological conspiracy theory can also pertain to an in-group (e.g., conspiracy beliefs of own government in which an opposing political party is in power). Moreover, many nonideological conspiracy theories can apply both to own and other communities (e.g., antielitist conspiracy theories that may pertain to both national and global elites). Finally, immigrant conspiracy theories refer to an in-group rather than an out-group in a sample of immigrants but still constitute downward conspiracy theories.

The three facets presented here have important implications for science and society. When it comes to urgent real-world topics such as climate change, these conceptualizations can inform public reactions toward relevant authorities. For example, some climate scientists are faced with intimidation and threats, and this may depend on people’s specific conspiracy theories depending on how they construe these scientists (e.g., as an out-group or high-status group).

We further wish to outline the importance of context, such as differences in governance across countries. For example, conspiracy theories about climate change can be conceptualized as ideological conspiracy theories among many U.S. citizens, but in a one-party state such as China they seem neither ideological nor a popular topic for conspiracy theories. This may suggest cultural differences in the applicability of these different facets of conspiracy beliefs. Future research may examine the relevance of these facets across social settings and cultures. Finally, the measures of conspiracy beliefs developed in previous studies are mainly about upward conspiracy beliefs (Nera et al., 2021). We call for the development of more variety in measures to capture the different conceptualizations of conspiracy theories as applicable to the respective studies.

To conclude, conspiracy beliefs are commonly treated as a homogeneous phenomenon. Accumulating research suggests, however, that it is necessary to distinguish between different types of conspiracy theories because such different conceptualizations have different psychological effects. By elaborating on the three different facets as presented in GIST, we aim to highlight the complexity of conspiracy beliefs and avoid an overgeneralization of research findings and provide direction to the domains (groups, ideology, and status) in which conspiracy theories come into being and may persist. Hence, the organizational framework presented here may help researchers design future studies that are more mindful of the types of conspiracy theories under investigation.

Footnotes

Transparency

Action Editor: Robert L. Goldstone

Editor: Robert L. Goldstone

ORCID iDs

Jia-Yan Mao

Jan-Willem van Prooijen

Paul A. M. Van Lange

References

Adam-Troian

Chayinska

Paladino

M. P.

Uluğ

Ö. M.

Vaes

Wagner-Egger

(2023). Of precarity and conspiracy: Introducing a socio-functional model of conspiracy beliefs. British Journal of Social Psychology, 62(Suppl. 1), 136–159.

Bertin

Delouvée

McColl

Van Prooijen

J. W.

(2023). Rage against the machine: Investigating conspiracy theories about the video assistant referee on Twitter during the 2018 FIFA World Cup. Sport Management Review, 26(4), 495–516.

Biddlestone

Green

Cichocka

Sutton

Douglas

(2021). Conspiracy beliefs and the individual, relational, and collective selves. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 15(10), Article e12639. https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1111/spc3.12639

Casara

B. G. S.

Suitner

Jetten

(2022). The impact of economic inequality on conspiracy beliefs. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 98, Article 104245. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2021.104245

Chayinska

Minescu

(2018). “They’ve conspired against us:” Understanding the role of social identification and conspiracy beliefs in justification of ingroup collective behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 48(7), 990–998.

Douglas

K. M.

Sutton

R. M.

(2023). What are conspiracy theories? A definitional approach to their correlates, consequences, and communication. Annual Review of Psychology, 74, 271–298.

Douglas

K. M.

Uscinski

J. E.

Sutton

R. M.

Cichocka

Nefes

Ang

C. S.

Deravi

(2019). Understanding conspiracy theories. Political Psychology, 40(Suppl. 1), 3–35.

Duckitt

Sibley

C. G.

(2010). Right–wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation differentially moderate intergroup effects on prejudice. European Journal of Personality, 24(7), 583–601.

Enders

A. M.

Uscinski

J. E.

(2021). Are misinformation, antiscientific claims, and conspiracy theories for political extremists? Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 24(4), 583–605.

10.

Enders

A. M.

Uscinski

J. E.

Klofstad

C. A.

Seelig

M. I.

Wuchty

Murthi

M. N.

Premaratne

Funchion

J. R.

(2021). Do conspiracy beliefs form a belief system? Examining the structure and organization of conspiracy beliefs. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 9(1), 255–271.

11.

Erisen

Guidi

Martini

Toprakkiran

Isernia

Littvay

(2021). Psychological correlates of populist attitudes. Political Psychology, 42(Suppl. 1), 149–171.

12.

Franks

Bangerter

Bauer

M. W.

Hall

Noort

M. C.

(2017). Beyond “monologicality”? Exploring conspiracist worldviews. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, Article 250235. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00861

13.

Gkinopoulos

Mari

(2023). How exposure to real conspiracy theories motivates collective action and political engagement? The moderating role of primed victimhood and underlying emotional mechanisms in the case of 2018 bushfire in Attica. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 53(1), 21–38.

14.

Golec de Zavala

Cichocka

(2012). Collective narcissism and anti-Semitism in Poland. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 15(2), 213–229.

15.

Hornsey

M. J.

Harris

E. A.

Fielding

K. S.

(2018). Relationships among conspiratorial beliefs, conservatism and climate scepticism across nations. Nature Climate Change, 8(7), 614–620.

16.

Imhoff

Bertlich

Frenken

(2022). Tearing apart the “evil” twins: A general conspiracy mentality is not the same as specific conspiracy beliefs. Current Opinion in Psychology, 46, Article 101349. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101349

17.

Imhoff

Bruder

(2014). Speaking (un-)truth to power: Conspiracy mentality as a generalised political attitude. European Journal of Personality, 28(1), 25–43.

18.

Imhoff

Dieterle

Lamberty

(2021). Resolving the puzzle of conspiracy worldview and political activism: Belief in secret plots decreases normative but increases nonnormative political engagement. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 12(1), 71–79.

19.

Imhoff

Zimmer

Klein

António

J. H.

Babinska

Bangerter

Van Prooijen

J. W.

(2022). Conspiracy mentality and political orientation across 26 countries. Nature Human Behaviour, 6(3), 392–403.

20.

Liekefett

Bürner

A. K.

Becker

J. C.

(2023). Hippies next to right-wing extremists? Social Psychology, 54(3), 123–135.

21.

Mao

J.-Y.

Zeng

Z.-X.

Yang

S.-L.

Guo

Y.-Y.

van Prooijen

J.-W.

(2024). Explaining the paradox of conspiracy theories and system-justifying beliefs from an intergroup perspective. Political Psychology, 45(2), 299–318.

22.

Miller

J. M.

Saunders

K. L.

Farhart

C. E.

(2016). Conspiracy endorsement as motivated reasoning: The moderating roles of political knowledge and trust. American Journal of Political Science, 60(4), 824–844.

23.

Nera

Wagner-Egger

Bertin

Douglas

K. M.

Klein

(2021). A power-challenging theory of society, or a conservative mindset? Upward and downward conspiracy theories as ideologically distinct beliefs. European Journal of Social Psychology, 51(4–5), 740–757.

24.

Obaidi

Kunst

Ozer

Kimel

S. Y.

(2022). The “Great Replacement” conspiracy: How the perceived ousting of Whites can evoke violent extremism and Islamophobia. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 25(7), 1675–1695.

25.

Pantazi

Gkinopoulos

Witkowska

Klein

Bilewicz

(2022). “Historia est magistra vitae”? The impact of historical victimhood on current conspiracy beliefs. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 25(2), 581–601.

26.

Smallpage

S. M.

Enders

A. M.

Uscinski

J. E.

(2017). The partisan contours of conspiracy theory beliefs. Research & Politics, 4(4). https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168017746554

27.

Sutton

R. M.

Douglas

K. M.

(2020). Conspiracy theories and the conspiracy mindset: Implications for political ideology. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 34, 118–122.

28.

Sutton

R. M.

Douglas

K. M.

Trella

(2024). Conspiracy mentality versus belief in conspiracy theories. Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 232(1), 50–54.

29.

Uscinski

Enders

Diekman

Funchion

Klofstad

Kuebler

Murthi

Premaratne

Seelig

Verdear

Wuchty

(2022). The psychological and political correlates of conspiracy theory beliefs. Scientific Reports, 12(1), Article 21672. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-25617-0

30.

Uscinski

J. E.

Parent

J. M.

(2014). American conspiracy theories. Oxford University Press.

31.

Van Bavel

J. J.

Pretus

Rathje

Pärnamets

Vlasceanu

Knowles

E. D

. (2022). The costs of polarizing a pandemic: Antecedents, consequences, and lessons. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 19, 624–639.

32.

van Prooijen

J.-W.

Song

. (2021). The cultural dimension of intergroup conspiracy theories. British Journal of Psychology, 112(2), 455–473.

33.

van Prooijen

J.-W.

Wahring

Mausolf

Mulas

Shwan

. (2023). Just dead, not alive: Reconsidering belief in contradictory conspiracy theories. Psychological Science, 34(6), 670–682.

34.

Wang

van Prooijen

J.-W.

(2023). Stolen elections: How conspiracy beliefs during the 2020 American presidential elections changed over time. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 37(2), 277–289.

35.

Zeng

Z.-X.

Tian

C.-Y.

Mao

J.-Y.

van Prooijen

J.-W.

Zhang

Yang

S.-L.

Guo

Y.-Y.

(2024). How does economic inequality shape conspiracy theories? Empirical evidence from China. British Journal of Social Psychology, 63(2), 477–498.

Conspiracy Theories: Groups,Ideology,and Status as Three Distinct Bases for Expressions in Society

Abstract

Keywords

Groups: Perceived Conspiracies Within or Outside a Valued Community

Ideology: The Relevance of Perceived Conspiracies for Core Values

The Perceived Status of the Conspirators

Conclusions

Recommended Reading

Footnotes

Transparency

ORCID iDs

References