The Self and Science

Abstract

In this paper, I have three goals. First, I argue that the self, a concept whose tremendous utility for psychological theory is matched by its absence of clarity, can be meaningfully divided into two broad theoretical categories: the self of neural instantiation and the self of first-person experience (i.e., conscious awareness of personal subjectivity). Second, I discuss the nature of the self of first-person experience and its relation to scientific methods of inquiry. I argue that, in contrast to the self studied by neuroscience (i.e., the systems mediating knowledge of self), the self of conscious experience cannot yet be submitted to satisfying analysis via scientific methodology. Finally, I argue that “reality” does not consist in physicalism, mentalism, idealism, or any other “ism” that implies unity of process or substance. Rather, reality, in my view, is best treated as a plurality (James, 1909/1996) that cannot be confined to one (or two, as in dualism) basic categories.