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Abstract

This paper explores the question of whether rationality can be explained. We begin by discussing Fodor's sceptical view, together with some retorts by Philip Cam and Dan Dennett. Next we outline Chemiak's theory of minimal rationality, which claims to rescue central systems from inexplicability. We argue that Chemiak comes to his conclusion about the possibility of an explanation of rationality by misconstruing the task for psychology. There is an axiological and a deontic sense of rationality, and psychology has to explain our competence for realizing the deontic sense, not merely how we manage to satisfy the axiological criteria for rationality, as Chemiak maintains. We conclude by showing that Chemiak has failed to provide such a theory. Moreover, we argue that it is unlikely that a naturalistic explanation of rationality is even possible. Explanations have to presuppose rationality, such that we cannot get beyond the Veil of Reason to explain the naturalistic genesis of rationality. Nonetheless, we maintain that much psychological work on rationality is possible, subject to the constraint that the determination of relevance is taken as a primitive operation.

Keywords

explanation frame problem naturalism rationality relevance

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Fodor,Cherniak and the Naturalization of Rationality

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