Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

David Franz’s (2022) claim that it is not possible to give an empirically meaningful answer to the question “Are psychological attributes quantitative?” is rejected as incorrect. First, the ambiguous terminology identified by Franz in the measurement debate is not inherent to the debate itself, but reflects a biased understanding of the empirical meaning of axioms of measurement. Second, the problem of “hidden” or “unobservable” phenomena described by Franz as the root of conceptual confusion is not unique to psychology, but can also be found in physics. Therefore, it cannot be the cause for the failure to establish measurement in psychology. This comment concludes with the statement that, though both conceptual and empirical analyses are useful, Franz’s general claim that the former supersedes the latter must be rejected as inaccurate.

Keywords

additivity derived measurement Newtonian forces psychometrics quantity objection

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Baker

G. P.

Hacker

P. M. S.

(2009). Wittgenstein: Rules, grammar and necessity: Essays and exegesis of §§185–242 (2nd ed.). Wiley-Blackwell.

Berkeley

(1951). De motu. In Luce

A. A.

Jessop

T. E.

(Eds.), The works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (Vol. 4, pp. 1–31). Nelson. (Original work published 1721)

Coelho

R. L.

(2001). Zur Konzeption der Kraft der Mechanik [On the concept of force of mechanics]. Waxmann.

Franz

D. J.

(2022). “Are psychological attributes quantitative?” is not an empirical question: Conceptual confusions in the measurement debate. Theory & Psychology, 32(1), 131–150. https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543211045340

Hallie

P. P.

(1966). Wittgenstein’s exclusion of metaphysical nonsense. The Philosophical Quarterly, 16(63), 97–112. https://doi.org/10.2307/2218446

Hölder

(1901). Die Axiome der Quantität und die Lehre vom Mass [The axioms of quantity and the theory of measurement]. Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Königlich Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Mathematisch-Physische Classe, 53, 1–64.

Kahneman

Sibony

Sunstein

C. R.

(2021). Noise: A flaw in human judgment. Little, Brown Spark, Hachette Book Group.

Maraun

M. D.

(1998). Measurement as a normative practice: Implications of Wittgenstein’s philosophy for measurement in psychology. Theory & Psychology, 8(4), 435–461. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354398084001

Massin

(2009). The metaphysics of forces. dialectica, 63(4), 555–589. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01213.x

10.

Maxwell

J. C.

(1871). Theory of heat. Longmans.

11.

Michell

(1999). Measurement in psychology. Cambridge University Press.

12.

Newton

(1999). Mathematical principles of natural philosophy. University of California Press. (Original work published 1687)

13.

Pulaczewska

(1999). Aspects of metaphor in physics: Examples and case studies. De Gruyter.

14.

Robb

(2018). Mental causation. In Zalta

E. N.

(Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter 2018 ed.). Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-causation/

15.

Trendler

(2009). Measurement theory, psychology and the revolution that cannot happen. Theory & Psychology, 19(5), 579–599. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354309341926

16.

Trendler

(2019). Conjoint measurement undone. Theory & Psychology, 29(1), 100–128. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354318788729

17.

Trendler

(2021). The incoherence of Rasch measurement [Manuscript submitted for publication].

18.

Wilson

(2007). Newtonian forces. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58(2), 173–205. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axm004

19.

Wittgenstein

(2009). Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical investigations (4th ed.). Wiley-Blackwell. (Original work published 1953)

Is measurement in psychology an empirical or a conceptual issue? A comment on David Franz

Abstract

Keywords

Get full access to this article

References