Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

Reflective function (RF) is the capacity to reflect on one’s own thinking and feelings, as well as on that of others. It involves an increasingly complex awareness that there is more than what is visible on the surface. Most studies of RF have focused on its significance for self-development and interpersonal relationships in dyadic and family contexts. In this article, I suggest that by imparting a more accurate perception of the intra- and interpersonal reality and interrelatedness, RF is inextricably related to concern and to reaching others in widening circles. I further suggest that obstacles to its development and realization can be found at the individual, relational, and sociopolitical levels. I conclude that the construct of RF both captures and facilitates the connection between psychology and ethics, and that psychologists play a key role in exploring the conditions that affect the realization of RF, and in promoting social change in general.

Keywords

concern ethics mentalization reflective function sociopolitical sphere

A human being . . . experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings, as something separated from the rest—a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and to affection for a few persons nearest to us. Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty.

—Albert Einstein, letter to a grieving father

The increasing level of insecurity in my country, Israel, and worldwide, as well as the environmental crisis and global interdependence, call for higher reflective capacities. Living in a conflict zone, imprisoned in dichotomous perceptions of “us” versus “them” and cycles of violence, underscores the need for a wider perspective of reality and a deeper understanding of underlying psychological mechanisms. In this essay, I suggest that reflective function (RF), a metacognitive capacity to reflect on one’s own and others’ thoughts and feelings,¹ is necessary for coping with these challenges. By reflecting on both self and others, and on our interrelatedness with others, RF enables a shift from a focus on the individual to a broader perspective, from which concern naturally evolves. By reaching an increasingly more accurate perception of the intra- and interpersonal reality, RF enables both an awareness of the importance of concern and the capacity for its realization. However, the realization of RF is fraught with obstacles. Overcoming these obstacles necessitates an effort not only at the individual or dyadic levels, but also in the social, cultural, and political spheres, and a transition from an individualistic psychology to a socially committed and ethical orientation. I conclude that by promoting awareness of the internal dynamics and environmental inputs that affect the realization of RF, and by keeping a socially committed attitude, psychologists can assume a key role in this transition. My specific objectives are (a) to review the development of RF and how it is related to concern; (b) to describe the emotional and cognitive aspects of RF and the effort needed for its realization; (c) to highlight the factors that may impede RF in the individual, social, cultural, and political spheres; and (d) to outline the ways in which the construct of RF both captures and facilitates the connection between psychology and ethics.

Development of reflective function: Self–Other dynamics

From an early age, infants share emotional states with others (Tomasello et al., 2005). The caregiver’s emotional availability and response to the infant’s signals seem to enable the development of the infant’s awareness of affective self-states and understanding of mental life (Licata et al., 2016). The infant appears to need recognizable images of their affective states, and the caregiver achieves this by responding with appropriate displays of emotions (Gergely & Unoka, 2008). The caregiver’s capacity to acknowledge and contain emotional experiences, including distress, without being overwhelmed, enables the child to cope with their own experiences and to develop a capacity for concern for others (Steele et al., 2002). Absence of emotional containment and of adequate response by the caregiver may lead to the exclusion of important aspects of the child’s self and of their perceptions of others (Fonagy et al., 2002).

Furthermore, humans seem to possess a species-unique externally oriented learning system, enabling cultural knowledge and conventions to be passed on by significant others (Fonagy et al., 2007; Gergely & Unoka, 2008). The openness of the child to the communication of social knowledge is known as epistemic trust (Fonagy et al., 2019). The development of epistemic trust further emphasizes the role of the social environment in either supporting or obstructing RF, with adversity and deprivation generating mistrust and avoidance of mental states (Fonagy et al., 2019). As children grow, language plays an important role, enabling expression and understanding of emotions and ideas (P. Harris, 1996; Vygotsky, 1981). Children’s interactions with a widening circle of persons permit the development of diverse perspectives of reality (Fuchs, 2013), and allow the development of the capacity to evaluate the significance of new inputs and to manage complex social relationships (Gergely & Unoka, 2008). Explanatory conversations, ranging from picture book reading to dinner-time discussions, about mental states and particularly about negative experiences, have been shown to promote children’s emotional and social competence (Marin et al., 2008; Sales & Fivush, 2005), and theory of mind (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2008).

Adolescence sets the stage for further understanding of the relations between self and others (Selman, 1980). There is evidence that the adolescent’s brain is reorganized, with an enhanced development of regions involved in social cognition (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006). Interaction with others provides adolescents with approval of their self, and recognition of the difference between their own thinking and that of others (Elkind, 1998). Adolescence has been identified as a critical period for the integration of values and ideals (Damon, 1984; Erikson, 1964) and for the development of political points of view (Eckstein et al., 2012). Absence of the capacity to acquire cultural knowledge may limit one’s ability to update one’s understanding of, and adaptation to, changing social situations (Fonagy et al., 2019). Hence, the importance of adolescence for further development of RF and for an ethical perspective.

Thus, RF and epistemic trust develop in the context of meaningful relationships, and form the basis for mutual understanding, and the acquisition of cultural knowledge and concern. By acknowledging the child’s mental states, the caregiver creates a reality of caring and of concern, in which self and others can be perceived and mental states can be acknowledged. By deferring their own needs out of concern for others, caregivers provide a model for an ethical endeavor. By relating to other people, children and adolescents acquire an ability to contain their own emotions and experiences and those of others, rather than their exclusion. Awareness of the feelings and thoughts of self and others is the basis for concern and responsibility toward others. Indeed, the capacity to appreciate our own and others’ internal states has been found to be essential for the development of concern for others (Batson et al., 2003; Jack & Robbins, 2012); and emotional understanding and perspective-taking have been found to be precursors of empathic emotions (Betancourt, 1990), prosocial behavior (Cassidy et al., 2003), and moral sensibility (Dunn et al., 2000).

Moreover, psychological theory and research suggests a blurring of self–other boundaries, with an overlap between one’s own representations and those of others (Davis et al., 1996; Galinsky et al., 2005). The blurring of self–other boundaries has been variously conceptualized as identification (Freud, 1921), I–thou relationships (Buber, 1958), projective identification (Bion, 1962), self-object (Kohut, 1977), enactive intersubjectivity (Fuchs & De Jaegher, 2009), and dissolving (Kulka, 2012). Neuroscience research has identified mirror neurons, that is, neurons that are responsible for one’s sensations and emotions overlap those recruited when one perceives another’s sensations and emotions (Gallese et al., 2004). Thus, humans appear to be able to capture another person’s experiences by watching, even without explicitly reasoning about the contents of someone else’s mind (Ferrari & Gallese, 2007). By blurring the boundaries between self and other, RF is related to concern not only at the cognitive level, but also at a deeper, emotional–intuitive level.

Realization of reflective function: Cognitive and emotional aspects

Evidence suggests the existence of two modes of mental-state processing: an automatic one that activates mental representations outside of one’s awareness, and a controlled, explicit, and reflective mode that brings mental content into one’s awareness for deliberation (Lieberman, 2007). The automatic mode processes information instantly and involves an implicit and direct understanding (Davidsen & Fosgerau, 2015). The controlled mode is slow, conscious, and voluntary. It requires more complex cognitive functions, including manipulation of higher order representations of the social environment (Adolphs, 1999), and top-down appraisal and regulation processes (Gergely & Unoka, 2008). Optimally, the two modes of mental processing are linked: as emotional experiences become more differentiated, their representations move from implicit to explicit form, thereby producing understanding and awareness; on the other hand, conscious experience is internalized and rendered less conscious and more automatic (Jurist, 2008; Knox, 2004).

Brain imaging has identified the amygdala and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex as the sites of the automatic processing (Lieberman, 2007). It is a phylogenetically early system (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009) that is related to the mirror-neuron system (Gallese et al., 2004). The controlled mode involves the prefrontal cortex (Lieberman, 2007). It is evident only in phylogenetically advanced mammals and relies on linguistic and symbolic abilities (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). The degree of connectivity between the activity in the amygdala and in the specific areas of the frontal cortex has been found to correlate with the effectiveness of regulation processes (Banks et al., 2007; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Indeed, understanding one’s self and others has been linked with emotion regulation and control (Fonagy et al., 2002). Similarly, there is evidence that the integration of automatic-emotional and controlled-cognitive aspects of mental-states processing is important for moral reasoning (Greene & Haidt, 2002); whereas reduced connectivity has been associated with psychopathy (Blair, 2007; Motzkin et al., 2011).

Humans seem to share with other primates the capacity to reason about social rules that forbid, permit, or obligate certain kinds of behaviors (Cummins, 2000). However, the capacity to appreciate internal states emerges late in evolutionary history, distinguishes humans from other species, and requires crossing into the realm of the unobserved (Cummins, 2000). Treating others as psychological entities with thoughts, emotions, and beliefs may require an effort to overcome egocentric inferences (Royzman et al., 2003). It involves setting aside one’s own immediate experience and generating a response based on representations of reality as perceived by others (Apperly et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2010). It entails an awareness, rather than avoidance, of negative aspects of one’s self and others, that may require bearing the distress generated by such an awareness (Benbassat & Shulman, 2016; Steele et al., 2002). In analytical psychology, acknowledging the least desirable aspects of one’s self (“the shadow”) is viewed as central in the process of individuation and self-realization (Jung, 1971), and as essential for ethical development (Neumann, 1969). It is assumed that recognition and integration of one’s own experiences and emotions enable more accurate perception of and coping with reality, rather than denial and projection (Neumann, 1969).

Moving beyond appearance toward internal representations and meanings is, therefore, cognitively complex and emotionally demanding, and motivation seems to be a key factor in the realization of RF and in bearing its costs (Ickes et al., 2011; Liotti & Gilbert, 2011). “Mind not willingly indulges unpleasing thoughts” (Boswell, as cited in Mizen, 2009), and an active endeavor seems to be needed in order to deal with the personal and interpersonal realities that are beyond the comfort zone. Motivation for increased reliance on the controlled mode may permit less impulsive responses, especially when the automatic mode is dominated by biased perceptions about self and others (Luyten & Fonagy, 2015). It has been claimed that the automatic mode makes up the greater part of understanding others (Davidsen & Fosgerau, 2015), and that unconscious motivation is central in forming perceptions in everyday life, and in affecting the preconscious processing of visual stimuli and what reaches conscious awareness (Balcetis & Dunning, 2006; Kahneman, 2011). This underscores the importance of early experiences, particularly the extent to which the environment fosters containment of the mental states of self and others (Fonagy et al., 2007), as well as concern for others (Eisenberg, 2000).

Barriers to reflective function: Personal and social hindrances

The potential for RF is innate. However, it is more vulnerable to unfavorable conditions than functions that appear earlier in evolutionary history (Goldman, 2009; Meares et al., 1999). There is evidence that the development of RF is inhibited by feelings of threat and facilitated by safety in early relations with caregivers, as well as later, in the cultural milieu and social environment (Liotti & Gilbert, 2011; Lorenzini et al., 2018). Sociocultural frameworks, practices, and norms affect the ways people think, act, and engage with others (Køster, 2017), and biological, psychological, and social factors interact, exemplifying the interconnectedness of individual and context in the course of development (Sameroff, 2010; Teo, 2018). Moving from a deterministic approach to an understanding of the complex interactions between innate processes and the environment requires an exploration of the various factors in the personal, social, and cultural spheres that may undermine the development and realization of RF.

Education and socioeconomic status

Verbal abilities and abstract thinking have been identified as affecting the development of RF (Hughes et al., 1999; Rutherford et al., 2012). Education has repeatedly been found to be associated with RF (Benbassat & Priel, 2012; Cook et al., 1994; Stacks et al., 2014) and theory of mind (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Meins et al., 2002). Similarly, socioeconomic status (SES) has been reported to correlate with RF (Jessee et al., 2018) and theory of mind (Cole & Mitchell, 2000; Hughes et al., 1999) by some authors, but not by others (Rosso et al., 2015). Still other studies found higher empathic attunement to others among individuals with lower SES (Kraus et al., 2010; Stellar et al., 2012). These inconsistent observations could be due to the importance of both cognitive and emotional–motivational determinants for the realization of RF. On the one hand, overall and child-directed conversations were found to be reduced in families with lower SES (Cutting & Dunn, 1999), and SES explained about 30% of the variance in first-grade children’s performance on language tasks (Noble et al., 2007). Poverty-related concerns may leave people with fewer mental resources for other tasks (Mani et al., 2013), and disadvantages related to SES have been reported to adversely affect parents’ capacity to respond to their children’s needs for warmth and cognitive stimulation (Linver et al., 2002). On the other hand, people with lower SES have less power, are more dependent on external reality, and their motivation to understand others may be higher (Kraus et al., 2010).

Power

People in positions of power control resources and they are less dependent on others. Several studies reported that people in positions of power were found to be less motivated to understand others (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Muscatell et al., 2012) and to perceive others in an automatic, simplistic way (Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003). Other studies reported that they revealed more psychological distancing from powerless individuals (Magee & Smith, 2013), a reduced tendency to comprehend how other people think, feel, and act (Galinsky et al., 2006; Hogeveen et al., 2014), reduced perspective-taking and ability to detect others’ emotions (Galinsky et al., 2006; Lammers et al., 2008), and reduced compassion with others’ suffering (Van Kleef et al., 2008). Thus, social power may hinder the emotional–motivational aspect of mental-states processing and create barriers between self and others.

Orientation to social dominance

An orientation to social dominance has been found to reduce empathy (Pratto et al., 2006), promote formation of stereotypes, and enhance a tendency to ignore others’ distress (Twemlow et al., 2005a). Researchers have argued that humans tend to differentiate between in- and out-groups, and to believe that members of different social groups are essentially different kinds of people (Birnbaum et al., 2010). Categorizing people into “us” versus “them” may create an illusion of a stable and separate existence that, in turn, releases the individual from the need to be aware of the feelings of others (Cummins, 2000). Freud (1921) pointed to a decline in personal responsibility and to regressive processes in group dynamics. It has been claimed that empathic response is a culturally scripted norm that is biased towards those who are similar, while overlooking the suffering of particular others (Matthiesen & Klitmøller, 2019). Brain studies have indicated that perceiving others as similar activated the medial prefrontal cortex, whereas its reduced activation was related to dehumanization, that is, to denial of the mental and moral characteristics of others (L. T. Harris & Fiske, 2011; Haslam, 2006; Jack et al., 2013). In another study, the brain response to the pain of others was reduced when the “others” were out-group members (Levy et al., 2016). Dehumanizing perception of out-group members was found to be related to lower levels of helping behavior (Cuddy et al., 2007), and may even herald violence, massacres, and genocide (L. T. Harris & Fiske, 2011; Jack et al., 2013). In trying to understand the genocide during WWII, Arendt (1969) asserted that thinking, by definition, is autonomous and critical, whereas thoughtlessness is an “almost total inability ever to look at anything from the other fellow’s point of view” (pp. 47–48).

Individualism, neoliberalism and materialism

Western culture emphasizes individual autonomy and self-centeredness, and this, in turn, may reduce interpersonal connectedness and commitment to others (Eckersley, 2006; Taylor, 1991). Our culture seems also to be intolerant of discomfort, to focus on reducing unpleasant emotions, and to ignore distress and suffering rather than accept them as part of life (Barreto, 2018; Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, 2005). Neoliberal discourse emphasizes one’s responsibility toward oneself rather than to others, and may thereby reduce social solidarity, and responsibility towards the vulnerable (Layton, 2009). There is evidence of a decline in concern for others over the last three decades (Twenge et al., 2012), and an increase in narcissistic tendencies (Twenge et al., 2008). Materialism has been reported to be associated with reduced social trust (Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002; Kasser & Ryan, 1993), and technological development appears to be pulling people further apart (Zimbardo & Duncan, 2012). In particular, the rising prominence of personal technology and media in everyday life, with less time spent interacting with others, seems to affect interpersonal dynamics and reduce empathy (Konrath, 2013; McPherson et al., 2006).

Gender

Any discussion of gender differences runs the risk of ignoring the variability within and overlap between genders (Costa et al., 2001). However, in most studies, women were reported to reveal higher levels of RF than men (e.g., Bouchard et al., 2008; Cooke et al., 2017; Rutherford et al., 2012). While these gender differences seem to have a biological component (Connellan et al., 2001), they are further amplified by social norms (Brebner, 2003; Brody, 2000). Fathers in particular seem to play a significant role in perpetuating gender differences in RF (Chaplin et al., 2005), and various factors in the social and cultural sphere may further impede RF among boys and men. For example, technological development has been reported to affect the interpersonal relationships of boys more than those of girls (Zimbardo & Duncan, 2012), and, cross-culturally, men still have more power than do women and were found to exhibit a higher social-dominance orientation (Maroda, 2004; Pratto, 1996).

Overcoming the hindrances to RF necessitates, therefore, an endeavor not only at the individual and dyadic levels, but also at social and political levels. As pointed out by Køster (2017), by remaining rooted in perceptions of individual and separate minds, the literature on RF overlooks the sociocultural dimension. Dominance and hierarchical relationships may cause people with power to ignore the experiences of those with less power. Although people with power wield the resources to create social change, they may be the least motivated to do so, thereby perpetuating a vicious cycle of power, low motivation, and low RF. Scholars have claimed that social and economic policies during recent decades repudiate vulnerability and disavow responsibility (Layton, 2009); that inequality creates an atmosphere of injustice, mistrust, and aggressiveness (Wilkinson, 2004); and that state violence may cause a breakdown in epistemic trust towards the social environment (Lorenzini et al., 2018). Although obvious to mental health care providers, the role of the sociocultural context remains under-accounted for in current conceptualizations of psychopathology (Fonagy et al., 2019). However, there seems to be a growing awareness about the importance of the broader contexts in which people are situated, thus promoting social change and justice (Hodgetts & O’Doherty, 2019). As pointed out by Neumann:

It has to be recognized that—especially in an era of social injustice—the principle of the equality of man does provide a basis for asserting the right of the individual to personal development and for demanding that obstacles placed in the path of this development by unjust external circumstances should be eliminated, once and for all. (1969, p. 72)

The potential of reflective function: Perceiving and creating reality

Traditionally, psychologists have restricted themselves to the personal and avoided the sociopolitical sphere and ethical issues (Layton, 2009; Samuels, 2004). They have viewed their knowledge as being value-neutral descriptions of an independent reality (Brinkmann, 2004). Yet, already in 1957, Martin Buber expressed his disappointment of the tendency of psychologists to ignore issues of conscience and guilt. He wrote:

the investigator cannot truthfully maintain his relationship with reality. . . if he does not again and again, whenever it is necessary, gaze beyond the limits into a sphere which is not his sphere of work, yet which he must contemplate with all his power of research in order to do justice to his own task. (p. 114)

Similarly, Erik Erikson (1964), in a lecture in New Delhi, said: “we cannot afford to live for long with a division of personal, professional, and political ethics—a division endangering the very life which our professions have vowed to keep intact” (p. 241). In recent decades there have been calls for shifting the focus of psychology from the individual to a broader perspective (e.g., Freeman, 2014; Teo, 2018), and for a transition from the “myth of individuality” to recognition of interbeing and complementarity, viewing ethics as an intrinsic aspect of human existence and compassion as an ethical commitment toward others (Kulka, 2008).

The construct of RF encompasses the inward motion of awareness and integration of mental content, as well as the outward motion of ethical commitment and widening circles of concern. Reflecting on one’s own experiences, emotions, and thoughts creates a reality of internal connectedness and responsibility; reflecting on the other’s perspective, beliefs, and desires creates a reality of interpersonal connectedness and recognition; reflecting on how self and others are interwoven creates a reality in which interdependence and mutual influences are acknowledged. Therefore, the construct of RF both captures and facilitates the connection between psychology and ethics, and enables new forms of integration and reciprocal influence between the two. It underscores the link between basic emotional functions and higher cognition, combined with appropriate social learning and cultural knowledge, and enables the move to social responsibility and ethical orientation.

In 1970, Iris Murdoch introduced the term “moral imagination,” that is, perceiving reality through the other’s eye, and argued that attention is an essential feature of an active moral agent. “I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’, which implies that clear vision is the result of moral imagination and moral effort” (pp. 35–36). Morality, according to Murdoch, is a continuous effort during everyday interactions, consisting of countless actions of seeing and paying attention; while the “enemy” to moral life is the “selfish consciousness” that, through self-deception, rationalization, dismissal, and lack of attention, obscures reality and avoids seeing the other, thereby leading to moral blindness and unethical behavior. This corresponds with Carol Gilligan’s (1982) concept of “ethic of care,” which is based on the need for paying attention and responsiveness in relationships, and to the costs of losing connection with oneself or with others. According to Gilligan (1982), the ethic of care is the ethic of a democratic society, as it is grounded in core democratic values: the importance of everyone having a voice and being listened to with respect. However, within a patriarchal framework, the ethic of care is a “feminine” ethic, trying to transcend gender binaries and hierarchies (Gilligan, 1982).

This may turn out to be particularly important in an era of “post-truth,” ethnocentricity, and environmental catastrophe, with society losing its perception of reality and its commitment to a code of ethics. The human potential for meaning creation can be distorted in a profound way, confusing what is real and what is fantasy, and the interdependence between self and other can result in an internal dissociation and interpersonal projections. Psychologists have the knowledge and the “epistemic authority” (Fonagy et al., 2019) needed to play a key role in increasing awareness and understanding of these processes in order to create change. Psychologists can increase awareness of the hidden assumptions and motives underlying various social practices, norms, and discourse (Teo, 2018). By widening the scope to include experiences and concepts from other cultures, the historical and cultural specificity of psychology’s epistemic projects can further become apparent (Adjei, 2019). Reflecting on how psychology comes to define particular phenomena as areas of scientific concern, and how the disciplinary shaping of psychological concerns has a bearing on what can and will be researched, is important in order to meet current challenges (Huniche, & Sørensen, 2019).

Psychologists can further investigate barriers to the realization of RF, such as disparities in education and SES, individualism and materialism. Promoting RF seems to necessitate an effort not only at the individual level, but also at the social and political levels, and both bottom-up and top-down processes of change. The individual may be seen as an avant-garde of the collective, so that new ways and new values appear earlier in the development of the individual than in that of the collective (Neumann, 1969). However, the social environment is critical in creating suitable conditions. Various intervention programs aimed at enhancing RF at the individual, family, and community levels have been developed and implemented, and there is evidence to support their effectiveness (e.g., Allen et al., 2008; Slade, 2007; Twemlow et al., 2005a). For example, the intervention program “Peaceful Schools Project” was found to reduce bullying and disruptive behaviors and to enhance RF among school children (Twemlow et al., 2005b).

Conclusion

This article joins the calls for integrating ethics into psychological theory and practice. I argue that RF is a central construct in this process, and highlight the vulnerability of RF to various personal and environmental conditions. A complex view of self and others is a developmental achievement that depends on relationships, social safety, and sociocultural context. Recognizing the other as an equivalent center of experience requires effort that needs to be cultivated from early stages of development. The relative ease of ignoring complexity, repudiating vulnerability, and dismissing the other’s perspective underscores the importance of motivation to perceive reality accurately, to overcome hindrances, and to relinquish short-term rewards for long-term benefits. By acknowledging the complexity of social reality and interrelatedness, RF allows us to avoid dichotomous perceptions, social essentialism, and biological determinism. Whereas appearance and behavior captivate attention and offer simplicity, and while neuroscience offers concreteness and robustness, RF encompasses subjectivity and meaning, complexity and ambiguity, fine distinctions and connectedness.

Therefore, I believe that psychologists have a responsibility to enhance understanding and awareness of intra- and interpersonal processes and dynamics, at the individual and social levels. Psychologists can explore the conditions that facilitate and undermine RF in individuals and groups, and to promote interventions for its enhancement. Not taking a critical stand in times of oppression and injustice is in and of itself a political statement. By further understanding the internal dynamics and the environmental inputs that affect the realization of RF, we can apply our knowledge in widening circles of concern; by bearing the tension between similarity and difference, between the particular and the universal, we can promote a vision of solidarity. In today’s fast-paced society, higher reflective capacities seem to have a survival advantage as they enable us to transcend immediate experience and ongoing events, and to create new understandings more adaptive for the individual, society, and nature.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my father, Jochanan Benbassat, MD, for his comments and support along the way.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Naomi Benbassat

Notes

Author biography

Naomi Benbassat, PhD (Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva), is a clinical psychologist at the Beer-Sheva Mental Health Center, Faculty of Health Sciences, Ben-Gurion University, Israel. Her main interests include reflective function, parenting, and adolescent/young adults’ adjustment, and sociopolitical influences on mental health. Recent publications include (with S. Shulman) “The Significance of Parental Reflective Function in the Adjustment of Young Adults” in Journal of Child and Family Studies (2016) and (with B. Priel) “Why is Fathers’ Reflective Function Important?” in Psychoanalytic Psychology (2015).

References

Adjei

S. B.

(2019). Conceptualising personhood, agency, and morality for African psychology. Theory & Psychology, 29(4), 484–505. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354319857473

Adolphs

(1999). Social cognition and the human brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3(12), 469–479.

Allen

Fonagy

Bateman

(2008). Mentalizing in clinical practice. American Psychiatric Press.

Apperly

I. A.

Back

Samson

France

(2008). The cost of thinking about false beliefs: Evidence from adults’ performance on a non-inferential theory of mind task. Cognition, 106(3), 1093–1108.

Arendt

(1969). Eichmann in Jerusalem (2nd ed.). Viking Press.

Balcetis

Dunning

(2006). See what you want to see: Motivational influences on visual perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(4), 612–625.

Banks

S. J.

Eddy

K. T.

Angstadt

Nathan

P. J.

Phan

K. L.

(2007). Amygdala-frontal connectivity during emotion regulation. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2(4), 303–312.

Barreto

M. H.

(2018). The ethical dimension of analytical psychology. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 63(2), 241–254.

Batson

C. D.

Lishner

D. A.

Carpenter

Dulin

Harjusola-Webb

Stocks

E. L.

Gale

Hassan

Sampat

(2003). “. . . As you would have them do unto you”: Does imagining yourself in the other’s place stimulate moral action? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(9), 1190–1201. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167203254600

10.

Benbassat

Priel

(2012). Parenting and adolescent adjustment: The role of parental reflective function. Journal of Adolescence, 35(1), 163–174.

11.

Benbassat

Shulman

(2016). The significance of parental reflective function in the adjustment of young adults. Journal of Child and Family Studies, 25(9), 2843–2852.

12.

Betancourt

. (1990). An attribution–empathy model of helping behavior: Behavioral intentions and judgments of help-giving. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 16(3), 573–591.

13.

Bion

(1962). Learning from experience. Heinemann.

14.

Birnbaum

Deeb

Segall

Ben-Eliyahu

Diesendruck

(2010). The development of social essentialism: The case of Israeli children’s inferences about Jews and Arabs. Child Development, 81(3), 757–777.

15.

Blair

R. J.

(2007). The amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex in morality and psychopathy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(9), 387–392.

16.

Blakemore

S. J.

Choudhury

(2006). Development of the adolescent brain: Implications for executive function and social cognition. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 47(3–4), 296–312.

17.

Bouchard

M. A.

Target

Lecours

Fonagy

Tremblay

L. M.

Schachter

Stein

(2008). Mentalization in adult attachment narratives: Reflective functioning, mental states, and affect elaboration compared. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 25(1), 47–66.

18.

Brebner

(2003). Gender and emotions. Personality and Individual Differences, 34(3), 387–394.

19.

Brinkmann

(2004). Psychology as a moral science: Aspects of John Dewey’s psychology. History of the Human Science, 17(1), 1–28.

20.

Brody

L. R.

(2000). The socialization of gender differences in emotional expression: Display rules, infant temperament, and differentiation. In Fischer

A. H.

(Ed.), Gender and emotion: Social psychological perspectives (pp. 24–47). Cambridge University Press.

21.

Buber

(1957). Guilt and guilt feelings. Psychiatry, 20(2), 114–129.

22.

Buber

(1958). I and thou. Scribner.

23.

Burroughs

J. E.

Rindfleisch

(2002). Materialism and well-being: A conflicting values perspective. Journal of Consumer Research, 29(3), 348–370.

24.

Cassidy

K. W.

Werner

R. S.

Rourke

Zubernis

L. S.

Balaraman

(2003). The relationship between psychological understanding and positive social behaviors. Social Development, 12(2), 198–221.

25.

Chaplin

T. M.

Cole

P. M.

Zahn-Waxler

(2005). Parental socialization of emotion expression: Gender differences and relations to child adjustment. Emotion, 5(1), 80–88.

26.

Cole

Mitchell

(2000). Family background in relation to deceptive ability and understanding of the mind. Social Development, 7(2), 181–197.

27.

Connellan

Baron-Cohen

Wheelwright

Ba’tki

Ahluwalia

(2001). Sex differences in human neonatal social perception. Infant Behavior and Development, 23(1), 113–118.

28.

Cook

E. T.

Greenberg

M. T.

Kusche

C. A.

(1994). The relations between emotional understanding, intellectual functioning, and disruptive behavior problems in elementary-school-aged children. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 22(2), 205–219.

29.

Cooke

Priddis

Luyten

Kendall

Cavanagh

(2017). Paternal and maternal reflective functioning in the western Australian peel child health study. Infant Mental Health Journal, 38(5), 561–574.

30.

Costa

Terracciano

McCrae

R. R.

(2001). Gender differences in personality traits across cultures: Robust and surprising differences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(2), 322–331.

31.

Cuddy

A. J. C.

Rock

M. S.

Norton

M. I.

(2007). Aid in the after-math of Hurricane Katrina: Inferences of secondary emotions and intergroup helping. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 10(1), 107–118.

32.

Cummins

D. D.

(2000). How the social environment shaped the evolution of mind. Synthese, 122(1), 3–28.

33.

Cutting

A. L.

Dunn

(1999). Theory of mind, emotion understanding, language, and family background: Individual differences and interrelations. Child Development, 70(4), 853–865.

34.

Damon

(1984). Self-understanding and moral development from childhood to adolescence. In Kurtines

W. M.

Gewirtz

J. L.

(Eds.), Morality, moral behavior, and moral development (pp. 109–127). John Wiley & Sons.

35.

Davidsen

A. S.

Fosgerau

C. F.

(2015). Grasping the process of implicit mentalization. Theory & Psychology, 25(4), 434–454.

36.

Davis

M. H.

Conklin

Smith

Luce

(1996). Effect of perspective taking on the cognitive representation of persons: A merging of self and other. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(4), 713–726.

37.

De Dreu

C. K. W.

Van Kleef

G. A

. (2004). The influence of power on the information search, impression formation, and demands in negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40(3), 303–319.

38.

Dunn

Cutting

A. L.

Demetriou

(2000). Moral sensibility, understanding others, and children’s friendship interactions in the preschool period. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 18(2), 159–177.

39.

Eckersley

(2006). Is modern Western culture a health hazard ? International Journal of Epidemiology, 35(2), 252–258.

40.

Eckstein

Noack

Gniewosz

(2012). Attitudes toward political engagement and willingness to participate in politics: Trajectories throughout adolescence. Journal of Adolescence, 35(3), 485–495.

41.

Eisenberg

(2000). Emotion, regulation, and moral development. Annual Review of Psychology, 51(1), 665–697.

42.

Elkind

(1998). Egocentrism in adolescence. In Muuss

R. E.

Porton

H. D.

(Eds.), Adolescent behavior and society: A book of readings (5th ed., pp. 91–97). McGraw Hill.

43.

Erikson

E. H.

(1964). Insight and responsibility: Lectures on the ethical implications of psychoanalytic insight. Faber & Faber.

44.

Ferrari

P. F.

Gallese

(2007). Mirror neurons and intersubjectivity. In Bråten

(Ed.), On being moved: From mirror neurons to empathy (pp. 73–88). John Benjamins.

45.

Fiske

S. T.

(1993). Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping. American Psychologist, 48(6), 621–628.

46.

Fonagy

Gergely

Jurist

E. L.

Target

(2002). Affect regulation, mentalization, and the development of the self. Other Press.

47.

Fonagy

Gergely

Target

(2007). The parent–infant dyad and the construction of the subjective self. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 48(3–4), 288–328.

48.

Fonagy

Luyten

Allison

Campbell

(2019). Mentalizing, epistemic trust and the phenomenology of psychotherapy. Psychopathology, 52(2), 94–103.

49.

Freeman

(2014). The priority of the other: Thinking and living beyond the self. Oxford University Press.

50.

Freud

(1921). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. Hogarth.

51.

Fuchs

(2013). The phenomenology and development of social perspectives. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12(4), 655–683.

52.

Fuchs

De Jaegher

(2009). Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 8(4), 465–486.

53.

Galinsky

A. D.

Wang

C. S.

(2005). Perspective-taking and self–other overlap: Fostering social bonds and facilitating social coordination. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 8(2), 109–124.

54.

Galinsky

A. D.

Magee

J. C.

Inesi

M. E.

Gruenfeld

D. H.

(2006). Power and perspective not taken. Psychological Science, 17(12), 1068–1074.

55.

Gallese

Keysers

Rizzolatti

(2004). A unifying view of the basis of social cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(9), 396–403.

56.

Gergely

Unoka

(2008). The development of the unreflective self. In Busch

F. N.

(Ed.), Mentalization: Theoretical considerations, research findings, and clinical implications (pp. 57–102). Taylor & Francis.

57.

Gilligan

(1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women’s development. Harvard University Press.

58.

Goldman

A. I.

(2009). Mirroring, mindreading, and simulation. In Pineda

J. A.

(Ed.), Mirror neuron systems: The role of mirroring processes in social cognition (pp. 311–330). Homana Press.

59.

Greene

Haidt

(2002). How (and where) does moral judgment work? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(12), 517–523.

60.

Harris

L. T.

Fiske

S. T.

(2011). Perceiving humanity or not: A social neuroscience approach to dehumanized perception. In Todorov

Fiske

Prentice

(Eds.), Social neuroscience: Toward understanding the underpinnings of the social mind (pp. 123–134). Oxford University Press.

61.

Harris

(1996). Desires, beliefs, and language. In Carruthers

Smith

P. K.

(Eds.), Theories of theories of mind (pp. 200–220). Cambridge University Press.

62.

Haslam

(2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 252–264.

63.

Hodgetts

O’Doherty

K. C.

(2019). Introduction: Applied social psychology–An evolving tradition. In O’Doherty

K. C.

Hodgetts

(Eds.), The SAGE handbook of applied social psychology (pp. xxv–xxxviii). SAGE.

64.

Hogeveen

Inzlicht

Obhi

S. S.

(2014). Power changes how the brain responds to others. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(2), 755–762.

65.

Hughes

Deater-Deckard

Cutting

A. L.

(1999). “Speak roughly to your little boy”: Sex differences in the relations between parenting and preschoolers’ understanding of mind. Social Development, 8(2), 143–160.

66.

Huniche

Sørensen

(2019). Psychology’s epistemic project. Theory & Psychology, 29(4), 441–448. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354319863496

67.

Ickes

Smith

J. L.

Hall

Hodges

S. D.

(2011). Interpersonal sensitivity: A set of abilities we can dial up or down as needed? In Smith

J. L.

Ickes

Hall

Hodges

S. D.

(Eds.), Managing interpersonal sensitivity: Knowing when—and when not—to understand others (pp. vii–xiii). Nova Science.

68.

Jack

A. I.

Dawson

A. J.

Norr

(2013). Seeing human: Distinct and overlapping neural signatures associated with two forms of dehumanization. Neuroimage, 79, 313–328.

69.

Jack

A. I.

Robbins

(2012). The phenomenal stance revisited. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3(3), 383–403.

70.

Jessee

Mangelsdorf

S. C.

Wong

M. S.

Schoppe-Sullivan

S. J.

Shigeto

Brown

G. L.

(2018). The role of reflective functioning in predicting marital and coparenting quality. Journal of Child and Family Studies, 27(1), 187–197.

71.

Jung

C. G.

(1971). Psychological reflections. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

72.

Jurist

E. L.

(2008). Minds and yours: New directions for mentalization theory. In Jurist

E. L.

Slade

Bergner

(Eds.), Mind to mind: Infant research, neuroscience, and psychoanalysis (pp. 88–114). Other Press.

73.

Kahneman

(2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

74.

Kasser

Ryan

(1993). A dark side of the American dream: Correlates of financial success as a central life aspiration. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(2), 410–422.

75.

Keltner

Gruenfeld

D. H.

Anderson

(2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. Psychological Review, 110(2), 265–284.

76.

Knox

(2004). From archetypes to reflective function. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 49, 1–19.

77.

Kohut

(1977). The restoration of the self. International Universities Press.

78.

Konrath

(2013). The empathy paradox: Increasing disconnection in the age of increasing connection. In Luppicini

(Ed.), Handbook of research on technoself: Identity in a technological society (pp. 204–228). IGI Global.

79.

Køster

(2017). Mentalization, embodiment, and narrative: Critical comments on the social ontology of mentalization theory. Theory & Psychology, 27(4), 458–476. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354317711031

80.

Kraus

M. W.

Côté

Keltner

(2010). Social class, contextualism, and empathic accuracy. Psychological Science, 21(11), 1716–1723.

81.

Kulka

(2008). From a civilization of discontent to a culture of compassion: An optimistic view on Freud’s pessimism. In Shefler

(Ed.), Freud: Culture and psychoanalysis (pp. 98–121). Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, Dvir Publishing House.

82.

Kulka

(2012). Between emergence and dissolving: Contemporary reflections on greatness and ideals in Kohut’s legacy. International Journal of Psychoanalytic Self-Psychology, 7, 264–285.

83.

Lammers

Gordijn

E. H.

Otten

(2008). Looking through the eyes of the powerful. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(5), 1229–1238.

84.

Layton

(2009). Who’s responsible? Our mutual implication in each other’s suffering. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 19(2), 105–120.

85.

Levy

Goldstein

Influs

Masalha

Zagoory-Sharon

Feldman

(2016). Adolescents growing up amidst intractable conflict attenuate brain response to pain of outgroup. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(48), 13696–13701.

86.

Licata

Kristen

Sodian

(2016). Mother–child interaction as a cradle of theory of mind: The role of maternal emotional availability. Social Development, 25(1), 139–156.

87.

Lieberman

M. D.

(2007). Social cognitive neuroscience: A review of core processes. Annual Review of Psychology, 58(1), 259–289.

88.

Lin

Keysar

Epley

(2010). Reflexivity mindblind: Using theory of mind to interpret behavior requires effortful attention. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(3), 551–556.

89.

Linver

M. R.

Brooks-Gunn

Kohen

(2002). Family processes as pathways from income to young children’s development. Developmental Psychology, 38(5), 719–734.

90.

Liotti

Gilbert

(2011). Mentalizing, motivation and social mentalities: Theoretical considerations and implications for psychotherapy. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 84(1), 9–25.

91.

Lorenzini

Campbell

Fonagy

(2018). Mentalization and its role in processing trauma. In Huppertz

(Ed.), Approaches to psychic trauma: Theory and practice (pp. 403–422). Rowman & Littlefield.

92.

Luyten

Fonagy

(2015). The neurobiology of mentalizing. Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 6(4), 366–379.

93.

Magee

J. C.

Smith

P. K.

(2013). The social distance theory of power. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 17(2), 158–186.

94.

Mani

Mullainathan

Shafir

Zhao

(2013). Poverty impedes cognitive function. Science, 341(6149), 976–980.

95.

Marin

K. A.

Bohanek

J. G.

Fivush

(2008). Positive effects of talking about the negative: Family narratives of negative experiences and preadolescents’ perceived competence. Journal of Research in Adolescence, 18(3), 573–593.

96.

Maroda

K. J.

(2004). A relational perspective on women and power. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 21(3), 428–435.

97.

Matthiesen

Klitmøller

(2019). Encountering the stranger: Hannah Arendt and the shortcomings of empathy as a moral compass. Theory & Psychology, 29(2), 182–199.

98.

McPherson

Smith-Lovin

Brashears

M. E.

(2006). Social isolation in America: Changes in core discussion networks over two decades. American Sociological Review, 71(3), 353–375.

99.

Meares

Stevenson

Gordon

(1999). A Jacksonian and biopsychological hypothesis concerning borderline and related phenomena. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 33(6), 831–840.

100.

Meins

Fernyhough

Wainwright

Das Gupta

Fradley

Tuckey

(2002). Maternal mind-mindedness and attachment security as predictors of theory of mind understanding. Child Development, 73(6), 1715–1726.

101.

Mizen

(2009). The embodied mind. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 54(2), 253–272.

102.

Motzkin

J. C.

Newman

J. P.

Kiehl

K. A.

Koenigs

(2011). Reduced prefrontal connectivity in psychopathy. The Journal of Neuroscience, 31(48), 17348–17357.

103.

Murdoch

(1970). The sovereignty of good. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

104.

Muscatell

Morelli

S. A.

Falk

E. B.

Way

B. M.

Pfeifer

Galinsky

A. D.

Lieberman

M. D.

Dapretto

Eisenberger

N. I.

(2012). Social status modulates neural activity in the mentalizing network. Neuroimage, 60(3), 1771–1777.

105.

Neumann

(1969). Depth psychology and a new ethic. Hodder & Stoughton.

106.

Niederhoffer

K. G.

Pennebaker

J. W.

(2005). Sharing one’s story: On the benefits of writing or talking about emotional experience. In Snyder

C. R.

Lopez

S. J.

(Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology (pp. 573–583). Oxford University Press.

107.

Noble

K. G.

McCandliss

B. D.

Farah

M. J.

(2007). Socioeconomic gradients predict individual differences in neurocognitive abilities. Developmental Science, 10(4), 464–480.

108.

Ochsner

K. N.

Gross

J. J.

(2005). The cognitive control of emotion. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(5), 242–249.

109.

Pratto

(1996). Sexual politics: The gender gap in the bedroom, the cupboard, and the cabinet. In Buss

D. M.

Malamuth

N. M.

(Eds.), Sex, power, conflict: Evolutionary and feminist perspectives (pp. 179–230). Oxford University Press.

110.

Pratto

Sidanius

Levin

(2006). Social dominance theory and the dynamics of intergroup relations: Taking stock and looking forward. European Review of Social Psychology, 17, 271–320.

111.

Rosso

A. M.

Viterbori

Scopesi

A. M.

(2015). Are maternal reflective functioning and attachment security associated with preadolescent mentalization? Frontiers in Psychology, 6, Article 1134.

112.

Royzman

E. B.

Wright Cassidy

Baron

(2003). “I know, you know”: Epistemic egocentrism in children and adults. Review of General Psychology, 7(1), 38–65.

113.

Rutherford

H. J.

Wareham

J. D.

Vrouval

Mayes

L. C.

Fonagy

Potenza

M. N.

(2012). Sex differences moderate the relationship between adolescent language and mentalization. Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 3(4), 393–405.

114.

Sales

J. M.

Fivush

(2005). Social and emotional functions of mother–child conversations about stressful events. Social Cognition, 23(1), 70–90.

115.

Sameroff

(2010). A unified theory of development: A dialectic integration of nature and nurture. Child Development, 81(1), 6–22.

116.

Samuels

(2004). Politics on the couch? Psychotherapy and society: Some possibilities and some limitations. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 14(6), 817–834.

117.

Selman

R. L.

(1980). The growth of interpersonal understanding. Academic Press.

118.

Shamay-Tsoory

S. G.

Aharon-Peretz

Perry

(2009). Two systems for empathy: A double dissociation between emotional and cognitive empathy in inferior frontal gyrus versus ventromedial prefrontal lesions. Brain, 132(3), 617–627.

119.

Slade

(2007). Reflective parenting programs: Theory and development. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 26(4), 640–657.

120.

Stacks

A. M.

Muzik

Wong

Beeghly

Huth-Bocks

Irwin

J. L.

Rosenblum

K. L.

(2014). Maternal reflective functioning among mothers with childhood maltreatment histories: Links to sensitive parenting and infant attachment security. Attachment & Human Development, 16(5), 515–533.

121.

Steele

Johansson

(2002). Maternal predictors of children’s social cognition: An attachment perspective. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 43(7), 861–872.

122.

Stellar

J. E.

Manzo

V. M.

Kraus

M. W.

Keltner

(2012). Class and compassion: Socioeconomic factors predict responses to suffering. Emotion, 12(3), 449–459.

123.

Taumoepeau

Ruffman

(2008). Stepping stones to others’ minds: Maternal talk relates to child mental state language and emotion understanding at 15, 24, and 33 months. Child Development, 79(2), 284–302.

124.

Taylor

(1991). The ethics of authenticity. Harvard University Press.

125.

Teo

(2018). Outline of theoretical psychology: Critical investigations. Palgrave Macmillan.

126.

Tomasello

Carpenter

Call

Behne

Moll

(2005). Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(5), 675–691.

127.

Twemlow

S. W.

Fonagy

Sacco

F. C.

(2005a). A developmental approach to mentalizing communities: I. A model for social change. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 69(4), 265–279.

128.

Twemlow

S. W.

Fonagy

Sacco

F. C.

(2005b). A developmental approach to mentalizing communities: II. The Peaceful Schools experiment. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 69(4), 282–304.

129.

Twenge

J. M.

Campbell

W. K.

Freeman

E. C.

(2012). Generational differences in young adults’ life goals, concern for others, and civic orientation, 1966–2009. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102, 1045–1062.

130.

Twenge

J. M.

Konrath

Foster

J. D.

Campbell

W. K.

Bushman

B. J.

(2008). Egos inflating over time: A cross-temporal meta-analysis of the narcissistic personality inventory. Journal of Personality, 76(4), 875–901.

131.

Van Kleef

G. A.

Oveis

Van der Löwe

LuoKogan

Goetz

Keltner

. (2008). Power, distress, and compassion: Turning a blind eye to the suffering of others. Psychological Science, 19(12), 1315–1322.

132.

Vygotsky

L. S.

(1981). The genesis of higher mental functions. In Wertsch

J. V.

(Ed.), The concept of activity in Soviet psychology (pp. 144–188). Sharpe.

133.

Wilkinson

(2004). Why is violence more common where inequality is greater? Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1036(1), 1–12.

134.

Zimbardo

Duncan

(2012). The demise of guys: Why boys are struggling and what we can do about it (Kindle ed.). TED.

Reflective function: A move to the level of concern

Abstract

Keywords

Development of reflective function: Self–Other dynamics

Realization of reflective function: Cognitive and emotional aspects

Barriers to reflective function: Personal and social hindrances

Education and socioeconomic status

Power

Orientation to social dominance

Individualism, neoliberalism and materialism

Gender

The potential of reflective function: Perceiving and creating reality

Conclusion

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Funding

ORCID iD

Notes

Author biography

References