Mechanistic unity of the predictive mind

Abstract

It has recently been argued that cognitive scientists should embrace explanatory pluralism rather than pursue the search for a unificatory framework or theory. This stance dovetails with the mechanistic view of cognitive-scientific explanation. However, one recently proposed theory—based on an idea that the brain is a predictive engine—opposes pluralism with its unificatory ambitions. My aim here is to investigate those pretentions to elucidate what sort of unification is on offer. I challenge the idea that explanatory unification of cognitive science follows from the Free Energy Principle. I claim that if the predictive story is to provide a unification, it is by proposing that many distinct cognitive mechanisms fall under a single prediction-error-minimization schema. I also argue that even though unification is not an absolute evaluative criterion for mechanistic explanations, it may play an epistemic role in evaluating the relative credibility of an explanation.