Is a psychology of the “person” a science? An art? Or is it a case of a “phase 1 science”—with its own logical rules and with a continuous character of changeability? Can it be any other than this, if the concept of a psychological person is always derived from a particular and always subject to its changeability? In a suspended phase 1 science, the psychologist’s role as a person, who is a thinker, is central. The psychologist’s thinking about the concept of the person is continuously engaged. It remains open to re-focus and to changes in its relation to other concepts and to target phenomena. Changes in the psychologist’s thinking keep discovery a dynamic process; yet move psychological concepts closer to accommodating scientific goals. A logical framework, which can accommodate this discovery mode, can achieve two contrary goals: changeability versus increased accommodation of scientific goals of sharpening hypotheses.
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