Abstract
Klasios, who asserts that my recent critique of evolutionary psychology contains egregious misunderstandings and a straw-man presentation of its theoretical assumptions, claims to outline the real position of evolutionary psychology while proffering a more accurate treatment of the neurobiological issues involved. On the contrary, I attempt to show that Klasios frequently misstates my position and that his arguments repeatedly prove my own. His evidentiary neurobiological examples meant to criticize my position are nearly identical to those provided by myself in pointing toward an alternative to evolutionary psychology—which suggests an unwillingness to seriously conceptualize a non-“blank-slate” null hypothesis. Klasios’ call to avoid the term “innate” and accept a revised terminology of modularity is also criticized, while his reductionist appeal to thermodynamics is argued to reveal what is most at stake in the debate between evolutionary psychologists and its critics: whether the future of psychology will leave adequate room for personhood in its conceptualization of the human mind.
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