Abstract
Evolutionary psychology defines the human mind as comprising innate and domain-specific information-processing mechanisms that were designed to solve specific evolutionary problems of our Pleistocene past. Yet it is argued here that evolutionary psychology’s assumptions regarding the mind are often inconsistent with the neurobiological evidence; biological constraints may place limits on the kinds of hypotheses that can be made within a theoretical framework that wants to remain true to the known properties and functions of the human nervous system. Evolutionary psychology’s assumptions regarding our innate biology also shape their treatment of culture and learning in ways that may inaccurately reflect true experience–neurodevelopmental interactions. It is suggested that the mind can be adequately understood and its activities properly explained without hypothetical appeal to countless genetically pre-specified psychological programs, and in a way that remains consistent with both our neurobiology and neo-Darwinian evolution.
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