Abstract
This paper argues that the prevailing theories, models, and explanations of contemporary psychology, in large part because they reflect the assumptions of reductive naturalism, provide an understanding of our human being such that aspiration—to the higher, the more noble, and the more meaningful—becomes not only unreasonable, but impossible. Indeed, such thinking in the discipline marks the death of aspiration. The paper further argues, following the work of Unamuno, Levinas, and Marion, that genuine aspiration is possible and reasonable only in the context of a temporal continuity of the soul, the existence of an other to whom we are obligated, and the possibility of loving with no expectation of reciprocity. Such a context, in turn, is possible only under a particular set of assumptions about our human being that operate on the ontological level. These assumptions, which include that we are innately possessed of meaningful intelligence, that we can, in fact, anticipate temporal continuity, that we are moral agents inhabiting a moral world, and that we are capable of genuine human intimacy, are presented as an alternative starting point for a psychology which does more than toll the death of aspiration.
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