Although the theoretical foundations of construct validity theory have been fairly well described, there remains equivocation over what should properly be taken to be its philosophical underpinnings, with some characterizing it as an essentially positivist enterprise, others identifying a realist philosophy underlying the theory, and others still characterizing its foundations as containing elements of both positivist and realist thinking. This paper summarizes recent work representing each of these three different stances on the philosophical foundations of construct validity theory. Explicit connections are drawn between the work of Herbert Feigl—who pioneered a philosophy of science whose roots lay in logical positivism, but which contained notably realist overtones—and early specifications of construct validity theory. Finally, an appeal is made for a realist interpretation of construct validity theory based both on the connections between early articulations of the theory and key Feiglian ideas and also on Cronbach and Meehl’s later reflections on the origins of their influential work.
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