Not all empirical work in the psychology of perception has operated explicitly within a theoretical framework. But when it has, that framework has usually been provided by the inferential theory of perception. I argue that in spite of its explanatory strengths, the inferential theory of perception conceals a well-established empirical phenomenon. That phenomenon is known in ordinary parlance as ‘familiarity’. I discuss why the inferential theory of perception cannot deal with familiarity and what it reveals about the limits of the inferential theory of perception.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1981). Comments on Professor R.L. Gregory’s paper on perception. In G. E. M. Anscombe , (Ed.), The collected papers of G.E.M. Anscombe (Vol. 2, pp. 64-70). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press . (Original work published 1971.)
2.
Brooks, R. (1999). Cambrian intelligence: The early history of the new A.I. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press .
3.
Churchland, P. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press .
4.
Coren, S. , & Girgus J. (1978). Seeing is deceiving: The psychology of visual illusions. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum .
5.
Coren, S. , Girgus, J. , & Day, R. (1973). Visual spatial illusions: Many explanations . Science, 179, 503-504 .
6.
Dennett, D. (1989). Reflections: About aboutness. In D. Dennett (Ed.), The intentional stance (pp. 203-211). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press . (Original work published 1987.)
7.
Dewey, J. (1896). The reflex arc concept in psychology . Psychological Review, 3, 357-370 .
8.
Duhem, P. (1981). The aim and structure of physical theory. New York: Atheneum . (Original work published 1914.)
9.
Eliasmith, C. (1998). The third contender: A critical examination of the dynamicist theory of cognition. In P. Thagard (Ed.), Mind readings (pp. 303-334). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press .
10.
Fodor, J. (1980). The language of thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press .
11.
Fodor, J. (1984). The modularity of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press .
12.
Fodor, J. (1985). Précis of The modularity of mind . Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8, 1-5 .
13.
Fodor, J. (1987). Psychosemantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press .
14.
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press .
15.
Gibson, J. (1966). The senses considered as perceptual systems. New York: Houghton Mifflin .
16.
Goldfield, E. (1995). Emergent forms: Origins and early development of human action and perception. New York: Oxford University Press .
17.
Goldstein, E. B. (2001). Sensation and perception. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth .
18.
Gregory, R. (1974a). Comments on the inappropriate constancy scaling theory of illusions and its implications. In R. Gregory (Ed.), Concepts and mechanisms of perception (pp. 350-356). New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons .
19.
Gregory, R. (1974b). Distortion of visual space as inappropriate constancy scaling. In R. Gregory (Ed.), Concepts and mechanisms of perception (pp. 342-349). New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons .
20.
Gregory, R. (1974c). Recovery from early blindness: A case study. In R. Gregory (Ed.), Concepts and mechanisms of perception (pp. 65-129). New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons .
21.
Gregory, R. (1997). Knowledge in perception and illusion . Philosophical Transactions, Royal Society, London B, 352, 1121-1128 .
22.
Gregory, R. (1998). Eye and brain (5th ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton Science Library .
23.
Held, R. (1965). Plasticity in sensory-motor systems . Scientific American, 213, 84-94 .
24.
Hoffman, D. (1998). Visual intelligence. New York: Norton .
25.
Kelso, J. A. S. (1997). Dynamic patterns: The self-organization of brain and behavior. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press .
26.
Kersten, D. , & Yuille, A. (2003). Bayesian models of object perception . Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 13, 150-158 .
27.
Kuhn, T. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press .
28.
Lakatos, I. (1980). The methodology of scientific research programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
29.
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A computational investigation into the human representation and processing of visual information. New York: W.H. Freeman .
30.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul .
31.
Newell, A. , & Simon, H. (1997). Computer science as empirical inquiry: Symbols and search. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design II (pp. 81-110). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press . (Original work published 1975.)
32.
Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press .
33.
Pylyshyn, Z. (1986). Computation and cognition: Toward a foundation for cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press .
34.
Quine, W. V. O. (1961). Two dogmas of empiricism. In W. V. O. Quine (Ed.), From a logical point of view. New York: Harper & Row . (Original work published 1951.)
35.
Robinson, J. O. (1972). The psychology of visual illusion. London: Hutchinson .
36.
Rock, I. (1983). The logic of perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press .
37.
Salmon, W. (1989). Four decades of scientific explanation. In P. Kitcher & W. Salmon (Eds.), Scientific explanation (pp. 3-219). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press .
38.
Simon, H. (1996). The sciences of the artificial (3rd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press .
39.
Sterelny, K. (1986). The imagery debate . Philosophy of Science, 53, 560-583 .
40.
Tye, M. (1991). The imagery debate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press .
41.
Van Gelder, T. (1995a). It’s about time: An overview of the dynamical approach to cognition. In R. Port & T. Van Gelder (Eds.), Mind as motion: Explorations in the dynamics of cognition (pp. 1-44). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press .
42.
Van Gelder, T. (1995b). What might cognition be, if not computation?Journal of Philosophy, 92, 345-381 .
43.
von Altrock, C. (1995). Fuzzy logic and neurofuzzy applications explained. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall .
44.
Wittgenstein, L. (1963). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Blackwell .
