This is a short response to a particular point made by our colleagues Wes Sharrock and Jeff Coulter in their otherwise convincing and devastating critique of the ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) avatar of cognitivism. We think they may have misunderstood what we once said about the use of ‘mental predicates’ and wish to clarify the point in question.
Bilmes, J. (1992). Referring to internal occurrences: A reply to Coulter . Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 22, 253–262 .
2.
Coulter, J. (1983). Rethinking cognitive theory. New York: St Martin's Press .
3.
McHoul, A. , & Rapley, M. (2003). What can psychological terms actually do? (Or: if Sigmund calls, tell him it didn’t work) . Journal of Pragmatics, 35, 507–522 .
4.
Sharrock, W. , & Coulter, J. (2004). ToM: A critical commentary . Theory & Psychology, 14, 579–600 .
5.
Sacks, H. (1970). Aspects of the sequential organization of conversation. Unpublished book manuscript.
