Abstract
This article examines a portion of the theory about and research on `race' in the field of psychology. Specifically, we examine whether the construct of `race' can be used efficaciously as a natural kind variable that explains data in psychological inquiry. The foregoing consideration involves an exploration of the so-called `biological/genetic' bases of `race' from the conceptual paradigms of (a) mutual exclusivity and inalterablity and (b) gradations on a continuum of genetic data. Our critique of these positions suggests an abdication of `race' as a natural kind variable because both of the above arguments for the concept are ultimately incoherent given the genetic data that they seek to explain. Consequently, `race' as a natural kind variable cannot explain psychological data. However, because the idea of `race' has become diffused into societies, `race' should be studied as a purely cognitive concept that influences social perception.
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