Is the EU evolving towards a Re-Insurance Union? The creation of SURE, an EU financial tool to support national short-time work (STW) schemes in the midst of the pandemic, has revitalized debates on fiscal stabilizers as a means to counter economic downturns and protect jobs within the European Union. Drawing from document analyses and 17 interviews with EU and national stakeholders, this study explores the politics underpinning SURE’s adoption following a decade of heated and unsuccessful debates on the European Unemployment Reinsurance Scheme (EURS). Through the lens of ‘purposeful opportunism’, the article illustrates how the European Commission leveraged prior EURS insights and the emerging consensus on STW schemes to craft SURE in a way which addressed national concerns about EU-wide welfare harmonization, while positioning the EU as a holding environment for national welfare states. Looking ahead, making SURE a permanent ‘second line of defence’ against macroeconomic shocks could contribute to further substantiating new, EU-wide, social rights codified in the European Pillar of Social Rights.
AlcidiCCortiF (2022) The EU response to Covid-19: breaking old taboos? In: VanherckeBSpasovaS (eds) Social Policy in the European Union: State of Play 2021. Brussels: ETUI and OSE, 39–60.
2.
BaumgartnerFJonesB (1991) Agenda dynamics and policy subsystems. The Journal of Politics53: 1044–1074.
3.
BulmerS (1983) Domestic politics and European community policy-making. Journal of Common Market Studies21: 349–363.
4.
CamisãoIGuimarãesM (2017) The Commission, the single market and the crisis: the limits of purposeful opportunism. Journal of Common Market Studies55(2): 223–239.
5.
CohenMDMarchJGOlsenJP (1972) A garbage can model of organizational choice. Administrative Science Quarterly17: 1–25.
6.
CortiF (2022) The Politicisation of Social Europe: Conflict Dynamics and Welfare Integration. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
7.
CortiFOunnasARuiz de la OssaT (2023) Job retention schemes between the Great Recession and the Covid-19 crises – does the institutional design affect the take up? An EU-27 cross-country comparison. In: CEPS In-Depth Analysis. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
8.
CramL (1994) The European Commission as a multi-organization: social policy and IT policy in the EU. Journal of European Public Policy1(2): 195–217.
9.
CrespyAMenzG (2015) Commission entrepreneurship and the debasing of social Europe before and after the eurocrisis. Journal of Common Market Studies53(4): 753–768.
10.
CroonenborghsK (2022) The European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE) – an innovative (social) approach to EU financial assistance under the treaty. In: UtrillaDShabbirA (eds) EU Law in Times of Pandemic. Madrid: EU Law Live Press.
11.
De GrauweP (2020) Economics of the Monetary Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
European Commission (2017) Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union. Brussels: European Commission.
14.
European Commission (2020) Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Establishment of a European Instrument for Temporary Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) Following the COVID-19 Outbreak. Brussels: European Commission. COM/2020/139 final.
15.
European Commission (2023) SURE after its Sunset: Final Bi-annual Report. Brussels: European Commission.
16.
European Parliament (2019) Report on Employment and Social Policies of the Euro Area. 2019/2111(INI). Strasbourg: European Parliament.
17.
GenschelPJachtenfuchsM (2018) From market integration to core state powers: the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis and integration theory. Journal of Common Market Studies56(1): 178–196.
18.
GenschelPJachtenfuchsM (2021) Postfunctionalism reversed: solidarity and rebordering during the Covid-19 pandemic. Journal of European Public Policy28(3): 350–369.
19.
HemerijckAHuguenot-NoëlR (2022) Resilient Welfare States in the European Union. Newcastle: Agenda Publishing.
20.
Huguenot -NoëlR (2023) ‘Cash for Reforms’ in the EU after the RRF: Can Cohesion Benefit? Academic Paper for the Group of High-Level Specialists on the Future of Cohesion Policy. Brussels: European Commission.
21.
Huguenot-NoëlRCortiF (2023) EU employment policy and social citizenship (2009–2022): an inclusive turn after the social pillar?Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research29(2): 185–201.
22.
ItalianerAVanheukelenM (1993) Proposals for community stabilization mechanisms: some historical applications. In: ‘The Economics of Community Public Finance’, European Economy, reports and studies. Brussels: European Commission, Vol. 5.
23.
KingdonJW (1995) Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. 2nd edn.New York: HarperCollins.
24.
LehnerTWasserfallenF (2019) Political conflict in the reform of the Eurozone. European Union Politics20(1): 45–64.
25.
MajocchiAReyM (1993) A special financial support scheme in EMU: need and nature. Rivista di Diritto Finanziario e Scienza delle Finanze52(2): 161–204.
26.
MarjolinR (1975) Report of the Study Group ‘Economic and Monetary Union 1980’. European Commission. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General of Economic and Financial Affairs. Available at:https://aei.pitt.edu/1009/1/monetary_study_group_1980.pdf(accessed 21 February 2024).
27.
McDonnellCBoussardJJustoI, et al. (2022) The SURE Instrument: an updated assessment. In: Quarterly Report on the Euro Area (QREA) 21. Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN). European Commission: 29–40.2
28.
MiróJKyriaziANatiliM, et al. (2023) Buffering national welfare states in hard times: the politics of EU capacity-building in the social policy domain. In: Social Policy and Administration. DOI: 10.1111/spol.12979
29.
MüllerTSchultenTDrahokoupilJ (2022) Job retention schemes in Europe during the Covid-19 pandemic – different shapes and sizes and the role of collective bargaining. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research28(2): 247–265.
30.
MundellR (1961) A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. The American Economic Review 51. American Economic Association, 657–665.
31.
Pisani-FerryJItalianerALescureR (1993) ‘Stabilization properties of budgetary systems: a simulation analysis'. In: The Economics of Community Public Finance’, European Economy, reports and studies. Brussels: European Commission.
32.
RhodesM (1995) A regulatory conundrum: industrial relations and the social dimension. In: LeibfriedSPiersonP (eds) European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
33.
RossG (1995) Jacques Delors and European Integration. Oxford: Polity Press.
ScheinertC (2019) European Investment Stabilisation Function (EISF), Briefing, EU Legislation in Progress 2021-2027 MFF. Brussels: European Parliament.
36.
SchelkleW. (2014) The insurance potential of a non-optimal currency area. In: CrammeOlafHoboltSaraB. (eds). Democratic Politics in a European Union Under Stress. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 137–154.
37.
SchelkleW (2017) The Political Economy of Monetary Solidarity: Understanding the Euro Experiment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
VandenbrouckeF (2023) On the benefits of solidarity, national and European. In: AranguizABednarowicBQueneM, et al. (eds) Pioneering Social Europe. Liber Amicorum Herwig Verschueren. Bruges: Die Keure.
40.
VandenbrouckeFLuigjesCNicoliF, et al. (2020) The European Commission’s SURE Initiative and Euro Area Unemployment Re-insurance, VoxEU, 6 April. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
41.
VesanPCortiF (2021) The return of the commission social entrepreneurship before and after the COVID-19 pandemic. Journal of European Integration44(2): 1–16.
42.
VesanPCortiFSabatoS (2021) The European Commission’s entrepreneurship and the social dimension of the European semester: from the European pillar of social rights to the covid-19 pandemic. Comparative European Politics19: 277–295.
43.
ZahariadisN (2008) Ambiguity and choice in European public policy. Journal of European Public Policy15(4): 514–530.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
