Multi-agent behavior strategy game and evolutionary simulation analysis under environmental regulation

Abstract

To avoid severe environmental pollution, the government actively implements environmental regulation (ER) to ensure that enterprises carry out green innovation (GI), and the public participation in supervision has become an important part of the process of environmental governance. In this study, we incorporated the three parties of enterprise, government, and public into one framework and constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model. On this basis, combined with the system dynamics simulation, the behavioral strategy selection and influencing factors of the tripartite agents were analyzed. The results indicate that no matter what the initial strategy of the enterprise, government, or the public is, after a continuous evolutionary game, the three parties will reach a stable and balanced state, that is enterprises carry out GI, governments implement ER, and the public participates in supervision. Whether the government implements ER has a great impact on the enterprises’ decision-making. The public's strategic choices have no obvious influence on the governments’ strategies. Notably, GI costs and government subsidies and fines are the main factors that affect the enterprises’ GI initiatives. Government subsidies are suitable for short-term and appropriate subsidies. Finally, we proposed strategies that could optimize the management processes of ER, while ensuring the effective contributions of enterprises, governments, and the public in a seamless manner. Our study can be used as a reference for the implementation of effective ER and serve policymakers in decision-making, to promote sustainable development at a regional and global scale.