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Abstract

It is widely assumed that people will share inaccurate gossip for their own selfish purposes. This assumption, if true, presents a challenge to the growing body of work positing that gossip is a ready source of accurate reputational information and therefore is welfare improving. We tested this inaccuracy assumption by examining the frequency and form of spontaneous lies shared between gossiping members of networks playing a series of one-shot trust games (N = 320). We manipulated whether gossipers were or were not competing with each other. We showed that lies make up a sizeable minority of messages and are twice as frequent under gossiper competition. However, this had no discernible effect on trust levels. We attribute this to the findings that (a) gossip targets are insensitive to lies and (b) some lies are welfare enhancing. These findings suggest that lies need not prevent—and may help—gossip to serve reputational functions.

Keywords

gossip accuracy lies trust competition reciprocity open data open materials preregistered

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Truth,Lies,and Gossip

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