Abstract
A fundamental theme in Gilbert Meilaender’s work on bioethical issues is the relationship between the ethical claims of finitude (that is, the biological necessity that characterizes human beings as finite creatures) and of freedom (that is, the capacity of human beings to transcend biological necessity). This article identifies two ways in which Meilaender articulates this relationship (one Niebuhrian, the other Augustinian) and proposes a third (Barthian) way which avoids the limitations of the first two ways while serving Meilaender’s purpose, which is to redress what he sees as an imbalance in favor of the claims of freedom over those of finitude in contemporary biomedicine and bioethics. The article ends by suggesting that Meilaender’s purpose would be best served by avoiding tensions between finitude and freedom as the third way does.
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