Recent scholarship has considered the strategic actions taken by bureaucrats in response to the political environment, primarily related to regulatory activity. In this paper, we examine a new avenue of bureaucratic response to politics—tone shifts in annual reporting. Specifically, we use sentiment analysis to gauge shifts in bureaucratic language after a change in party control of government in U.S. states. Our sample includes the text of reports from higher education agencies in five states over an extended period. We argue bureaucrats modify the framing of policy issues to appeal to the perspective of the party in power. The results further the notion that bureaucratic actors are acutely aware of and reactive to their political surroundings in a variety of ways, adding to the literature about bureaucrats as strategic actors.
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