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Abstract

The study explores whether elected officials’ involvement in the way street-level bureaucrats implement policy affects social equity. This question is addressed empirically through interviews and focus groups with 84 Israeli educators and social workers. Findings indicate that elected officials involve themselves directly and indirectly in street-level bureaucrats’ policy implementation and their involvement reduces social equity in the provision of services. The study contributes to the literature on policy implementation by enabling a deeper understanding of the factors that shape the decision-making process of street-level bureaucrats when providing services and their ultimate impact on policy outcomes.

Keywords

Policy implementation politicians’ involvement social equity street-level bureaucrats

Introduction

Since Michael Lipsky’s (2010) groundbreaking work, numerous studies have addressed the factors that shape the discretion of street-level bureaucrats when implementing policies (Davidovitz, Cohen and Gofen 2021; Hupe, 2014; Jilke and Tummers, 2018), as well as investigated the implications of their work for promoting or reducing social equity (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2012). Studies emphasize the importance of factors that control the actions of street-level bureaucrats, such as managerial influences (Gassner and Gofen, 2018), socialization (Moyson et al., 2018) and supervisors (Keulemans and Groeneveld, 2020). Research has examined how political control shapes the discretion of street-level bureaucrats (May and Winter, 2009). However, the literature has not yet systematically addressed the possibility that elected officials’ involvement in policy implementation by street-level bureaucrats leads to a decline in social equity in the delivery of services.

There is broad consensus among public administration scholars that the public and political arenas should be distinct. It is the role of elected officials to design policies (Wilson, 1887) and the role of bureaucrats to implement them (Meyers and Vorsanger, 2007). Nevertheless, it has long been clear that there is considerable overlap between the two realms (Peters and Pierre, 2004). Political considerations influence bureaucrats’ behavior (Wood and Waterman, 1993) and affect those who operate at the street level (May and Winter, 2009).

Street-level bureaucrats are dominant players in the public service environment, with extensive discretion that allows them to influence significant aspects of citizens’ lives (de Boer, 2020; Davidovitz and Cohen, 2021; Lipsky, 2010; Lavee and Strier, 2019). Their decisions shape the distribution of resources in society and have a strong impact on social equity (Cárdenas and Ramírez de la Cruz, 2017; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2012). What is unclear is what happens when elected officials intervene in how street-level bureaucrats implement policy.

The goal of this study is to examine the involvement of elected officials in the practices of street-level bureaucrats, particularly how such involvement impacts social equity in the street level service delivery process. The underlying assumption is that when political considerations influence the discretion of street-level bureaucrats, the latter may favor certain groups of clients over others and impair the welfare of society (Keiser and Soss, 1998).

This issue is examined empirically through the case of Israeli education and social welfare providers, using in-depth semi-structured interviews and focus groups. The context is particularly relevant because it offers insight into the unique dynamics between political figures in local government and street-level organizations, from the perspective of front-line workers. It also allows us to investigate the impact of political involvement on policy outcomes as implemented on the street level.

Literature review

Interactions between politicians and bureaucrats

A long-standing discussion in the public administration literature is the link between politics and legislative processes on the one hand, and the administration of the resulting laws on the other (Meyers and Vorsanger, 2007). Traditionally, scholars have followed Woodrow Wilson (1887) in maintaining that there is a dichotomous distinction between the arenas. Politicians design policy, while bureaucrats implement it.

However, many scholars have disputed this. One of the most prominent was Luther Gulick (1955), who argued that it is impossible, impractical and unnecessary to create such a strong division. Gulick insisted that both worlds be differentiated in terms of specialization and the division of labor (Yang and Holzer, 2005). Criticism of the idea of a dichotomy between the worlds of politics and administration has been directed against Woodrow Wilson’s position on both positivist and normative levels. On the positivist-empirical level, researchers argue that political and administrative questions are indistinguishable; politicians interfere in administrative decisions, and administrative officials are involved in policy-making processes (Montjoy and Watson, 1995; Svara, 1985). On the normative level, researchers argue that the split between the two spheres is undesirable (Svara, 2008). The dichotomy model has been routinely rejected on empirical grounds (Svara, 1998). Specifically, in Israel, studies have demonstrated that there is a clear overlap (Cohen, 2015).

Scholars such as William Niskanen (1971) have discussed the inherent conflict in the interplay between politicians and bureaucrats. Niskanen’s budget-maximizing model claims that self-serving bureaucrats are motivated by the desire to increase their prestige and the budgets of their offices as much as possible. This model uses agency theory to indicate how public sector behavior breeds dysfunctionality (Pierre and Peters, 2017).

Perhaps the most prominent model for describing this interplay between politicians and bureaucrats is the principal–agent model, which focuses on the inherent conflict between the goals of bureaucrats (the agents) and politicians (the principals) (Meier and O’Toole, 2006). This model describes the fundamental problem that arises from imbalance in information between agents (experts with information) and principals (lacking information). Under such conditions, the bureaucrats (the experts) may use the information they possess to advance their interests at the expense of the politicians who have the authority (Garen, 1994). What results is a management problem: how can politicians control bureaucrats and make them utilize their expertise to serve the public (Arrow, 1985)?

Political involvement in street-level bureaucrats’ implementation of policy

Street-level bureaucrats are the public administration officials with the closest relationship to the public (Lipsky, 2010). Unlike other public officials, they have the power to decide how public policy should be delivered and how to tailor the policy as designed to the needs of clients (Edlins and Larrison, 2020; Goldman and Foldy, 2015; Golan-Nadir, 2020; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000).

Studies have shown that the decisions of street-level bureaucrats depend on a variety of considerations. Although Lipsky (2010) was doubtful about the ability of politicians to control the actions of street-level bureaucrats, given the hierarchical gulf separating them, some studies point to the interference of elected officials in street level bureaucratic decisions. In her study of the Social Security program, Lael Keiser (1999) found that while street-level bureaucrats act professionally, they also respond to local political pressures. Similarly, focusing on the enforcement of child support, Keiser and Soss (1998) reported that discretionary use of good cause exemptions was systematically influenced by the partisan control of the state governments.

According to Meyers and Vorsanger (2007), these findings only reflect indirect effects on the discretion of street-level bureaucrats. Winter (2003), in the Danish context, studying social policy on the integration of refugees and immigrants and regulatory policy on agroenvironmental issues, found that the influence of the municipality’s elected officials on street-level bureaucrats responsible for implementation of policies varied according to the degree of information asymmetry between them. Politicians had a greater effect on visible aspects of street-level bureaucrats’ behavior. The nature of the signals given by politicians also played a role.

May and Winter’s (2009) study was unique in noting the direct effects of elected politicians on the discretion of street-level bureaucrats, with reference to municipal caseworkers implementing employment policy in Denmark. They found that front-line employees were more willing to deviate from national goals when supported by local political executives. However, although political involvement certainly plays a role in the considerations of street-level bureaucrats when delivering services, it remains unclear whether the direct and indirect involvement of elected officials has implications for social equity in this process.

Social equity in the context of street-level bureaucrats

The concept of social equity began to gain importance in public administration scholarship and practice in the late 1960s. Centered on fair and just treatment, and the equitable distribution of benefits to society at large (Riccucci, 2009), social equity can range from elementary fairness and equal treatment to the narrowing of inequalities (Svara and Brunet, 2004). According to the National Academy of Public Administration, later cited by Gooden and Portillo (2011: i61–i62), social equity is “the fair, just, and equitable management of all institutions serving the public directly or by contract, the fair and equitable distribution of public services and implementation of public policy, and the commitment to promote fairness, justice and equity in the formation of public policy.”

H. George Frederickson (1971, 1990), one of the most prominent scholars in this field, perceived social equity as the highest value in public administration. He argued that democracies fail or gradually harm disadvantaged minorities by systematic reverse discrimination (Frederickson and Hart, 1985). Rejecting the dichotomy between policy and administration, he claimed that administration is law in action. Given that public administrators are responsible for implementing laws and policies, they are always dealing with questions of fairness, justice and equality (Frederickson, 2005).

In the early years of implementing the concept of social equity in American public administration, ethical ideals guiding public administrators led them to believe that good, efficient economic management would result in the equitable distribution of programs for all citizens. However, administrators gradually came to realize that the effective dissemination of public programs applied only to certain citizens (Frederickson, 2005). Public administrators could no longer deny responsibility for practices that reduced fairness and equality.

Clearly social equity issues are particularly relevant when it comes to street-level bureaucrats, who have unique, broad-based autonomy in determining resource allocation between citizens, thereby influencing their chances in life (Lipsky, 2010). As Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2012: S16) noted, “Street-level workers’ judgments, decisions, and actions invoke questions of social equity.” Many scholars have pointed to street-level bureaucrats’ importance in creating or violating social equity when implementing policy (see e.g. Cárdenas and Ramírez de la Cruz, 2017).

Studies have demonstrated how street-level bureaucrats use their discretion to assist clients, sometimes even at personal risk, bending or breaking rules to improve client well-being (Davidovitz and Cohen, 2021; Fleming, 2020). Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2000) identified two narratives that characterize the discretion of street-level bureaucrats: (1) citizen agents and (2) state agents. In interviewing hundreds of street-level bureaucrats, they demonstrated that although most researchers considered street-level bureaucrats to be state agents strictly enforcing rules and regulations, in practice, citizen agent more accurately described the nature of their work. Street-level bureaucrats were more likely to be altruistic public servants working tirelessly to improve client well-being.

However, some studies indicate that they may violate social equity and discriminate against certain citizens (White et al., 2015) when making decisions. To deal with their workloads and minimize conflicts, they stereotype clients, dividing them into social categories (Davidovitz and Cohen, 2020; Raaphorst et al., 2018). They create a hierarchy to determine which client is more worthy of an investment in goods and services (Keulemans and Van de Walle, 2020). When distributing services, they decide whom to prioritize and provide with personal resources to improve their well-being (Lavee 2020).

Often these actions and choices are in response to organizational or environmental conditions (Lavee, Cohen and Nouman, 2018). As Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2012) have shown, street-level bureaucrats must deal with the tension between realistic demands and the requirements of social justice. They are less likely to implement policies that do not accord with their values (Tummers et al., 2012). Moreover, the political culture may diffuse throughout the street-level bureaucrats’ organization causing resources to be allocated unequally (Cohen, 2018).

Political culture may be characterized by clientelism and patronage (Piattoni, 2001), where the main motivation driving the politician’s actions is to maximize his/her chances of being elected (Dunlevy, 1992). Politicians, who may provide material election support (Stokes, 2007) or use an appointment to reward those who help them keep their job (Piattoni, 2001), operate out of a completely different set of considerations than do bureaucrats. The inherent divergences in the interests of each of the parties may result in a different approach to issues relating to social equity. It may shape behavior in a way that will be expressed in the environment of street level service delivery.

Research proposition

Building on the above literature, the current study focuses on how political involvement, as part of the organizational environment in which street-level bureaucrats operate, plays a role in their decisions and impacts social equity.

In line with studies that point to the direct and indirect involvement of politicians in street-level bureaucrats’ policy implementation (Keiser, 1999; May and Winter, 2009), we focus on both types of involvement. Direct involvement occurs when a political figure contacts a street-level bureaucrat or the bureaucrat’s organizational manager with the aim of intervening in the implementation process. Indirect involvement occurs when a political figure contacts a bureaucratic entity that does not belong to the street-level bureaucrats’ organization (e.g. the head of the municipality’s education or social welfare department) with the aim of intervening in the implementation process.

We propose that, when elected officials are directly or indirectly involved in the implementation process, this will impact social equity in the delivery of services.

The context: Israeli education and social welfare providers

Israel is a developed welfare state with an extensive set of social institutions responsible for promoting social goals (Gal, 2017). However, in Israel (Cohen, Benish and Shamriz-Ilouz, 2016) as in many Western countries (Brodkin, 2012), the development of the welfare state has stalled in recent decades, partly due to New Public Management reforms, which have fundamentally changed the public service environment. In the areas of social welfare and education in Israel, there has subsequently been a demand for public agencies to view citizens as clients (Vigoda-Gadot and Meiri, 2008), improve transparency and customer service, and respond to the increasing demands of citizens, professionals, politicians and other stakeholders (Fountain, 2001; Hood, 1995).

In Israel, 257 local authorities are divided into four functionally and legally different structures (77 municipalities, 124 local councils, 54 regional councils and 2 local industrial councils). The 1975 Local Authorities Law stipulated that the head of the local authority (in cities and local councils) would be elected directly by the residents. The legislation gives the head of the authority all the decision-making powers and responsibility for its functioning. This has crucially affected the relationship between the central and local government by giving the latter great freedom of action and autonomy (Cohen, 2019; Levi, 2014).

However, the relationship between local and central governments in Israel tends to be closer when compared to Western European and North American countries. Local government is responsible for the provision of services, but it is directly subject to the guidelines and approvals of the Ministry of the Interior and other central government ministries (Cohen, 2019; Levi, 2014).

The local authority is composed of democratically elected individuals from a list/faction/party. The head is elected directly. The local authority hires employees to serve in various positions. Appointment of senior statutory officials requires a public tender; candidates must have relevant education, proven employment experience, recommendation of the local authority selection committee, and approval of the council members. The CEO or Secretary of the Council is a special case. It is a statutory role; the candidate must be chosen by tender, be recommended by the local authority’s selection committee, and have the approval of the head of the authority (Beeri, 2014).

The 1958 Social Welfare Act made local authorities responsible for the provision of social services (Doron, 2001). Hence, Israeli social workers serve as professionals in local municipalities that provide social welfare services, while financially supported and regulated by local and national governments. They service individuals, families, social groups and communities in distress, as well as the indigent, children with special needs, victims of domestic violence and the elderly (Weiss-Gal et al., 2020). Israeli social workers also work with non-profit organizations and private groups that provide services in various quasi-market arrangements (Weiss-Gal et al., 2020).

Israeli education is centralized: the Ministry of Education is in charge of the financial, organizational, pedagogical, administrative and structural elements of the system (Gaziel, 1994). While the ethos of equality and unity was dominant when the state was established (Nir et al., 2016), in recent years, neoliberal ideas of privatization and competition have created more flexible options for urban schools. As citizens demand the right to choose their children’s school, municipal education authorities gain in power. Urban schools compete for students, and open enrollment and school choice have become common (Shaked and Schechter, 2014). Consequently, many agents, including the mayor, citizens and business players, who previously had no part in the educational environment, now play a significant role. Local politics are increasingly a factor in the schools and influence the professional considerations of the faculty (Oplatka, 2015).

Method

Research design

The study applies a qualitative constructivist approach, enabling us to uncover participants’ experiences, attitudes and perceptions in their natural environment and the meaning they ascribe to them (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008). Using in-depth, semi-structured interviews and focus groups, we examined the involvement of elected officials in the implementation practices of street-level bureaucrats, as well as whether such involvement affected social equity.

Specifically, we examined the views of two groups of Israeli social service providers: teachers and social workers. Our choice of these two groups is particularly relevant, because most of our participants operate in the political environment of the local government, thereby allowing for close examination of the interplay between political considerations and organizational dynamics. These social service providers are considered classic street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010), who interact with clients on a daily basis and whose decisions have a powerful effect on their clients’ lives. These front-line employees operate in environments characterized by a dearth of resources and multiple pressures. Attempting to meet the demands of both their clients and their organizations, they tend to allocate resources selectively to different clients (Brodkin, 2012).

In-depth interviews

Between July 2019 and March 2020, we interviewed 62 street-level bureaucrats (30 teachers and 32 social workers). Using convenience sampling, we recruited participants according to their professional role and their affiliation with organizations that implement public policies. We presented the study as one that examines how public administration employees deal with their clients, their attitudes about the policies they are required to implement, and their relationship with their managers. Almost all potential participants we contacted agreed to take part in the study. The interviewed teachers taught a variety of subjects at different grade levels and the social workers operated in diverse areas of practice (Supplementary Table identifies the interviewees by number and describes the nature of their work). With the exception of seven interviews conducted by telephone due to COVID-19 restrictions, interviews were face-to-face. All interviews were recorded and transcribed by the authors.

We asked respondents to describe the factors that influence their decision-making process when delivering services to clients, with a particular focus on the involvement of managers and politicians. The following questions served as a guideline in the interviews: Have public officials ever become involved in your work? Did this involvement affect your ways of dealing with clients? Can you explain how? Have you ever prioritized one client over another because of political involvement? Can you explain why you did it? Did you ever bend or break rules in your job because of political involvement? Can you explain why you chose to do so? Have public officials ever become involved in your work in a way that influenced social equity? Can you describe how it happened? Have your dealings with clients been affected by this involvement? Can you describe how? How did you feel about this involvement?

Focus groups

We conducted two hour-long focus group sessions, one with 12 social workers and the other with 10 teachers. All participants interacted daily with clients and implemented public policy in organizations operating under the authority of the local government. The goal in using focus groups was to cross-check the data collected during the interviews and discuss the issues with a group. We tried to learn about the factors that influence, and the organizational dynamics that play a role in the participants’ decision-making process, the feasibility of the emergence of political involvement in their work, and how political pressures affected their delivery of services.

Analytical procedure

We utilized the theory-based open-coding approach (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), using ATLAS.ti software (8th ed.). The data analysis was performed while constantly comparing an inductive and deductive circular analysis process (Glaser and Strauss, 2017) The process was divided into three stages that helped us analyze the data, conceptualize it, and rebuild it. In the first stage (open coding) we checked the transcripts of the interviews and focus groups, reading each of the transcripts several times to allow the data to emerge without reliance on presuppositions. At this point we created the initial codes by comparing participants’ statements and classifying them into groups. For example, when one of the participants mentioned: “A city councilor asks what can be done for this family, and that very client jumps to the top of the priority list”, we classified this statement as a politician who asks a street-level bureaucrat to give priority to a particular client. When a participant stated: “I myself approved a certificate of social excellence for certain students because the mayor called me himself and asked me to do so”, it was classified as a street-level bureaucrat who bend rules due to a politician’s request.

In the second stage (axial coding) we grouped our codes into categories. At this point we classified all statements indicating the involvement of politicians in the implementation processes as active or indirect. For example, a participant’s statement: “to ‘solve the problem,’ ‘to provide material assistance’, was classified as indirect political involvement intended to influence policy implementation. In addition, we grouped together each participant’s statement referring to political involvement that led to unjust and unfair acts and classified it as political involvement leading to violation of social equity. We matched our data to the definition of social equity to ensure that the participants’ reports of a violation were in accordance with the definition of the term proposed by Gooden and Portillo (2011: i61–i62) as “the fair, just, and equitable management of all institutions serving the public directly or by contract, the fair and equitable distribution of public services and implementation of public policy, and the commitment to promote fairness, justice and equity in the formation of public policy.” For example, a participant’s statement: “I am hurt by these situations on a personal level. I did not give equal treatment to all my students”, was classified as political involvement leading to violation of social equity.

In the last stage (selective coding) we created connections between core categories in order to formulate the central thesis of our research. The involvement of politicians in the implementation processes was classified as direct or indirect in its effect on social equity violation in the provision of street level services.

Since we are aware of the challenge of determining the validity of qualitative research in terms of description, interpretation of data and constructing a theory (Whittemore et al., 2001), we took a number of safeguarding steps. To deal with the challenge of interpreting the data, all interviews were recorded, transcribed and reread several times and field notes were written during and directly following each interview. In order to ensure inter-coder reliability, the data were coded by the two authors and discussed till agreement was reached on any differences that arose in the coding process.

Findings

Political involvement in street-level bureaucrats’ implementation of policy

The study findings indicate that both direct and indirect political involvement tend to have an impact on street-level bureaucrats’ policy implementation, reducing social equity in this process.

Indirect involvement intended to influence policy implementation

In terms of indirect intervention efforts of politicians, participants reported that political officeholders in local government tried to influence policy implementation behind the scenes. They described how politicians guided senior bureaucrats, such as the heads of the education and welfare departments of the municipality in this effort. For example, one of the interviewees mentioned how she received an instruction from the director of the welfare department (who is subordinate to the mayor) to “solve the problem,” “to provide material assistance” (social worker, interviewee 15).

There’s a student here whom we wanted to transfer to another school because he doesn’t get along at school and his parents aren’t ready to send him for treatment. We asked the superintendent to take care of it, but she wouldn’t transfer the child. Suddenly, two days later, the superintendent gave approval. I realized the mayor was involved (teacher, interviewee 28).

Participants also indicated that they are required to mediate and bridge the gap between political requests and professional requirements they view necessary for their clients’ welfare. For example, one of the interviewees emphasized how she is subject to political pressure and criticism from above and how she is required to overcome the gap between political and professional interests noting: “we need to mediate between the policy and the needs of the clients” (social worker, focus group).”

In addition, respondents reported indirect political pressures to implement policies that were outside their job definition, sometimes leading to role conflict: “There is a policy of distributing food baskets to those in need and we are required to implement it. It’s not in our job description at all. The political side is what dictates here” (social worker, focus group).

The “school climate” questionnaire is hard-core politics. A neighborhood is considered more prestigious when the educational establishment is ranked higher in the municipality. So we’re required to prepare students, be nice to them and share chocolate on the day of the questionnaire, just so the students rank the school high on the questionnaire (teacher, interviewee 24).

Direct involvement intended to influence policy implementation

The street-level bureaucrats described many situations in which they experienced direct political pressure to shape the implementation process: “There are cases where tasks come down directly from the mayor” (social worker, interviewee 25); “The mayor asked us to write someone [a letter of recommendation to receive a service]” (social worker, interviewee 27); “Sometimes we get direct inquiries from the mayor” (teacher, interviewee 1).

Participants described the unwritten contract of “give-and-take” between the organization’s manager (school principal or director of the welfare department) and politicians as a means allowing politicians to influence policy implementation. For instance:

The whole system is political … The politicians dictate that an average grade should not be less than 85. So, we make sure to do so. We are told to do this so that the eligibility percentage is high. It’s totally political; it’s the mayor’s demand (teacher, interviewee 24).

Sometimes guidelines are very focused and direct the street-level bureaucrats to use certain coping strategies to handle specific cases. For example, politicians give explicit instructions to the street-level bureaucrat to bend a rule to resolve a particular case or to prioritize a specific client when delivering services: “There are situations where we give applicants a negative answer, so they approach the mayor. Immediately afterwards, a directive comes down from the mayor that it is precisely this client who is to receive the [service]” (social worker, interviewee 13).

The interviewees pointed out that when there is an opening for a school principal, it is supposed to be publicly advertised so eligible candidates may apply and their credentials be evaluated. In practice however, the mayor chooses whomever he wants and therefore “The principal must meet the mayor’s expectations” (teacher, interviewee 24).

The impact of political involvement on social equity

While the study findings indicated that political involvement shapes the implementation process, some participants refused to go along with the politicians’ direct demands because they considered them illegitimate, unethical, and unjustly favoring certain clients over others: “Some clients come through the mayor. But that doesn’t really interest me. I don’t give them priority. They will receive service just like anyone else” (social worker, interviewee 27). Indeed, some street-level bureaucrats were even willing to risk their jobs by refusing to go against their conscience and obey the political guidelines: “When the deputy mayor asked us to write something fictitious for someone, I didn’t agree to write it. The system did not like my refusal, but I did not agree. It is illegal and unethical, and I won’t do it” (social worker, interviewee 10).

However, 23 out of 34 participants (68%) who described the occurrence of the phenomenon indicated that direct instructions from politicians led them to choose modes of action vis-a-vis their clients that clearly violated the concept of equal distribution of services. Our participants defined a violation of social equity as the provision of unequal service, both in the creation of an unjustified distinction between clients receiving the services, as well as injustice and unfairness in their delivery: “I am hurt by these situations on a personal level. I did not give equal treatment to all my students” (teacher, interviewee 18). “Children of parents who put pressure on the mayor are getting more. Even if it’s not fair, that’s what happens…” (social worker, focus group).

One of the most common requests was to prioritize certain clients over others:

“There are situations where we are told, ‘a city councilor asks what can be done for this family,’ and that very client jumps to the top of the priority list” (social worker, interviewee 2). “There are a lot of inquiries that come down from the top, from the deputy mayor or the mayor. They say you have to drop everything and give particular clients priority, so I give them priority” (social worker, interviewee 10). “I myself approved a certificate of social excellence for certain students because the mayor called me himself and asked me to do so” (teacher, interviewee 19). “When pressures are exerted from above, the emphasis is placed on a particular person who receives extra. We will approve things we would not approve for anyone else, even if it’s not justified” (social worker, interviewee 21).

Studies examining the prioritization process of street-level bureaucrats as a coping mechanism indicate that they use this method to make judicial assessments about their clients in order to determine priorities in providing services (e.g., Jilke and Tummers, 2018). In contrast, in the current study, it is precisely the directions from politicians that reduced the discretion participants could exercise to prioritize specific clients. The street-level bureaucrats resented these unexpected instructions that came down from the top and disrupted their daily work: “We give priority to people who have influence [over the mayor]. It infuriates me. I do this because last year one of the teachers was fired because of one mother who complained [to the municipality]” (teacher, interviewee 13).

The study findings also indicated that street-level bureaucrats are reluctantly forced to bend or break rules for some clients. Participants described how a top-down directive drives them to approve requests that would normally be rejected:

We have a club with a waiting list of kids trying to get in. We make the priorities. Usually, all of the children need to get in, but there are parents who come to the mayor every day, exerting pressure. Then, when the mayor presses us to put them in, we fold and do it even though, according to the guidelines, we’re not supposed to (social worker, focus group).

When the guideline comes from above, from political officeholders in the municipality, suddenly there is more flexibility and bending of rules and policies. It is very difficult for me. Suddenly, you can help the client. It greatly reduces my role with this person (social worker, interviewee 15).

I think students who do not come to school regularly for no good reason should be ineligible to go on the annual trip. They are also supposed to be ineligible to take tests in subjects where they missed classes without justification … but because of personal considerations from above or [political] pressures on the principal; we are obliged to reexamine whether to allow these students to go on the annual trip contrary to my initial evaluation (teacher, interviewee 1).

Participants pointed out that when they bent or broke rules it allowed them to meet their clients’ demands. However, it was the politicians who used the street-level bureaucrats to please the clients as a tool for mediating policy: “I gave preference to a specific client for a mentoring service. In the past, the manager said it was forbidden, but because she received a call from a senior municipal councilor, it was suddenly possible to do so” (social worker, interviewee 13).

The study findings also suggest that fear of political involvement drives street-level bureaucrats to provide unequal services, favoring clients who seem to have political influence. In these cases, it is not the involvement of elected officials that leads to decision-making regarding policy implementation, but the concern that they will interfere if the desired outcome does not occur: “The principal treats certain clients differently. She demands they be given priority and that we bend the rules to satisfy them. These are influential parents who can contact the mayor” (teacher, interviewee 13).

We cared for a boy here who is the grandchild of the supervisor. Demand from above forced us to treat him like he’s the center of the universe. I told them, I wish the battered child we were treating had such a grandmother; maybe they would be interested in him in the same way (social worker, interviewee 25).

Such instances reveal the extent to which political involvement plays a role in the implementation process and the degree to which concern for a politician’s reaction shapes the discretion of street-level bureaucrats.

The study participants described such political involvement as unjust, unfair and discriminatory. Well-connected clients have a greater ability to use their “voice” (Hirschman, 1970). They have direct channels to reach political figures, leading politicians to intervene in the implementation process in their favor. Political involvement reduces social equity by allowing clients with connections to obtain better, faster and preferred services than those who lack them:

Because someone shouts and goes above us, he will get preference over someone else who needs it more … we are behaving in an unfair way … It can put me in a position of helplessness - [the client asks] – “Why did he get it and I did not?” I cannot tell him ‘Because unlike you he has relatives in the municipality’ (social worker, interviewee 15).

Our findings show that this phenomenon is most common in the public service environment at the street level. Participants even reported to us how they sometimes encourage clients to adopt “voice” practices to get improved service:

Sometimes I feel like saying [to clients] - go to the mayor … I do not say this in practice because it is problematic. I cannot trust them [the clients] that they will not say I said it … but it’s totally okay in my opinion. This is the way to get what they want from the municipality (social worker, interviewee 23).

Are there any differences between teachers and social workers?

The comparison between the two groups (teachers and social workers) revealed no significant differences. Both reported occurrences of direct and indirect political involvement in implementation processes. In addition, participants from both groups noted that the involvement of politicians led to a violation of social equity in providing services to clients. Nevertheless, in most cases they were unable to oppose the instructions of their superiors.

Discussion

This study proposed that the direct and indirect involvement of elected officials in policy implementation would have implications for social equity in service delivery by street-level bureaucrats. The research findings confirm this proposition. While research has pointed to the effects of political control on the street-level implementation process (Keiser, 1999; Keiser and Soss, 1998; May and Winter, 2009; Meyers and Vorsanger, 2007), as well as the discretion of street-level bureaucrats in increasing or reducing social equity (Cárdenas and Ramírez de la Cruz, 2017; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2012), this is the first study to explore the implications of political involvement for social equity. By filling this gap, the present study makes two main contributions.

First, the current research contributes to literature on policy implementation by identifying the impact of political involvement on the decision-making process of street-level bureaucrats and its implications for policy outcomes. The findings suggest that political involvement tends to limit the ability of street-level bureaucrats to exercise discretion in policy implementation in a manner that benefits all.

Second, the study demonstrates the consequences of the direct and indirect political involvement of elected officials for social equity. Despite the large hierarchical distance between politicians and front-line employees in the public administration, the interference of the former in the decisions of the latter prioritizes certain individuals over others, impeding the fair distribution of public resources. This finding accords with studies that emphasize the importance of street-level bureaucrats in strengthening or reducing social equity (e.g. Cárdenas and Ramírez de la Cruz, 2017; Thomann and Rapp, 2018). Furthermore, our findings highlight how politicians reward clients for their voter support and maximize their chances of election through the infiltration of political culture into the implementation processes of street-level bureaucrats. As our study demonstrates, this political culture, which is characterized by clientelism and patronage (Grindle, 1977; Piattoni, 2001) seeps into the implementation practices of street-level bureaucrats, creates friction between them and politicians and clearly exposes the conflict of interest between the parties. As our findings illustrate, this conflict of interest, in turn, is expressed by our participants who voice disgust at this involvement of politicians in the implementation arena. Indeed, as previous studies show, culture and especially political culture is a major factor in street-level bureaucrats’ practices (Cohen, 2018).

The study findings reveal a paradox. Although on the surface, the interface between political figures and front-line workers indicates that they enjoy a direct, clear channel of communication, in practice it illustrates the conflict between the players. Policy implementation is a team effort that requires productive cooperation between politicians and bureaucrats in order to improve the welfare of all citizens.

Practical implications, limitations and future research directions

The study has practical implications for decision-makers and practitioners. Given that improving social equity is supposed to be a leading value among all levels of public servants, decision makers would do well to advise politicians of the consequences of their involvement in the practices of street-level bureaucrats. Oversight of politicians, especially in local government, could help reduce such involvement.

The research is not without limitations. First, given that it was the researchers who analyzed the data, there may have been bias in the meaning given to the findings. Second, conclusions may be limited as the study examined only two types of street-level bureaucrats – teachers and social workers – who operate under the authority of local government. The insights gained may not necessarily apply to other types of street-level bureaucrats, such as judges or tax officials who operate directly under the central government.

Future studies could examine whether and how political involvement affects additional variables, such as street-level bureaucrats’ motivation, willingness to implement policy and policy alienation. In addition, unlike street-level bureaucrats, who are at the bottom of the public administration hierarchy, politicians can see the broader picture. Additional research might also investigate the possibility that politicians’ involvement in the implementation process could actually improve policy outcomes. Furthermore, as previous studies demonstrate, street-level bureaucrats’ aversion to political involvement in implementation processes may lead them to distrust their regulators (Davidovitz and Cohen, 2021) and may have far-reaching implications for policy outcomes. Therefore, future research is needed to examine how phenomena such as clientelism and patronage derived from political culture (Grindle, 1977) play a role in the trust of street-level bureaucrats in government institutions, in their burnout, in public service motivation, as well as in their turnover intention.

Supplemental Material

sj-pdf-1-ppa-10.1177_09520767211024033 - Supplemental material for Politicians’ involvement in street-level policy implementation: Implications for social equity

Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-ppa-10.1177_09520767211024033 for Politicians’ involvement in street-level policy implementation: Implications for social equity by Maayan Davidovitz and Nissim Cohen in Public Policy and Administration

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Maayan Davidovitz

Nissim Cohen

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