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Abstract

Drawing on an original and unique survey data set of 243 medium- and big-sized firms operating in five sectors (energy, telecommunications, railways, airlines and postal services) and across 29 European countries, we analyse what incentivizes firms to interact with and influence multiple regulators. In so doing, we map the regulatory opportunity structure and scrutinize firms’ venue shopping logics. The study shows that firms can clearly identify where the locus of political and regulatory competence lies and that they concentrate their activities at this level. In particular, the data show that the national level is still the most important target level for regulatory representation. Regulatory venue shopping, the study illustrates, occurs when issues are highly salient, highly technical and when high stakes are involved. Notably, we show that firms tend to address more regulators in sectors characterized by higher international competitiveness to mitigate uncertainty when operating in multiple markets and facing rivalry from international competitors.

Keywords

Agencies business-government relations regulation venue shopping

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The logic of regulatory venue shopping: A firm’s perspective

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