The theoretical literature of interstate conflict is dominated by two conceptual models, classical deterrence theory and the spiral model. The fundamental tenet of classical deterrence theory is that credible and capable threats can prevent the initiation, and contain the escalation, of conflict. By contrast, proponents of the spiral model claim that the prescriptions associated with deterrence theory frequently lead to vicious cycles of reciprocated conflict.
According to Jervis `both sets of theorists fail to discuss the conditions under which their theories will not apply'. In this article we do just that, identifying and comparing the conditions associated with conflict spirals and with crisis stability, in the context of a game-theoretic escalation model with incomplete information. For the special case in which a challenger is likely willing to endure an all-out conflict, our analysis indicates that the conditions associated with successful deterrence, limited conflict, and escalated conflict are mutually exclusive.
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