Majority Voting with Bribes Does Not Eliminate Voting Cycles

Abstract

This paper shows that majority voting with bribes cannot generate voting cycles when voters' preferences are separable in alternatives and money. When preferences are not separable in alternatives and money, voting cycles are possible under majority voting with bribes.

Keywords

arrow logrolling majority voting voting paradox

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References

Miller, Nicholas (1987) `Voting', in John Eatwell et al. (eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 826-830. London: Macmillan.

Mueller, Dennis (1989) Public Choice II. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tullock, Gordon (1992) `Is There a Paradox of Voting?', Journal of Theoretical Politics 4: 225-230.