A common feature of the legislative process in several American legislatures - especially the US House - is the referral of legislation to multiple committees. Multiple referral calls into question traditional interpretations of committee power and thus warrants careful theoretical analysis. This paper uses a basic spatial model to analyze the impact that multiple referral has on committee proposal and gatekeeping power. After discussing several implications yielded by the model, the paper tests - and finds support for - the hypothesis that multiple referral increases obstruction.
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