Researchers know very little about the quest for internal power in the U.S. House of Representatives because the leadership climb takes place largely behind closed doors. The current article attempts to shed some light on the heretofore little-known process by focusing on one aspect of this climb that actually is public: legislators' decisions to make contributions from their so-called leadership political action committees. In contrast with much of the extant literature, the data show that leadership-minded legislators carefully consider the ideological positions of potential recipients of their help when deciding how to distribute their campaign contributions. I also show that parties, when they use the right tools, can harness the ambition of leadership-minded legislators to the benefit of the party as a whole.
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