The circumstances of the author's discovery of the median voter theorem and the steps which led from there to his Theory of Committees and Elections are set out. His theory is presented in the form of the `statistical thesis' that the best choice procedure selects the option which `on average' is highest on the committee members' schedules. As there is more than one concept of average, so there is more than one acceptable committee procedure. The author's way of proceeding is compared and contrasted with Arrow's.
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2.
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3.
Black, Duncan
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4.
Black, Duncan
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5.
Black, Duncan
(1958) The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6.
Black, Duncan
(1969) `On Arrow's Impossibility Theorem', Journal of Law and Economics12: 227-248.
7.
Black, Duncan
and Newing, R.A. (1951) Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation. Glasgow: William Hodge.
8.
Coase, R.H.
(1937) `The Nature of the Firm', Economica, N.S.IV: 386-405. Reprinted in G.J. Stigler and K.E. Boulding (eds) Readings in Price Theory, pp. 331-51. London: Allen & Unwin 1953.
9.
Goodman, Leo A.
(1954) `On Methods of Amalgamation', in R.M. Thrall, C.H. Coombs and R.L. Davis (eds) Decision Processes, pp. 39-48. New York: Wiley.
10.
Ross, W.D.
(1930) The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
11.
Rothenberg, Jerome
(1961) The Measurement of Social Welfare. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
12.
Sen, A.K.
(1970) Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd.
