We consider a politician's choice of whether to be evaluated, either by subjecting himself to a detailed interview or by asking for the appointment of a special prosecutor. If politicians are risk-neutral, then in equilibrium all choose to be evaluated. If politicians are risk-averse, then whether when they do or do not know the quality of their own actions, stable equilibria may exist in which politicians can avoid evaluation, or prefer evaluation by a body which can poorly discriminate between good and bad actions. The ability of voters to distinguish between good and bad politicians may therefore be limited.
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