The strategies of centralization and politicization have long served as a foundation for presidential influence over federal policymaking. However, most previous work has studied these strategies informally and/or in isolation. This article employs formal models of both centralization and politicization to explore the trade-offs presidents face when deciding how to create and influence policy. The models present several unique findings. First, contrary to existing literature, the president’s ideal level of politicization is not monotonically increasing in ideological distance between the president and agency, but, after initially growing, is replaced by centralization. Second, congressional veto threats can exert substantial influence on the centralization/politicization decision apart from altering agency ideology. Finally, in a model that focuses on oversight of policy implementation, centralization and politicization serve as strict substitutes. More generally, the model illustrates how the joint examination of presidential tools can reshape our understanding of presidential actions.
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