Abstract
In sequential primaries, fair representation of the electorate may be undermined by the New Hampshire effect. Simultaneous primaries address fair representation, as there is no New Hampshire effect, but may increase expenditures. We analyze these issues by studying heterogeneity in sequential and simultaneous contests. The nature of heterogeneity is crucial. If a player is stronger in every battle, then expenditures in sequential contests are smaller than in simultaneous ones, in line with the existing literature, and the stronger player is more likely to win in sequential than simultaneous contests. If players’ advantages alternate across battles, for sufficiently large advantages, expenditures in sequential contests are greater than in simultaneous ones, and the player who has the advantage later in sequential contests is more likely to win: dynamics affect representation. We interpret our results in light of the candidates’ advantages due to the different demographic composition of states and discuss novel testable implications.
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