Why are some states open to talking while fighting while others are not? We argue that a state considering opening negotiations is concerned not only with the adverse inference that the opposing state will draw, but also the actions that the opposing state might take in response to that inference. We use a formal model, with assumptions grounded in extensive historical evidence, to highlight one particular response to opening negotiations—the escalation of war efforts—and one particular characteristic of the state opening negotiations—its resilience to escalation. We find that states are willing to open negotiations under two conditions: when their opponents find escalation too costly, and when there is a signal of high resilience that only the highly resilient care to use. To illustrate the dynamics of the second condition, we offer an extended case study detailing North Vietnam’s changing approach to negotiations during the Vietnam War.
AdmatiARPerryM (1987) Strategic delaying in bargaining. The Review of Economic Studies54(3): 345–364.
2.
AsselinP (2002) A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
3.
Captured Training Document States Viet Cong Current Fighting Objectives. February 8, 1968. Vietnam Country File NSF Box 152 Vietnam, Press Releases on Captured Documents Folder, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJL).
4.
Central Intelligence Agency (1964) The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, Section 3: 1961–1962. CIA Report reference title Polo XIV.
5.
Central Office for South Vietnam February 1 Assessment of the Situation (1968). Vietnam Country File NSF Box 164 Captured Documents, Vol. 11 (2) Folder, LBJL.
6.
Chen Yi fuzongli jiejian yinni zhuhua dashi Sukani tanhua jilu (guanyu yafei huiyi hezhong, yindu bianjie wenti) [Record of discussion, Vice Premier Chen Yi meets with Indonesian ambassador to China (regarding the India boundary question during the Afro-Asia meeting)], Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives, Doc. 105-01789-07, November 17, 1962.
7.
CliffordCHolbrookeR (1991) Counsel to the President: A Memoir. New York: Random House.
8.
CoeAJVaynmanJ (2020) Why arms control is so rare. American Political Science Review114(2): 342–355.
9.
Communist Uprising Plans for 1968. May 1, 1968. Vietnam Country File NSF Box 152 Captured Documents Folder, LBJL, A-1.
10.
CramtonPC (1992) Strategic delay with 2-sided uncertainty. The Review of Economic Studies59(1): 205–225.
11.
Documents Show Viet Cong Plans for 1967–1968 Winter-Spring Campaign. February 13, 1968. Vietnam, Press Releases on Captured Documents, Vietnam Country File NSF Box 152 Extracts from Captured Documents and Copies Folder, LBJL.
12.
FearonJD (1995) Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization49(3): 379–414.
13.
FearonJD (1997) Tying hands versus sinking costs: Signaling foreign policy interests. Journal of Conflict Resolution41(1): 68–90.
FudenbergDTiroleJ (1991) Gamt Theory. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
20.
Goemans HE (2000) War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
21.
GuanAC (2004) Ending the Vietnam War: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective. New York: Routledge Curzon.
22.
HallTYarhi-MiloK (2012) The personal touch: Leaders’ impressions, costly signaling, and assessments of sincerity in international affairs. International Studies Quarterly56(3): 560–573.
23.
HerringGC (1994) LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War. Austin: University of Texas Press.
24.
HerringGC (2002) America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw Hill.
25.
HershbergJG (2012) Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
26.
HolmesM (2013) The force of face-to-face diplomacy: Mirror neurons and the problemof intentions. International Organization67(4): 829–861.
27.
IklèFC (1991) Every War Must End. New York: Columbia University Press.
28.
Intelligence Memorandum, November 1966; FRUS, 1966, Vol. 4, Doc. 292.
29.
INR (Thomas L. Hughes) to Dean Rusk. April 21, 1967. Hanoi’s Attitudes, as Reflected in Recently Captured Documents. Vietnam Country File NSF Box 157 1966 Documents Folder. LBJL, Appendix 5.
30.
January 29 Initiative. April 10, 1968. CDEC #03-2378-68, Bulletin 10. Vietnam Country File NSF Box 164 Captured Documents Vol. 11 (2) Folder. LBJL.
31.
JiangT (2010) Jiedu Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng[Understanding the Korean War]. Beijing: PLA Press.
32.
JosephMF (2021) A little bit of cheap talk is a dangerous thing: States can communicate intentions persuasively and raise the risk of war. The Journal of Politics83(1): 166–181.
33.
KaplowJM (2016) The negotiation calculus: Why parties to civil conflict refuse to talk. International Studies Quarterly60: 38–46.
34.
KennanJWilsonR (1993) Bargaining with private information. Journal of Economic Literature31(1): 45–104.
35.
KertzerJ (2016) Resolve in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
36.
KissingerH (1979) The White House Years. New York: Little Brown.
37.
KraslowDLooryS (1968) The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam. New York: Random House.
38.
LangloisJ-PPLangloisCC (2012) Does the principle of convergence really hold? War, uncertainty and the failure of bargaining. British Journal of Political Science42(3): 511–536.
39.
LangloisCCLangloisJ-PP (2009) Does attrition behavior help explain the duration of interstate wars? A game theoretic and empirical analysis. International Studies Quarterly53(4): 1051–1073.
40.
Le Duan (1986) Letters to the South. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House.
41.
Letter from Director of Central Intelligence Raborn to President Johnson. May 8, 1965. FRUS, January–August 1968, Vol. 6, Doc. 286.
42.
LeventoǧluBTararA (2008) Does private information lead to delay or war in crisis bargaining?International Studies Quarterly52: 533–553.
43.
MastroOS (2019) The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
44.
McNamaraRSBlightJG (1999) Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy. New York: Public Affairs.
45.
Memorandum from Art McCafferty to Walt Rostow November 14, 1967. (a) February 21, 1968. Winter-Spring Campaign. Vietnam Country File NSF Box 164 Captured Documents, Vol. 1 Folder. LBJL.
46.
Memorandum from Art McCafferty to Walt Rostow November 14, 1967. (b) March 5, 1968. Winter-Spring Campaign. Vietnam Country File NSF Box 164 Captured Documents, Vol. 1 Folder. LBJL.
47.
Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson. January 24, 1966. FRUS 1966, Vol. 4, Doc. 36.
48.
MinE (2020) Talking while fighting: Understanding the role of wartime negotiation. International Organization 74(3): 610–632.
49.
PillarPR (1983) Negotiating Peace: War Termination As a Bargaining Process. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
50.
RamsayKW (2011) Cheap talk diplomacy, voluntary negotiations, and variable bargaining power. International Studies Quarterly55(4): 1003–1023.
51.
ReiterD (2009) How Wars Ends. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
52.
Report by Nguyen Duy Trinh to the 13 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam. January 23, 1967. Hanoi: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Party Central Committee. Trans for the Cold War International History Project by Merle Pribbenow.
53.
Saigon to Department of State, Le Duan Letter. March 7, 1967. Vietnam Country File NSF Box 164 Vietnam, Key Communist Documents and Public Pronouncements 1967 (1) Folder. LBJL.
54.
SchellingTC (1957) Bargaining, communication and limited war. Journal of Conflict Resolution1(1): 19–36.
55.
SchellingTC (1966) Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
56.
SechserT (2010) Goliath’s curse: Coercive threats and asymmetric power. International Organization64(4): 627–660.
57.
SlantchevB (2010) Feigning Weakness. International Organization64(3): 357–388.
58.
Sun Shao and Chen Zibin, Ximalayashan de xue: Zhong Yin zhanzheng shilu [Himalayan snow: An account of the China-India War] (Taiyuan, China: Beiyue Wenyi Chubanshe, 1991).
59.
Tab A: General Policy Statements and International Strategy. 1967. Vietnam Country File NSF Box 164 Vietnam, Key Communist Documents and Public Pronouncements 1967 (1) Folder. LBJL.
60.
The Position of North Vietnam on Negotiations. 1967. Vietnam Country File NSF Box 152 Vietnam, Press Releases on Captured Documents Folder. LBJL.
61.
Translation Report. May 7, 1967. Vietnam Country File NSF Box 164 Vietnam, Key Communist documents and Public Pronouncements 1967 (1) Folder. LBJL.
62.
VC/NVA Policy on Peace Negotiation and Outline Plan for General Counter Offensive and General Uprising. August 4, 1967. Vietnam Country File NSF Box 164 Vietnam, Key Communist Documents and Public Pronouncements 1967 (2) Folder, LBJL.
63.
ZhouEVan DongP (1998) September 17, 1970 in 77 Conversations No. 51 ed. Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tungand, and James G. Hershberg. Working Paper 22. Beijing: Cold War International History Project, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACFB39.pdf.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
